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This dissertation aims to critically intervene in twentieth century European philosophical 
thought on technics, the discourse concerning skills, tools, instruments, and machines, as 
well as technology, the scientific meta-discourse on technics, by way of a critical reading 
and conceptualization of the role and meaning of technics for Immanuel Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy. Starting from a critical analysis of Martin Heidegger, Gilbert 
Simondon, and Bernard Stiegler’s thought on technics, I will show how Kant came to 
stand for a philosophy that could not, and, further did not think technics. Against 
Heidegger, Simondon and Stiegler, according to whom Kant was incapable of recognizing 
the technical problematic at the center of his philosophy, I argue that we should read 
Kant’s philosophy as being constitutively shaped by an ongoing, developing concern for 
technics. Following a close reading of Kant’s texts from the Critique of Pure Reason 
(1781) until his very last unfinished manuscript, the Opus Postumum (1796-1803), my 
project works chronologically through Kant’s explicit references to technics (die Technik), 
as I aim to synthesize a concept of technics out of the Kantian text and lay out the role and 
meaning of technics through the various stages of Kant’s thought. I will show that Kant did 
not only ‘know’ something about technics, but that his transcendental philosophy is 
essentially of technics, at once explicitly constituted against, while at the same time relying 
on, being built upon, and proceeding from technics. While the Critique of Pure Reason 
will be shown to be at heart a critique of instrumental reason, which is to be remedied by a 
two-fold critical program, both sides of which already harbor a positive concept of 
technics, it is in the final Opus Postumum that Kant will be seen to articulate the systematic 
place and vital role of technical-practical reason for the system of transcendental 
philosophy. The Opus Postumum charges technical-practical reason with the technical-
practical task of world-building, and thus the cosmo-technical context for both the 
universal laws of science and any particular technical-practical action. Consequently, then, 
while for Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler, Kant came to stand for a philosophy that 
could not think technics, I aim to re-open the larger question concerning the relation 
between philosophy and technics through the restricted discussion of the relation between 
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A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is 
a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of 
familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought, the practices that 
we accept rest.... Criticism is a matter of flushing out that thought and 
trying to change it: to show that things are not as self-evident as we 
believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be 
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Kant and/without technics 
	
In 1936, the German Akademie der Wissenschaften published the first part of the Opus 
Postumum (Nachlasswerk), containing the hitherto unpublished manuscript on which 
Immanuel Kant had worked over the last decade of his life. In Fascicle I, which holds the 
chronologically last pages of the manuscript, Kant sketched out the following chapter 
outline, which bears witness to the systematic importance granted to technical-practical 
reason (technisch-praktische Vernunft) in the Opus Postumum: 
 
Titelblatt u Vorrede 
Die Welt als Universum 
In allen diesen Objecten ein Maximum Idee ergo unicum in allen 3 Fällen 
1. Die theoretisch//speculative 
2. Die technisch practische 
3. Die moralisch practische Vernunft 
 
Aus Anschauungen, Begriffen a priori u Ideen 
Die Idee der Freiheit führt durch den categor. Imperativ auf Gott 
1. die speculative 
2. die practische 
3. die technisch//practische 
4. die moralisch//practische Vernunft in einem System1 
																																																								
1 OP 21:44. 
“Titlesheet and Preface 
The world as universum 
In all these objects, a maximum: idea, ergo unicum in all three cases 
1. theoretical-speculative [reason] 





Evidently, Kant had planned to include technical-practical reason (technisch-praktische 
Vernunft) as part of his final system of transcendental philosophy. At the very end of his 
life, Kant seems to have planned to systematically treat technical-practical reason on a par 
with theoretical, practical, and moral-practical reason, and thus as a vital part of his system 
of transcendental philosophy. Differently to theoretical and pure practical reason, however, 
technical-practical reason had not been subjected to a critique. As a problem of empirical 
philosophy, it had had no need of a preliminary critique. Kant had, of course, written a 
third critique, which was furthermore tasked with the important function of bridging 
theoretical and practical reason. It was, however, not a critique of reason, but instead of the 
power of judgment.  
 
As the chapter outline shows, the Opus Postumum places technical-practical reason in 
between theoretical and practical reason proper, indicating that technical-practical reason 
might have taken over the systematic role of bridging theoretical and practical reason. 
Furthermore, as the German philosopher and editor of the Opus Postumum Gerhard 
Lehmann pointed out, the Opus Postumum contains the outline to what would have been 
Kant’s third critique of reason, this time addressed to reason in its technical-practical use.2 
On a meta-level, then, technical-practical reason not only bridges theoretical and practical 
reason, but furthermore provides the ground to conjoin the two terms in the title of this 
dissertation, as the Opus Postumum holds what can only be understood as a Kantian 
thought on technics.  
 
In his 1954 Die Frage nach der Technik (The Question Concerning Technics), and thus 
almost two centuries after the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, Martin Heidegger 
argued that still the right questions concerning technics had not been asked. Addressing 
both philosophy and culture at large, Heidegger was not the only philosopher who, in the 
years immediately following the devastating events of World War II, problematized a 
fateful oversight and forgetting of technics. In his 1958 On the Mode of Existence of 
																																																																																																																																																																							
From intuitions, a priori concepts, and ideas. 
The idea of freedom leads, through the categorical imperative, to God 
1. speculative [reason] 
2. practical [reason] 
3. technical-practical [reason] 
4. moral-practical reason in one system” 
	
2	Lehmann, G., 1969. Die Technik der Natur. In Beiträge zur Geschichte und Interpretation der Philosophie 
Kants. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., p.289. First published in 1938 in: Forschungen und Fortschritte, 14. 
Jg. Nr. 18, p.212-21.	
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Technical Objects, 3  Gilbert Simondon claimed that technics must be understood as 
philosophy’s aporia, meaning that philosophy is structurally incapable of seeing, let alone 
addressing, technics. Yet further to this, and in a similar vein to Heidegger, Simondon also 
located this problem in culture as a whole, which, he wrote, “has constituted itself as a 
defense system against technics.”4 Following both Heidegger and Simondon, Bernard 
Stiegler had the first installment of his Technics and Time series published in 1994. 
Repeating Heidegger and Simondon’s criticisms a near fifty years later, Stiegler states that 
the history of philosophy must ultimately be understood as the history of the repression of 
technics by philosophy.  
 
According to all three of these thinkers, philosophy’s aporia reaches its clearest expression 
in one of modernity’s most prominent techno-oblivious philosophers, Immanuel Kant. 
According to Heidegger, Kant articulated the essence of modern technics as enframing 
(Gestell) under the name of the Transcendental Analytic without understanding the nature 
of his own insight, while Simondon claimed that technics is the one question that 
transcendental philosophy is incapable of answering, since its answer will either come too 
early (a priori) or too late (a posteriori). Stiegler synthesizes both positions in his claim that 
Kant was incapable of seeing the technical constitution of his own consciousness. What 
becomes clear, then, is that all three thinkers argue, in their own way, that Kant was 
essentially incapable of seeing, understanding, let alone thinking, technics.  
 
This situation is underlined by the striking absence of references or discussions of Kant’s 
explicit writing on technics, as if he had had nothing to say on the subject. To say with 
Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler that Kant does not speak of technics means that, 
ultimately, Kant does not have a future beyond the status of the symptom granted to him, 
because philosophy’s task in the present conjunction, these three thinkers claim, has 
become to think technics. According to these three self-proclaimed thinkers of technics, 
technics is thus philosophy’s symptom, and Kant’s transcendental philosophy has become 
the symptom of a philosophy that could not think technics. Thus, what in the first 
paragraph initially appeared as an easy conjunction, innocently inquiring into the relation 
between Kant and technics, is forcefully undercut by the history of philosophy as told by 
Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler. Rather than going by the name of Kant and technics, 
should the title of this dissertation then rather read Kant without technics? 
																																																								
3 Simondon, G., 2017. On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects. Translated into English by C. 
Malaspina, J. Rogove. Univocal.	
4 Ibid., p.15. 
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The Problem and the Promise 
 
At the center of this dissertation lies an essentially two-fold problematic. In what follows, I 
will argue against Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler that there is indeed an explicit 
concept of technics at work in Kant’s philosophy. As the following discussion will show, 
this concept is not a technics that was overlooked by Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler, 
but it is rather the case that transcendental philosophy must be understood as of technics. 
As a philosophy of technics, transcendental philosophy does not topically engage with 
technics as a possible object of inquiry amongst others. What I will show is that 
transcendental philosophy is at once explicitly constituted against, while at the same time 
relying on, being built upon, and proceeding from, technics. The aim of my thesis is to 
show that the conjunction “and,” correlating the two terms in the title of this discussion, is 
subject to development over time, as its meaning changes together with the trajectory of 
Kant’s thought from the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) to the Opus Postumum (1796-
1803).  
 
On the other hand, however, and in asking about the relation between Kant and technics, 
this dissertation also enquires into the wider relation between philosophy and technics. 
Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler all claim that philosophy has a problematic relation to 
technics, in the sense that it is structurally incapable of seeing, recognizing, or 
remembering its own, essentially technical, constitution. Each in their own way can be 
seen to put forward their respective thought on technics in contradistinction to philosophy 
through the act of questioning (Heidegger), problematizing (Simondon), or remembering, 
in the sense of inventing, technical thought anew (Stiegler). Their conceptual arguments 
are supported and warranted by their reading of the history of philosophy as the history of 
philosophy’s  technical oblivion. The methodological challenge faced by each of the three 
thinkers is great, since they must all, in one way or another, be able to ask, problematize, 
or remember the hitherto structurally impossible. While the singularity of their own 
position, both epistemologically and methodologically, is a problem that each of them 
must address, the methodological role played by the history of philosophy is clear. 
Philosophy must harbor the resources for thinking or remembering technics, but only ever 
implicitly.  
 
The account of the history of technical thought told by Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler 
is thus narrow and simple. In broad strokes, they all put forward a quasi-universal concept 
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of technics, geographically and politically undifferentiated while being historically 
differentiated into the first, pre-industrial, artisanal techne, followed by the second, 
industrial, modern technics. However, if there is indeed such a thing as a Kantian thought 
on technics, and if that technical thought falls outside what has here been presented as the 
simple two-form schema, then Kant can no longer play the role of philosophy’s most 
prominent techno-oblivious thinker, and the question of the relation between philosophy 
and technics as a whole will need to be re-opened; the history of philosophy will need to be 
reinvestigated from the point of view of possible other technics, as there might be, despite 
Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler’s inability to see them, explicit philosophical resources 
for thinking technics in the history of philosophy. At stake in the restricted question about 
the relation between Kant and technics is thus ultimately the relationship between 
philosophy and technics as a whole.  
 
The promise of the opening encounter with Kant’s projected chapter outline in the Opus 
Postumum is that there is indeed a positive and explicit notion of technics at play in Kant’s 
thinking. As I will argue, this notion is at once developed out of the specifically German 
context surrounding Kant, responding to the medieval scholastic German notion of 
Technologie as well as to Johann Beckmann’s newly founded science of Technologie, and 
at the same time engaged with the Aristotelian notion of techne. Furthermore, however, 
Kant’s notion also harbors resources for thinking technics from a higher standpoint, as 
technical-practical reason systematically charges itself with the technical-practical task of 
world-building. Technical-practical reason would thus have the role of forming the cosmo-
technical context from which specific notions of technics can then, in a second step, derive 




This dissertation is organized according to four chapters. The first chapter will set the 
scene by laying out in more detail the field and history of technical thought according to 
Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler. The problem addressed by this chapter is that of 
shining a light on the details of the paradoxical role occupied by Kant and transcendental 
philosophy within both the field of technical thought and its history, as presented in 
Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler’s respective projects. In this regard, each thinker will 
be discussed first on their own concerning their technical thinking, secondly via their 
reading of the history of philosophy, and finally through Kant’s role within both their 
thinking and their projected history of technical thought.  
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In Chapter 2 I will leave behind Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler’s writings in order to 
begin the task of reading Kant on his own terms. At a first glance, Kant’s world of 
universal and necessary forms of thought – the transcendental – surely seems removed 
from the world of technics, with its problems of technical production and instrumentality, 
as thematized in Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler. From a methodological perspective, 
however, I will argue that technics is the implicit problem that Kant ascribes to reason, 
warranting the Critique of Pure Reason as a whole. According to Kant, reason is addicted 
to speculative expansion by means of the instrument of logic. The explicit aim of the 
Critique of Pure Reason is thus to counteract reason’s instrumental transgressions by way 
of a two-fold critical program. Firstly, Kant will venture to restrict what theoretical reason 
wants, drives, or strives to know to what it “can” know, meaning that reason’s ends and 
questions are to be set in relation to its own proper powers, its faculties and forces under 
the name of a canon. Following the canon laid out in the Transcendental Doctrine of 
Elements, the subsequent Transcendental Doctrine of Method continues by asking what 
reason can do with these materials. I will show that, according to Kant’s lexicon, questions 
of method constitute the properly speaking “technical” part of logic. Following the work of 
German Linguist Wilfried Seibicke, I will show that Kant employed the term technics (die 
Technik) in line with the medieval scholastic notion of Technologie, which he shortened to 
die Technik, in order to refer to methodological problems of terminology and the 
systematization of terms. At the same time, however, the technical doctrine of logic will 
also take recourse to a second genealogy of technics, under the name of a discipline of 
reason. Only after reason has been disciplined and its skill and talent (its techne) has been 
worked upon will reason want what it can have, as its ends will now have been set in 
accordance with what it can do.  
 
While Kant’s explicit discussion of technics takes place in regards to method, Chapter 2 
will also show that both Heidegger and Stiegler’s symptomatic readings of technics in 
Kant consider the Transcendental Analytic, and thus the canon, as the place of Kant’s 
implicit technics. I will furthermore show that Heidegger and Stiegler were not the first to 
have read the canon put forward by Kant as containing a technical problematic. In a 
scholarly discussion between Kant and his contemporary J.G. Schlosser,5 Kant was already 
accused of having reduced cognition to “a mere form-giving manufacture [Formgebungs-
																																																								
5 This was first brought to my attention by Catherine Malabou’s in Before Tomorrow: Epigenesis and 
Rationality. Translated into English by Shread, C. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016. p.6. 
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Manufactur].”6 Despite Kant’s dismissal of the critique, I will show that Kant insists on the 
distinction between the operations (Handgriff, grasping by hand) performed by the power 
of judgment in schematization and concepts (Begriff) of the understanding precisely in 
order to avoid the aporia of judgment, namely the infinite need for ever further rules to 
legislate the application of rules. Consequently, schematization will turn out to be quite 
literally a manufacture, and thus dependent on a hidden art (eine verborgene Kunst), with 
art here referring to a general notion of techne, designating the general skill (Können) and 
capacity of grasping by hand. Thus while initially put forward by Kant as a remedy to 
reason’s instrumentality, the canon will be shown to rely on an art, and thus on technics in 
the general sense. 
 
Chapter 2 will reveal the surprisingly central place occupied by instrumentality and 
technics in Kant’s critical project. When it comes to Kant’s explicit engagement with the 
concept, however, technics (die Technik) is only mentioned a total of six times throughout 
the Critique of Pure Reason. It is thus all the more remarkable that, in all its grammatical 
forms, the term technics was mentioned a near five hundred times in the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment, published a mere nine years after the first edition of the Critique of 
Pure Reason. Chapter 3 will argue that the Critique of the Power of Judgment picks up 
precisely where Kant had left off in the Critique of Pure Reason when he called 
schematization a hidden art.  
 
To the end of securing the relation between concepts and intuitions on the level of the 
faculties, Kant develops the idea of a technics of nature (Technik der Natur), a Kantian 
neologism without precedent in the history of philosophy. The idea of technics of nature is 
to secure and explain how the understanding, with its universal laws, can find itself in 
nature in its actuality and not just in its possibility. But since, properly speaking, we can 
only judge nature technically in a reflective judgment, and thus with a hypothetical 
restriction, that which is properly speaking technical will in the end be shown to be our 
very own power of judgment. Paradoxically, then, the Critique of the Power of Judgment 
harbors the following predicament. On the one hand, Kant employs the terms technics in 
its substantive (Technik der Natur, Technica speciosa, Technicism) and adjectival 
(technisch) forms a near five hundred times throughout the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment, indicating that technics most certainly occupies a central and explicit place 
within the Critique of the Power of Judgment. On the other hand, and despite calling nature 
																																																								
6 J.G. Schlosser, Plato’s Briefe nebst einer historischen Einleitung und Anmerkungen. Footnote to p.182.	
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in its actuality technical hundreds of times throughout the print edition of the Critique of 
the Power of Judgment, for Kant it is ultimately not nature that is technical, but our own 
power of judgment. But while the unpublished first introduction to the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment identifies the power of judgment as the properly technical instance that 
allows us to judge nature technically, the final version of the book omits any reference to a 
technical power of judgment. And as if that was not enough, Kant twice further insists that 
the sphere of purposiveness that is not legislated by the categorical imperative should 
actually be called technical, seemingly forgetting that he had always already called it so. 
Thus, what is properly speaking not technical is called technical, while that which is 
properly speaking technical is not. And what has always already been called technical is 
insisted upon, again and again, as that which should properly be called technical.  
 
Had Kant’s philosophical and authorial task ended with the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment, one might be inclined to agree with Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler, even if 
for different reasons, that Kant’s relation to technics was indeed uneasy, as it occupied 
what can only be understood as an important yet difficult role within the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment, oscillating in and out of sight, at once appearing from and then 
receding into the background. Kant, however, continued to write until shortly before his 
death in 1804. And it is precisely in his last piece of writing that Kant re-evaluates his 
preceding engagement with and understanding of technics. The Opus Postumum, I argue, 
contains Kant’s mature systematic reflections regarding the place and role of technics, and 
specifically technical-practical reason, in the system of transcendental philosophy. The 
most important change in this regard is that, while the idea of a technics of nature was 
presented by Kant as a necessary regulative supplement for science and thus theoretical 
philosophy, the Opus Postumum will move to place the entire sphere of theoretical 
philosophy under the jurisdiction of technical-practical reason. Furthermore, technical-
practical reason is systematically treated in the last two Fascicles of the Opus Postumum, 
and thus within and following from the context of Kant’s renewed engagement with self-
positing, that is, the two-fold act by which the subject makes itself into an object of 
experience. While the first act concerns the merely logical act of constituting oneself as an 
object of thought, I will show that that the second, subsequent act of self-positing, by 
which the subject posits itself as an object in time and space, is ultimately the 
responsibility of technical-practical reason.  
 
Contra Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler, this dissertation thus proposes to articulate the 
longstanding and systematic engagement with technics at the heart of Kant’s philosophical 
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project. Already the Critique of Pure Reason must be recognized as orienting itself against 
reason’s technics of instrumentality, as it considers all philosophy prior to its own critical 
intervention as part of the history of instrumental reason. At the same time, however, and 
as the discussions of schematization and the discipline of reason will show, the Critique of 
Pure Reason already relied on a positive technics determined in opposition to reason’s 
pathological instrumentality. This other technics will then be further developed, if only 
tentatively, in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, before fully stepping into the light in 
Kant’s final, unfinished piece of writing, the Opus Postumum. What this trajectory from 
the three Critiques to the Opus Postumum shows is that Kant’s transcendental philosophy 
has always already been of technics, at once explicitly constituted against and by it, a fact 
that Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler failed to recognize. In the following, then, a 
surprising image of Kant will step to the fore, as Kant will be shown to have engaged in 
several simultaneous technical discussions, the importance of which will finally find itself 
reflected, as sketched in the Opus Postumum, in the outline of the system of transcendental 
philosophy: a system which at once grants technical-practical reason a systematic place, 












CHAPTER 1. TECHNICS, PERIODIZATION, AND THE 
ECLIPSE OF KANT IN THE TECHNCIAL THOUGHT OF 






The twentieth century was witness to an upsurge of European philosophical thought on 
technics, addressing both the domains of skills and tools, instruments and machines, as 
well as technology, the scientific meta-discourse on technics. Among a whole array of 
perspectives, Martin Heidegger, Gilbert Simondon and Bernard Stiegler stand out as three 
of the most lucid and fruitful contributors. A closer look into their projects reveals that 
each, in their own way, had a multifaceted, yet uneasy, relation to Kantian philosophy. In 
one way or another, Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler each put forward a symptomatic 
reading of Kant, arguing that he articulated the problem of modern technics without self-
reflexively understanding the nature of his own insight. Consequently Kant is given a 
prominent place in their projects while, at the same time, read as being incapable of 
recognizing the true nature of technics. The reason for this structural incapacity to think 
technics on Kant’s part is said to be internal to the constitution of transcendental 
philosophy, leading each of these three thinkers to the conclusion, again and again, that 
when it comes to addressing the question and problem of technics, there is no future for 
Kant.  
 
The aim of the following chapter is specific and limited. Before diving into Kant’s own 
texts from Chapter 2 onwards in order to decide for ourselves how Kant thought or failed 
to think technics, the present chapter proposes three consecutive introductions of Martin 
Heidegger, Gilbert Simondon, and Bernard Stiegler’s technical thought. Each of these 
accounts will be discussed according to three main points. Each thinker will first be 
discussed on their own according to their technical thinking, secondly via their reading of 
the history of philosophy, and finally through Kant’s role within both their thinking and 




CHAPTER 1.1 Heidegger and the question of technics 
 
Martin Heidegger published his seminal essay The Question Concerning Technics (Die 
Frage nach der Technik) in 1954.7 Providing the German pole to the techno-optimistic 
parallel discourse emerging in France (involving the anthropologist André Leroi-Gourhan, 
Simondon, Jacques Derrida and others), Heidegger’s elaborations appear to be more 
pessimistic in nature. Technics, he writes, “sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to 
reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as a standing reserve. Enframing means that way 
of revealing which holds sway in the essence of modern [technics] and which is itself 
nothing [technical].”8 With these famous words, Heidegger articulated the threat posed by 
modern technics for Dasein. This threat is said to be the consequence of the curiously un-
technical essence of technics, with Heidegger here indicating that this will not be a 
discourse on machines and tools: for Heidegger, if one remains within a so-called 
“technical” discourse on technics, primarily concerned with the concrete technical object, 
“we remain unfree and chained to [technics], whether we passionately affirm or deny it.”9 
This, Heidegger claims, is due to the relata that are put into relation within the technical 
discourse on technics – on the one hand, the concrete technical object, and on the other, the 
human. In order to bring forth a free relation to technics, it is necessary to shift the 
discussion from the concrete technical object in its relation to the human to that of the 
essence of technics in its relation to Dasein.  
 
While the nature of such a free relation remains yet to be determined, one can nonetheless 
already begin to qualify Heidegger’s apparent techno-pessimism. It appears that Heidegger 
can neither be said to position himself “against” technics, not even in its modern guise, nor 
does he seem to want to “free” Dasein from technics. In his posthumously published notes 
on technics, entitled Techne und Technik, he holds that his “Denken ist nicht gegen >die 
																																																								
7 The essay The Question Concerning Technics is derived from material that Heidegger first presented at his 
1949 Bremen lecture entitled Das Gestell. The title is usually translated as The Question Concerning 
Technology, but in order to uphold the conceptual distinction between the German terms Technik and 
Technologie, which was fully in place at the time of Heidegger’s essay, I will henceforth translate the 
German Technik with the English neologism technics, which is also employed in English translations of 
Bernard Stiegler’s and Gilbert Simondon’s works. 
8 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, p.20.  
9 Martin Heidegger, Die Frage nach der Technik, p.4. 
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Technik< […], sondern gegen die Oberflächlichkeit und Ahnungslosigkeit, mit der die 
Technik betrachtet wird.”10 In another set of notes, Heidegger further writes:  
Die Technik ablehnen? 
 Ist um nichts weniger töricht als die Sonne ablehnen. 
 Was soll diese Ablehnung? – eine Selbsttäuschung!”11 
 
Heidegger’s position thus is not directed against technics, nor does it aim to free Dasein 
from technics. Instead, his relation to technics seems to be two-fold. On the one hand, by 
mentioning the sun and technics together, Heidegger considers technics to be a quasi-
natural and therefore necessary element of our contemporary world that it would be foolish 
to try to reject. At the same time, however, and despite the fact that technics is everywhere 
and in everyone’s mouths and minds, it is subject to the general thoughtlessness that 
Heidegger diagnoses in the historical moment at large. Heidegger’s point, then, is that the 
right questions concerning technics have not been asked yet. “Die Frage nach der Technik. 
Der Ton liegt auf der Frage. Sie zu entfalten ist vor allem nötig. Die Frage auszuhalten. 
Bedrängender als die Technik selbst ist die Frage nach ihr.”12 Thus, in as much as it would 
be a self-deception to try to reject technics itself, Heidegger’s position should also not be 
understood as rejecting the current discourses on technics tout court. Differentiating 
between the right and the true, in the sense that the right makes accurate observations 
without, however, revealing inner truth,13 Heidegger’s aim is to search in and through what 
is right in order to arrive at the true. Heidegger thus begins his inquiry into the inner truth 
of technics by working through two common approaches to technics, namely the 
instrumental approach and the anthropological approach. According to both approaches, 
technics is a means (an instrument) for the human to bring about an end, and thus an 
essentially anthropological characteristic. And indeed, who could doubt that the human 
employs technical tools as a means for its ends? 
 
From techne to technics 
 
																																																								
10 Martin Heidegger, GA Band 76, Vorstudien zum Technik-Vortrag, p.347. “My thinking is not against 
technics […] but against the superficiality and naivety with which we consider technics.” 
11 Heidegger, GA Band 76, Wie läßt die Technik die Differenz (Ereignis) gewahr, p.373:  
“To reject technics?  
Is no less foolish than rejecting the sun. 
What is this rejection? – A self-deception!” 
12 Heidegger, GA Band 76, Vorstudien zum Technik-Vortrag, p.358. “The question concerning technics. The 
tone lies on the question. It is necessary to develop it above all. To endure the question. The question is more 
pressing than technics itself.” 
13 Heidegger, Die Frage nach der Technik, p.9. 
	 19	
Heidegger discusses the anthropological and instrumental discourses on technics in 
reference to Aristotle, who had famously determined the ancient Greek notion of techne in 
a twofold manner. On the one hand, Aristotle placed techne in relation to nature (physis), 
and thus within an ontological discussion of technical bringing forth (poiesis). On the other 
hand, techne was also discussed in contradistinction to the systematic and unchanging 
Greek notion of science (episteme), its epistemological counterpart. Heidegger’s reading of 
the Aristotelian text proposes that what is at stake in both of these relations is in fact 
revealing (entbergen, aletheia), meaning that in both relations techne is a specific mode of 
revealing. Technical bringing forth (poiesis) reveals things which cannot come into 
appearance by themselves, in as much as any technical form of knowledge is nothing but a 
way of opening up, and thus a mode of revealing once again.14 Starting from the 
instrumental and anthropological definitions of technics as instrument and means for 
human ends, Heidegger thus arrives at revealing as the inner truth of techne. But can 
revealing be said to remain the key to understanding technics in its modern guise as well? 
 
In the posthumously published collection of notes entitled Techne und Technik, 15 
Heidegger explicitly deals with the relation between the ancient techne and the modern 
Technik. Here, Heidegger writes that the machine (die Kraftmaschine) is precisely not the 
“Nachahmung der Handarbeit und des Naturvorganges.”16 The machine, he writes, has a 
“motorischen Charakter der wesentlich auf Krafterzeugung bezogen ist,”17 meaning that it 
generates Kraft and thus energy rather than force, since it is thermodynamic in character. 
While the above section from Techne und Technik was already drafted around the year 
1940, the same argument will be employed in the later The Question Concerning Technics. 
Modern technics is here primarily characterized as a demand directed at nature “to supply 
energy that can be extracted and stored as such.”18 In its essential demand of generating 
and storing energy, modern technics is thus fundamentally distinguished from its pre-
modern instantiation. At the same time, however, Heidegger claims that modern technics 
remains a mode of revealing (entbergen) nonetheless, retaining a direct relation to the 
ancient form of techne. But rather than revealing as a mode of bringing forth (poiesis) or 
technical knowledge, modern technics reveals as a mode of challenging (herausfordern).19  
 
																																																								
14 Ibid., p.13-14. 
15 Heidegger, GA Band 76, Techne und Technik. The cover of the first Fascicle containing the manuscript is 
entitled Technik 1940. See p.401. 
16 Ibid., p.309. “… imitation of handicraft and the natural process.” 
17 Ibid., p.308. “… motoric character which is essentially related to the generation of force.” 
18 Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technics, p.14. 
19 Heidegger, Die Frage nach der Technik, p.15. 
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Heidegger’s argument is as follows. Modern technics remains a mode of revealing because 
it challenges the real to reveal itself as something specific, which he calls standing reserve 
(Bestand). What this means is that through modern technics the real no longer comes into 
view as an object (Gegenstand), but as a standing reserve (Bestand). The modern world, he 
claims, can only come into view by being put in reserve, subjected to acts of “unlocking, 
transforming, storing, distributing and switching.”20 As a standing reserve the real no 
longer stands against us the same way that an object (Gegenstand) does, but instead has 
been “ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it 
may be on call for a further ordering.”21 Heidegger’s point, then, is that thinking an 
airplane, for example, with the concept of object (Gegenstand) is certainly right. But it 
fails to be true, in the sense that one misrecognizes both what and how the airplane “is,” in 
the sense of exists. The name standing reserve (Bestand) thus “designates nothing less than 
the way in which everything presences that is wrought upon by the challenging 
revealing.”22 The mode of existence of that which has been challenged and revealed by 
modern technics is subsequently no longer objective, but a standing reserve (Bestand). 
 
When it comes to the difference between ancient and modern technics, there is a second 
important difference that Heidegger points out. Complementing the relation between, or 
rather the move from, object (Gegenstand) to standing reserve (Bestand), Heidegger 
situates the conceptual relation between mind (Gemüt) and enframing (Gestell). The 
Gemüt, Heidegger writes, is “that original gathering from which unfold the ways in which 
we have feelings of one kind or another.”23 Enframing (Gestell) is equally said to have a 
gathering or assembling function. But rather than assembling our faculties in relation to a 
world of objects (Gegenstände), enframing (Gestell) challenges the human to reveal the 
real as a standing reserve (Bestand). According to Heidegger it is this call to enframing 
that is the curiously un-technical essence of modern technics: “Enframing means that way 
of revealing which holds sway in the essence of modern [technics] and which is itself 
nothing [technical].”24 It is nothing technical because, in the way that the essence of a tree 
is not simply another tree and thus cannot be found in a forest, the essence of modern 
technics not just another technical object neither.25 Enframing (Gestell), as the essence of 
																																																								
20 Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technics, p.16. 
21 Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, p.17.  
22 ibid., p.17. 
23 ibid., p.19 
24 ibid., p.20. 
25 Heidegger, Die Frage nach der Technik, p.7. 
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technics, thus cannot be found amongst technical objects, nor adequately addressed from 
within a technical discourse on technics. 
 
The second term: the human 
 
The preceding section has provided a first, initial discussion of Heidegger’s thinking of 
technics. But in order to round off the preceding discussion, and before moving onto 
Heidegger’s account of the history of technical thought, technics needs to be positioned in 
relation to the human. In claiming that enframing (Gestell) sets upon or challenges the 
human to reveal the real as a standing reserve (Bestand), the human as the second relata of 
the technical relation has been called into question. Heidegger’s posthumously published 
collection of notes on technics includes the following remarkable passage on this point. 
“Das Wesen der Technik ist nichts Menschliches, aber die Technik gehört zum Menschen, 
weil der Mensch in das Wesen der Technik gehört. Je nach der Wesensgestalt der Technik 
[…] ist die Zugehörigkeit des Menschen in das Wesen verschieden und demgemäß die Art 
seines technischen Tuns anders.”26 While the essence of technics is here explicitly said to 
be neither technical nor human, the human is at the same time said to “belong” to the 
essence of technics in different, that is, changing, ways. Heidegger’s point is that there is 
no immediate (un-mediated) relation between such a thing as “the human” and technics.27 
Depending on the specific (historical) form of the essence of technics, the human is called 
upon differently, and consequently partakes in the essence of technics in different ways.  
 
This very point was already made by Ernst Jünger in his 1932 essay The Worker (Der 
Arbeiter), where he claimed that “man [sic] is bound up with [technics] not directly, but 
indirectly.”28 For Jünger, the relation between the human and modern technics is mediated 
by a metaphysical Gestalt (figure), which he named the worker. Technics is then the mode 
in which this Gestalt of the worker mobilizes the world.29 Heidegger engaged with 
Jünger’s writing throughout his life, and was particularly fond of The Worker. Band 90 of 
the Heidegger Gesamtausgabe contains the posthumously published collection of 
Heidegger’s notes on Jünger, where we find an important passage from 1954, the same 
																																																								
26 Heidegger, GA Band 76, Vorstudien zum Technik-Vortrag, p.339. “The essence of technics is nothing 
human, but technics belongs to the human because the human belongs to the essence of technics. Depending 
on the essential form [Wesensgestalt] of technics, the affiliation of the human to the essence of technics is 
different and, accordingly, the nature of his [sic] technical doing is different.” 
27 Heidegger, GA Band 90, Gestalt, p.287. 
28 Ernst Jünger, 2017. The Worker: Dominion and Form. Translated into English by B. Costea and L. P. 
Hemming. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, p.97. 
29 Jünger, Der Arbeiter. p.77. 
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year that The Question Concerning Technics was published. Here, Jünger’s claim about the 
mediated relation between the human and technics is explicitly discussed in 
contradistinction to a conference paper and essay written by the quantum physicist Werner 
Heisenberg, who claimed that “der Satz, daß der Mensch nur noch sich selbst 
gegenüberstehe, gilt aber im Zeitalter der Technik noch in einem viel weiteren Sinne.”30  
 
In reference to Heisenberg, Heidegger asks “wer ist der Mensch – der sich da selbst 
begegnet?” A few lines further down he continues by asking “Der Mensch ob so etwas 
überhaupt möglich? Und wenn für möglich gehalten – ob nicht in dieser Meinung die 
größte Verblendung.”31 On the Question Concerning Technics explicitly references the 
same sentence from Heisenberg, but Heidegger’s own answer omits Jünger’s name. 
Heidegger’s claim is that when called upon by enframing (Gestell) to reveal the real as a 
standing reserve, the human is itself threatened with disappearing into the standing reserve 
(Bestand). And once faced with this threat, “man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts 
himself to the posture of lord of the earth. In this way the impression comes to prevail that 
everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise 
in turn to one final delusion: It seems as though man everywhere and always encounters 
only himself.”32  
 
Heidegger’s point here is that it only seems as if modern technics has made the world into 
the mirror-image of “the human.” But in fact, the human is called upon by enframing 
(Gestell) in a specific way, which Jünger called the Gestalt of the worker and which 
Heidegger can here be seen to call the Gestalt of the lord of this earth (Gestalt des Herrn 
der Erde). Being mediated in its relation to the world by such a Gestalt means that the 
human can no longer reflect itself anywhere in its inner being, meaning that it is essentially 
endangered by modern technics in its truthful relation both to itself as Dasein as well as to 
everything else that exists.33 Everywhere we look, we find ourselves reflected back in the 
Gestalt of the worker as the lord of this earth. This is the case, Heidegger explains, 
because, while modern technics is indeed a mode of revealing, it at the same time covers or 
veils. It covers not only the past mode of revealing as bringing forth (poiesis), from which 
																																																								
30 Werner Heisenberg, “Das Naturbild der heutigen Physik.” In Die Künste im technischen Zeitalter. 1956, 
S.42. “The proposition that the human only faces itself is valid in a much broader sense in the age of 
technics.” 
31 Heidegger, GA Band 90. Gestalt – notes to a letter to Ernst Jünger, p.297. “who is this man – that meets 
himself,” and a few lines later continuing “man, whether such a thing is possible at all? And if thought 
possible – if not in this opinion the greatest delusion.” 
32 Heidegger, The Question Converning Technology,  p.27.  
33 Heidegger, Die Frage nach der Technik, p.28. 
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it itself originated, but it furthermore covers revealing as such, “wherein unconcealment, 
i.e., truth, comes to pass.” 34  This predicament, which Heidegger also calls 
Seinsvergessenheit and, in its aggravated form, Seinsverlassenheit, is diagnosed by 
Heidegger as the central problem of metaphysics ever since ancient Greece.35  
 
Heidegger and the history of technical thought 
 
Band 90 of the Heidegger Gesamtausgabe shows that Heidegger engaged with Ernst 
Jünger’s writing from as early as 1932, and continued to do so until the end of his life.36 
With both thinkers living through the far reaching technological change imparted on the 
world by the industrialized slaughter of the First and Second World Wars, including 
nuclear warfare, and the emergence of Fordism and the production line, Heidegger saw 
Jünger as someone who experienced these large-scale technological developments on the 
front line, and was able to articulate their inner truth. Heidegger argued that Jünger 
experienced his life as an active soldier during the abysmal First World War essentially 
through the fundamental insight that was first carved out by Nietzsche’s metaphysics.37 
Jünger, he writes, “faßt in der Wirklichkeit Fuß, die Nietzsche denkerisch erlitten hat.”38  
 
However Heidegger does not see in Jünger “only” a soldier who lived and suffered the 
material reality of what Nietzsche had anticipated in thought, but also someone who then, 
in a second step, was able to find “die Stärke und Entschiedenheit der Besinnung und des 
Wortes.”39 As such for Heidegger Jünger is at once a highly decorated soldier during the 
Materialschlacht (battle of matériel) that was the First World War and a literary genius 
who was able to give word to the “geschichtlichen Grunde des Wesens des vollendeten 
Zeitalters der Neuzeit.”40 Jünger’s writing, and in particular his essay The Worker (Der 
Arbeiter), is thus read by Heidegger as the key to reflecting on the historical present in its 
																																																								
34 Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, p.27. 
35 See Heidegger, GA Band 9. p. 339. 
36 Heidegger, GA, IV.: Hinweise und Aufzeichnungen, Band 90, Zu Ernst Jünger. Vittorio Klostermann. See 
Martin Heidegger, 1983. Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität. Das Rektorat 1933/34, p.24. 
37 Heidegger, GA, IV.: Hinweise und Aufzeichnungen, Band 90, Zu Ernst Jünger, p.217. Also see p.218: 
“Jünger hatte nicht das Buch mit dem Titel >>Nietzsche, Der Wille zur macht << im Tornister – sondern er 
wurde von Feuer und Blut, von Tod und der Arbeit, vom Schweigen und Donnern der Materialschlacht als 
Erscheinungen des Willens zur Macht betroffen.” “Jünger did not only carry the book Nietzsche, The Will to 
Power in his knapsack  - but he was affected by the fire and blood, by death and work, by the silence and 
thunder of the battle of materiel as appearances of the will to power.” 
38 Heidegger, GA Band 90, p.214. “… gained a foothold in the reality that Nietzsche has suffered in 
thought.” 
39 Ibid., p.218. “… the strength and determination of reflection and word.” 
40 Heidegger, GA Band 90, p.37. “… the historical ground of the essence of the completed age of 
modernity.” 
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most inner truth. But how is one to understand Heidegger’s claim that Jünger articulated 
the “completed epoch” of modernity when Jünger himself explicitly aimed to bring a new 
reality into view, which he believed to have just begun, and which he discussed under the 
name of the worker, total mobilization, and will to power (Wille zur Macht)?  
 
Despite the explicit aim and content of Jünger’s The Worker, which tries to articulate the 
beginning of a new kind of power (the worker), as well as an epoch (determined by work), 
which was to destroy bourgeois society, Heidegger claims that Jünger did not articulate the 
beginning of anything new, but that his contribution was rather the astute and lucid 
articulation of the completion of the modern epoch.41 For Heidegger, his time was not at all 
the beginning of anything new, least of all a new epoch. Instead, he understood his time to 
be the fulfillment of a process that had long been underway and that should now, finally, 
come to a close under the name of modern technics. Thus while for Jünger his time was the 
beginning of a new millennium and epoch, Heidegger believes Jünger, with his The 
Worker, to have articulated the conclusion and end of the modern epoch. According to 
Heidegger, Jünger thus greatly misinterpreted the temporal nature of his insight. There is 
then an important question that needs to be addressed. How does Heidegger characterize 
the modern period, and what role do both Jünger and modern technics play within it?  
 
In the previous sections The Question Concerning Technics was seen to differentiate pre-
modern techne from modern technics (Technik) by a two-fold move from object to 
standing reserve (Bestand) and from mind (Gemüt) to enframing (Gestell). We thus already 
know something about the specificity of Heidegger’s conception of modern technics vis à 
vis its pre-modern instantiation. At no point, however, have we determined how exactly 
this transition from the pre-modern to the modern supposedly occurred. In order to engage 
with Heidegger’s periodization claims, it is important to keep in mind that he differentiates 
between the chronologically right and the historically true.42 Thus, when considered 
chronologically, the emergence of modern technics post-dates the emergence of modern 
natural science, because modern technics is dependent on the exact natural sciences for its 
functioning.43 Subsequently, modern technics is said to have emerged two centuries after 
the advent of modern science, with the invention of the modern machine (Kraftmaschine), 
and thus around the year 1750. This chronological history of how the emergence of 
																																																								
41 Ibid., p.37. 
42 Heidegger, Die Frage nach der Technik, p.23. 
43 Ibid. 
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modern science is followed by modern technics is most certainly right. There is plenty of 
material evidence in the form of concrete technical objects to support it. But is it also true?  
 
Heidegger’s critique of the chronological periodization of the advent of modern technics 
hinges, once again, on the difference and overlap between the concrete technical object and 
the essence of technics. While the modern machine, meaning the concrete modern 
technical object, most certainly matters, it is necessary to keep in mind that it is the 
phenomenal manifestation of the essence of modern technics. And this very essence, 
Heidegger claims, already “holds sway” in physics. “Modern physics is the herald of 
Enframing, a herald whose origin is still unknown.”44 The essence of modern technics is 
thus, according to Heidegger, already “active,” so to speak, in the modern exact sciences, 
which emerged during the seventeenth century, before coming into the open with the 
modern machine. What this means, then, is that what chronologically appears as later (that 
is, modern technics), in truth, when considered historically and in terms of its inner 
essence, predates modern science.  
 
Because the essence of modern technology lies in Enframing, modern technology must 
employ exact physical science. Through its so doing, the deceptive illusion arises that 
modern technology is applied physical science. This illusion can maintain itself only so 
long as neither the essential origin of modern science nor indeed the essence of modern 
technology is adequately found out through questioning.45  
 
Heidegger thus claims that the essence of modern technics, Gestell, first emerged during 
the seventeenth century with modern physics, after which, two centuries later, the concrete 
technical object emerged, by way of modern natural science, in the form of the modern 
machine (Kraftmaschine). 
 
In his posthumously published notes on technics, Heidegger further qualifies the relation 
between modern technics and modern science. They are both said to derive from the same 
metaphysical root (dieselbe metaphysische Wurzel). 46  Consequently, discussions 
concerning the priority or dependence of technics on science are futile and nonsensical, 
since they both derive from metaphysics.47 At the same time, there is an asymmetry 
																																																								
44 Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, p.22. 
45 Ibid., p.23 
46 Heidegger, GA Band 76: Leitgedanken zur Entstehung der Metaphysik, der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft und 
der modernen Technik, p.299 
47 Ibid., p.310. 
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between metaphysics’ two descendants, since modern technics does not only derive from 
metaphysics, but is furthermore “die eigentliche Vollendung der >Metaphysik<.”48 In its 
last stage, metaphysics is thus said to determine itself as technics.49 Subsequently, and 
when considered from the historical rather than the chronological point of view, the 
question concerning technics turns out to be nothing but the question concerning 
metaphysics, as technics becomes that which must be asked about the “Wahrheit, in der 
das Seiende steht (dieses Stehen als Seynsgeschick selbst) und nach dem Seyn, das das 
Seiende in solche Wahrheit losgelassen hat.”50 What this means for our purpose here, then, 
is that our inquiry into Heidegger’s account of the history of technical thought demands an 
inquiry into the history of metaphysics, as it is in its final stage that metaphysics 
“becomes” technics.  
  
From metaphysics to technics 
	
It is clear that working with a category as broad as the whole of metaphysics goes beyond 
the limits of the present discussion. Consequently the following discussion will employ a 
more restricted notion of metaphysics, namely that of modern metaphysics as 
philosophical modernity. In his notes on Jünger, Heidegger writes that philosophical 
modernity was “opened” with Machiavelli’s 1532 Il Principe. The closing point, he goes 
on to argue, is marked by none other than Jünger’s The Worker.51 In between Machiavelli 
and Jünger, or the prince and the worker, Heidegger then positions Descartes and Newton. 
Descartes is said to have performed the “Grundlegung des neuzeitlichen Menschentums”52 
and modern thought in 1637 with his Discourse on the Method,53 the essential feature 
(Grundzug) of which, according to Heidegger, is “the mathematical” (mathemata).54 While 
the first effects of the mathematical are said to have arisen during the late scholasticism of 
the fifteenth century, and thus sufficiently earlier than the previously mentioned 
seventeenth century, Descartes’s contributions in the seventeenth century allowed for the 
mathematical to be further clarified and determined, and Newton is credited with having 
subsequently produced the “first systematic and creative conclusion” 55 with his Principia 
Mathematica in 1686/87. The important question here, then, is of how to relate 
																																																								
48 Ibid., p.294. “... the actual completion of metaphysics.” 
49 Ibid., p.285. 
50 Ibid., p.296.  
51 Heidegger, GA Band 90, p.80. 
52 Ibid., p. 152.  “… foundation of modern humanity.” 
53 Ibid. 
54 Martin Heidegger,1987. Die Frage nach dem Ding. Tübingen: Max Niemayer Verlag, p.74. 
55 Martin Heidegger, 2018. The Question Concerning the Thing. Translated into English by J. Reid and B. 
Crowe. London: Rowman & Littlefield, p.52. 
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Heidegger’s characterization of the mathematical, as the characteristic feature of modern 
metaphysics, to what was discussed earlier on as enframing (Gestell).  
 
Within Heidegger’s corpus, the work best suited to addressing this question is without 
doubt the 1962 The Question Concerning the Thing, the reworked, published transcript of 
what was initially presented by Heidegger as a lecture course in the winter semester of 
1935/36. It is thus situated at once before and after the 1954 The Question Concerning 
Technics, to which it stands in a quasi-complementary relation. The Question Concerning 
the Thing not only asks the metaphysical question par excellence – what is a thing? – but 
narrows this question: it asks what is, and how something can become, a thing for us now, 
in the modern period. And since, as discussed, the standing reserve (Bestand) is seen as the 
mode in which things “are” once they have been subjected to enframing as the essence of 
modern technics, the Question Concerning the Thing must be understood as narrating the 
history of metaphysics as the movement from the objective mode of existence to that of the 
standing reserve.  
 
Heidegger begins his inquiry into the thing by pointing out that there is a historical 
dimension to thingness. What this means is that a thing is not just a thing naturally, but that 
there is a historical dimension to what can come into our view as a thing. The old 
metaphysical question of “what is a thing?” thus turns out to be a historical question, 
asking how something can become a thing for a specific time. The hypothesis put forward 
by Heidegger is, that when it comes to the modern age, the “thingness of things” is 
determined by the mathematical (mathemata), which is “that ‘in’ things [jenes >>an<< 
den Dingen] which we really already know; hence, what we do not first have to fetch from 
things, but what we bring along with us in a certain way.”56 The mathematical is thus that 
which a priori allows things to come into view as things for us.57  
 
As suggested in advance by the reference to the a priori character of the mathematical , 
Heidegger goes on to introduce a new protagonist into the movement from metaphysics to 
modern technics, who has hitherto been absent from our discussion. Immanuel Kant, and 
specifically his 1780 Critique of Pure Reason, is subsequently introduced by Heidegger as 
performing a crucial role within the movement of modern metaphysics to technics. 
Heidegger claims that from its outset the Critique of Pure Reason already takes place in a 
world of mathematical-physical objects, never even questioning whether there could be 
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another access to the world than the one prescribed by Newtonian science. The Critique of 
Pure Reason, Heidegger thus claims, essentially lays open the a priori sketch of the 
thingness of things and the modern foundational attitude (Grundstellung) that comes with 
it, which to this day remains the “basic historical and spiritual stance [geschichtlich-
geistige Grundstellung], which supports and determines us today.”58  
 
Heidegger and Kant 
 
Heidegger charges Kant with numerous contributions to the movement of modern thought 
towards modern technics. Firstly, and most importantly, Kant is said to have formulated 
the “basic historical and spiritual stance, which supports and determines us today.”59 This 
basic historical and spiritual stance (Grundstellung) is essentially modern and determined 
by the mathematical. The problem with a Grundstellung, however, is that it needs to be 
investigated and inquired into, in order to come out into the open and be understood. 
 
In mastering or failing to master the question of the thing in a sufficiently thoughtful way, 
or in disregarding it altogether, there are decisions whose field of play and distance in our 
history are to be considered always only after centuries [have passed]. The confrontation 
with Kant’s step should provide us with the proper perspective [das rechte Augenmaß] for 
such decisions.60  
 
Secondly, then, Kant is not only said to have articulated the modern Grundstellung, he is 
furthermore said to provide the proper perspective (Augenmaß), and thus methodological 
instrument, to account for how the decisions taken within that modern Grundstellung have 
shaped and continue to shape the present. Kant is thus at once the subject and means of 
Heidegger’s inquiry into modern thinking. 
 
Thirdly, Heidegger seems to propose an underlying relation between “the mathematical” 
discussed in The Question Concerning the Thing and what was earlier, in The Question 
Concerning Technics, called enframing (Gestell). The mathematical has so far been 
defined as the attempt to determine the being of beings, or the thingness of things, a priori, 
meaning from principles. From the point of view of the mathematical, “the givens of 
everyday getting around in the world [das umgänglich alltägliche gegebene] are construed 
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as mere material and splintered into a manifold of sensations,”61 which, once ordered and 
organized, can then come into view as an object of mathematical-physical science. In The 
Question Concerning the Thing, “material” thus means material for the a priori forms of 
the mathematical sketch of the thingness of things. From the perspective of The Question 
Concerning Technics, this consideration of something as sheer material is also precisely 
what Heidegger had in mind when he wrote that “man’s ordering attitude and behavior 
display themselves first in the rise of modern physics as an exact science.”62 Consequently, 
there is a direct relation between the material for the mathematical outline of cognition and 
the mode of existence of technically produced things as a standing reserve (Bestand), and 
thus as sheer material for enframing (Gestell). According to Heidegger, Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason reveals to us the ordering attitude (bestellendes Verhalten) of the 
mathematical sketch, which he also calls, in The Question Concerning Technics, enframing 
(Gestell). 
  
There is, however, a further important point to Heidegger’s discussion of Kant. This last 
point concerns nothing less than the movement from metaphysics to modern technics itself. 
With the Critique of Pure Reason mapping onto the system of general and special 
metaphysics of the Wolff-Leibniz school, the chapter entitled Transcendental Analytic 
deals with what was hitherto discussed under the name of general metaphysics, and thus 
ontology: Kant’s self-professed aim with the Transcendental Analytic was to replace “the 
proud name of ontology [with] the more modest title of a transcendental analytic.”63 At the 
same time, the Transcendental Analytic, and specifically the section entitled Analytic of 
Principles, is the very place in which Kant lays out the mathematical sketch of the 
thingness of things. When considered from the perspective of Heidegger’s reading of Kant 
performed in The Question Concerning the Thing, the Kantian move from metaphysics to 
the Transcendental Analytic is thus, in essence, the very moment in which modern thought 
self-reflexively did away, so to speak, with metaphysics. This moment as such shifted the 
discussion of metaphysics to the mathematical sketch of the thingness of things, which at 
heart is nothing but enframing (Gestell) and thus the essence of modern technics. Kant’s 
Transcendental Analytic is thus, in a sense, the moment in which metaphysics “became” 
technics. From the perspective of Heidegger’s account of the movement of modern 
metaphysics to technics, Kant’s Transcendental Analytic is thus fundamentally a 
Transcendental Technics. 
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Looking back, it thus becomes clear that Heidegger reads the history of technical thought 
as a two-fold movement from the ancient Greek techne to modern technics. Modern 
technics is further discussed and problematized in relation to modern metaphysics. Within 
the movement of modern metaphysics to technics, Kant situates Machiavelli and Jünger, 
understood as the respective opening and closing figures of modern metaphysics. Within 
that movement Heidegger also assigns important places to Descartes, Newton, and finally 
Kant. Kant’s role is explicitly discussed in The Question Concerning the Thing, which was 
considered in its complementary relation to The Question Concerning Technics, as both 
texts, in their own way, ask the metaphysical question par excellence: what is a thing? 
Kant was here shown to occupy a multifaceted role. Apart from providing insight into the 
modern historical and spiritual stance (Grundstellung), he was also discussed as offering 
the proper perspective (Augenmaß) for adequately understanding this modern stance. 
Thirdly, The Question Concerning the Thing laid out the ordering attitude of the human, 
which had first showed itself in the natural sciences. Here, the notion of “material” was 
discussed as the hinge between both the mathematical outline, which orders “material” 
according to its a priori forms, and enframing (Gestell), which challenges the real to reveal 
itself as a standing reserve and thus as “material” for further ordering and organization. 
Fourthly and most importantly, I argued that the Kantian move to do away with 
metaphysics in favor of the Transcendental Analytic, which laid open the a priori 
principles of the thingness of things, was considered by Heidegger as the very moment in 
which metaphysics, so to speak, “became” modern technics. Kant’s Transcendental 
Analytic, according to Heidegger’s reading, is thus in essence a Transcendental Technics.  
 
I have shown, that paradoxically, Heidegger’s reading of Kant both credits Kant with 
announcing the beginning of modern technics with his Transcendental Analytic, while at 
the same time occluding any direct references to Kant’s own account of technics. This is 
the case because, while providing the foundation for Heidegger’s own technics-thinking as 
enframing (Gestell), Heidegger did not consider Kant to be a thinker of technics himself. I 
have shown that for Heidegger, Kant ‘suffered’ from the Gestell (enframing) instead of 
thinking it, transforming Kant into a symptom, possibly the symptom, of modern technics. 
Kant thus occupied a central but contradictory role in Heidegger’s account of technics, at 




However, Heidegger’s symptomatic reading of Kant only makes sense under the 
assumption that Kant did not put forward any explicit writings on technics, or, if there 
were writings on technics, that Kant did not recognize their inherent technical nature.  
As the following chapters will show, Kant however already “thought” technics, despite 
Heidegger’s refusal to acknowledge it. The most important text in this regard is Kant’s 
very last, unfinished work. The Opus Postumum will be shown to consist of nothing less 
than what would have been Kant’s critique of technical-practical reason, had he lived to 
complete it. That Heidegger himself had access to the Opus Postumum, and explicitly 
referred to it, makes no difference at this point.64 What remains to be done, then, is to 
inquire into Kant’s thinking on technics, which might just reveal, in the process of doing 





64 References to the Opus Postumum appear in Heidegger‘s lecture course on Schelling and German Idealism 
(1941-1943), in Martin Heidegger, GA IV. Abteilung: Hinweise und Aufzeichnungen. Bd. 86, p.246; 
Heidegger, Die Frage nach dem Ding p.60; and elsewhere. 
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CHAPTER 2.2. Simondon and the problem of technics 
Martin Heidegger was, however, not the only philosopher to put forward an inquiry into 
the essence of technics in the post-war period. Gilbert Simondon’s On the Mode of 
Existence of Technical Objects (1958)65 can be read as the French techno-optimistic 
counterpart to Martin Heidegger’s intervention in The Question concerning Technics.66 In 
contrast to Heidegger’s explicitly non-technical engagement with the question of technics, 
the explicit assumption of Simondon’s title already suggests that there is precisely such a 
thing as a technical mode of existence, which Simondon calls réalité technique (technical 
reality).  
 
In order to fully appreciate the scale and depth of Simondon’s intervention in and 
engagement with the Heideggerian proposition, an important translation issue needs to be 
taken into consideration. In the first 1939 French translation of Heidegger’s Qu’est-ce que 
la métaphysique? (Was ist Metaphysik?), Henry Corbin translated Heidegger’s Dasein as 
réalité humaine.67 Following and at the same time diverting from the Heideggerian path, 
Simondon ventured to employ the term réalité humaine and furthermore to supplement it 
with his own invention: réalité technique. Cecile Malaspina and Jon Rogove, the 
translators of the 2017 Univocal English translation of On the Mode of Existence of 
Technical Objects, have chosen to translate the two terms directly, as “human reality” and 
“technical reality.” However, rather than referring to reality as a philosophical category of 
quality, Simondon must be seen to fundamentally refer to human and technical being 
(Dasein). Employing the Heideggerian terminology and its specific French philosophical 
history, Simondon argues that technical objects have being (Dasein) – a properly technical 
mode of existence that he calls technical reality – which is further complemented by a 
properly technical essence (technicity). At this point it should be clear that we are indeed a 
long way from Heidegger’s famous claim, in The Question Concerning Technics, that “the 
essence of [technics] is by no means anything technical”.68 Simondon proposes that there 
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J. Rogove. Minneapolis: Univocal. 
66 Simondon’s two-fold doctorate remained the only published work during his lifetime. His minor thesis On 
the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects was published in its entirety in 1958, while at first only the first 
half of his major thesis L’Individuation à la lumiére des notions de forme et d’information (Individuation in 
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translation of On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, by Ninian Mellamphy, has been circulating 
since the late 1980s, it was not until 2017 that the first complete English translation was published by 
Univocal. The translation of Simondon’s major thesis is still underway.  
67 Martin Heidegger, 1938. Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique?,  Translated by H. Corbin, Paris: Gallimard. 
68 Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, p.20. 
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is, essentially, such a thing as technical being, and that technicity only provisionally and 
partly manifests itself in the material technical objects that we interact with in the world. 
“Objects appear at a certain moment, but technicity precedes them and goes beyond them; 
technical objects result from an objectivation of technicity.”69 Technicity must thus be 
thought as a power or potentiality in the proper sense, “a depository of a capacity to 
evolve”.70  
 
Simondon’s accounts of technical reality and technical essence are not, however, the only 
fundamental disagreements that Simondon has with the Heideggerian discourse. The 
previous section on Heidegger’s technical thought showed that a discourse of questioning 
runs through Heidegger’s philosophy. Simondon’s discourse, on the other hand, centers 
not on questions but around the problem and the problematic. However, the problematic is 
here not primarily an epistemological trope formulated by a thinking subject, as Gilles 
Deleuze already pointed out in his 1966 review of Simondon’s L’Individu et sa genèse 
physico-biologique (Individuation and its Physical-Biological Genesis). 71  Rather, the 
problem “acquires in Simondon’s thought tremendous importance in so far as the category 
is endowed with an objective sense.”72 Simondon thus extends the territory of the problem 
to include objective reality, as he understands the problem to be the main dynamism in 
both the becoming of the world as well as the main figure through which an understanding 
of this becoming of the world comes about. What this means, then, is that becoming, or 
genesis, is at heart the resolution of a problem. Becoming, Simondon writes in the 
Introduction to L’Individu et sa genèse physico-biologique, “is not a framework in which 
being exists, it is a dimension of being, a mode of resolution of an initial incompatibility 
that is rich in potentials.”73  
 
Consequently, Simondon also takes issue with the metaphysical discipline of ontology. But 
differently to Kant, who replaced “the proud name of ontology [with] the more modest title 
of a transcendental analytic,”74 and differently to Heidegger, who derived his notion of 
Gestell from reading Kant’s Transcendental Analytic as he put forward his own Existential 
Analytic, Simondon took another route, as he replaced the metaphysical discipline of 
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ontology with that of ontogenesis, understood as an inquiry into ontogenetic problems and 
resolutions, that “by which being becomes, insofar as it is, as being.”75 What, then, is the 
problem of technics as formulated by Simondon in On the Mode of Existence of Technical 
Objects, and how does technical being become?  
 
The problem of technics and becoming in Simondon’s On the Mode of Existence of 
Technical Objects	
 
Philosophy, Simondon claims, has historically approached the reality of being in two, 
mutually exclusive, ways. Firstly, there is the substantialist mode of approach, which holds 
that being is not subject to construction or creation, but is rather given to itself or founded 
on itself in its unity. 76  Secondly, there is the hylemorphic mode of approach. 
Hylemorphism (in ancient Greek hyle meaning matter and morphe form) is the ancient 
philosophical doctrine of how form, usually taken to be active, bestows its shape on 
passive matter. According to hylemorphism, being “is considered to be created by the 
coming together of form and matter.”77 What both of these approaches share is that they 
“presuppose the existence of a principle of individuation that is anterior to the 
individuation itself, one that may be used to explain, produce, and conduct this 
individuation.”78  What this means is that both philosophical doctrines take a given 
individual as their starting point in order to then work their way back to its condition of 
existence, whereby granting ontological privilege to the constituted individual. Simondon’s 
project aims to critique these two approaches as he instead ventures to understand the 
individual through individuation, rather than the other way around.79  
 
Within the more restricted context of Simondon’s technical thought, one encounters the 
same opposition and problematization of philosophical doctrines in the third and final 
chapter of On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects. Here, the substantialist first 
pole is termed Apriorism, which is said to attempt to grasp technics by means of the idea, 
and proceeds according to the logical procedure of deduction. The primary representative 
of Apriorism mentioned by Simondon is Plato.80 The hylemorphic approach supplies the 
corresponding pole of Aposteriorism, which employs concepts over ideas, and is generally 
said to be the complementary empiricist, conceptual and partly nominalist approach to 
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technics (and philosophy more broadly). 81  Discussing these approaches, Simondon 
employs a temporal critique, arguing that metaphysical thought in both its instantiations is 
either too early (a priori) or too late (a posteriori), but never contemporary with the 
becoming of technics. The temporal problematization of these two philosophical 
approaches can already be found in The Position of the Problem of Ontogenesis, where he 
writes that “the search for the principle of individuation occurs either before individuation 
or after individuation, depending on whether the model of individuation is physical (for 
substantial atomism) or technological and vital (for the hylemorphic scheme).”82 Despite 
Simondon’s claim that metaphysics is structurally incapable of accounting for the mode of 
existence of technical objects, due to its being out of time with the becoming of technics, 
his argument at the same time suggests that hylemorphism is essentially based on a 
technical model of individuation. How is one to understand this argument, where 
metaphysics is at once incapable of thinking technics and yet technical at heart? 
 
Simondon’s point concerning hylemorphism is that its supposedly universal and logical 
scheme is in fact nothing but “the transportation into philosophical thought of the technical 
operation reduced to work.”83 The main critique of hylemorphism, then, is that it leaves the 
active center of the technical operation obscure, as it relies on the activity of human work 
to effectuate the link between the two terms of matter and form. But while, as in 
brickmaking, for instance, the worker surely prepares the clay in order for it to take on 
form, it is “the clay that takes form according to the mold, not the worker who gives it its 
form.”84 Simondon’s point is thus that at the foundation of the hylemorphic scheme, and 
thus at the foundation of the Aposteriorism of operational knowledge, lies a specific but 
ultimately incomplete technical experience.85  As he puts this elsewhere, “l'opération 
technique qui impose une forme à une matière passive et indéterminée […] c’est 
essentiellement l'opération commandée par l'homme libre et exécutée par l'esclave; 
l'homme libre choisit de la matière, indéterminée parce qu'il suffit de la désigner 




82 Simondon, “The Position of the Problem of Ontogenesis,” p.5. 
83 Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, p.248. 
84 Ibid., p.249. 
85 Ibid., p.248. 
86 Simondon, L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information. p.51. “The technical 
operation which imposes a form on a passive and undetermined matter […] is essentially the operation 
commanded by the free man and executed by the slave; the free man chooses matter, undetermined because it 
suffices to designate it generally by the name substance, without seeing it, without handling it, without 
preparing it.” 
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Consequently, with hylemorphism, form can only be considered to be the active principle 
of individuation, as it is by both Aristotle in his Physics and Hegel’s lord in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, because “la véritable passivité de la matière est sa disponibilité 
abstraite derrière l'ordre donné que d'autres exécuteront.”87 It is this simplified and socio-
politically overdetermined model of technical production that is ultimately the target of 
Simondon’s critique. With hylemorphism, while attention is paid to the two terms of 
matter and form, or passivity and activity, what happens between them is left in the dark. 
Looking at the centre of the operation would reveal that it is in fact the clay that actively 
keeps the form embodied in the mould of the brick, rather than it being the worker 
transferring form onto passive matter in the name of the master.88 While for Heidegger 
modern technics was the completion of metaphysics, it is now clear that for Simondon an 
incomplete technical experience, overdetermined by the socio-economic and political 
reality of the ancient Greek master-slave dynamic, has been at the heart of the so-called 
abstract logical categories of the hylemorphic metaphysician ever since antiquity.  
 
Simondon’s proposition, then, is to replace the inaccurate and incomplete techno-
metaphysical schema of hylemorphism with a detailed account of technical operation 
proper. This move is both conceptual and historical in nature. Simondon argues that the 
metaphysical schema of the universalized master’s perspective could only remain 
unquestioned for as long as it was a human worker, bondsman, or slave who took care of 
the veiled centre.89 However, “man [sic] cannot leave the center of operation in the dark, 
when he no longer intervenes as tool bearer; it is the center that must effectively be 
produced by the technical object.”90 Simondon thus argues that the philosophical doctrine 
of hylemorphism is essentially subject to challenge from the material reality of the 
technical object, rather than from a socio-political or philosophical critique of the master-
slave dynamic inherent in hylemorphism. While in artisanal, pre-modern times, it was 
indeed the human who was responsible for the mediation between form and matter, with 
the the advent of the technical machine taking over the responsibility of mediation, the 
representation of the “way of functioning that coincides with technical operation, which 
accomplishes it”91 has necessarily been put into question.  
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The underlying argument here is then, that, insight into technical operation proper could 
remain structurally unquestioned until the invention of post-artisanal technical objects. 
This is the case because the industrially produced technical object, the machine, took over 
the worker’s role of mediating between form and matter, meaning that the veiled centre 
necessarily became subject to inquiry. There is thus, according to Simondon, a specific 
historical moment that brought about both the possibility and necessity of developing post-
metaphysical, technical thought proper. This specific historical moment is the transition 
from the artisanal to the industrial mode of production, with its industrially produced 
technical objects and machines. Consequently, the conditions for technical knowledge 
proper and post-metaphysical thought are said to be the result of the industrially produced 
technical object. 
 
This direct interference of the industrial technical object in the development of technical 
and philosophical thought is, however, only one side of Simondon’s account of the history 
of technical thought. The underlying implication of On the Mode of Existence of Technical 
Objects is that to this day, and thus long after the invention of the industrial technical 
object, knowledge of technical objects remains “nonessential” in character. 92   His 
argument is that while the material conditions for both “essential” technical knowledge and 
post-metaphysical philosophical thought have been in place since the Industrial 
Revolution, these conditions have yet to be actualized. Simondon’s project articulated in 
On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects is thus essentially two-fold in nature. 
Firstly, Simondon argues that culture “has constituted itself as a defense system against 
technics; yet this defense presents itself as a defense of man, and presumes that technical 
objects do not contain a human reality within them.”93 The exclusion of technics from 
culture proper is thus to blame for the non-actualization of technical knowledge proper, 
giving rise to prevalent tensions and conflict, anxiety, alienation, and resentment in the 
relations between technics and the human. Simondon’s explicit aim, then, is to rediscover 
the so-called alienated human reality at the heart of the technical object, and to integrate it 
into culture in order to resolve present social conflicts and contradictions. Secondly, in 
sketching out the role that technical operation and the Industrial Revolution play for the 
development of technical thought and, in a second step, also philosophical thought, 
Simondon aims to at last introduce and actualize the dormant conceptual resources that 
have materially been available since the Industrial Revolution. In so doing he seeks to 
overcome the metaphysical limits to knowledge and to finally put forward a post-
																																																								
92 Ibid., p.xiii. 
93 Ibid., p.15. 
	 38	
metaphysical philosophy – his very own philosophy of individuation – capable of doing 
justice to the mode of existence of technical objects. 
 
Simondon’s history of technical thought 
 
Thinking back to the discussion of Heidegger, it thus becomes clear that, when it comes to 
the history of technical thought, Simondon tells a radically different story. While 
Heidegger understood modern metaphysics as the movement from the objective mode of 
existence to the standing reserve (Bestand), in the sense that metaphysics in its final stage 
becomes modern technics, Simondon instead understands technics as the beginning of 
metaphysics in its hylemorphic instantiation, in the sense that metaphysics is founded on 
an incomplete technical experience, where, since the very beginning of metaphysics in 
ancient Greece and onwards, technical experience is reduced to work. Furthermore, 
Heidegger understood Kant’s Transcendental Analytic as the moment in which modern 
metaphysics becomes technics, while he understood the nature of his own time to be the 
final coming-to-end of metaphysics. Simondon, on the other hand, claims that it was in fact 
the industrially produced technical object, in the form of the machine itself, that brought 
about the conditions of possibility for post-metaphysical thought and technical knowledge 
proper. While both locate this moment of transition in the end of the eighteenth century, 
the challenge to the metaphysical conception of technics was posed, according to 
Simondon, by the material technical object itself. What both thinkers share is an agreement 
that the end of metaphysics is yet to be brought about, and an explicit aim to end it, either 
through the process of questioning (Heidegger) or problematization (Simondon).  
 
As we saw, Heidegger positioned as guiding figures between Descartes and his own time 
the trio of Newton, Kant and Nietzsche, none of whom Simondon explicitly engages with 
at length. However, both Newton and Nietzsche fit into the Simondonian narrative without 
difficulty. Newton is, without doubt, the most famous representative of what Simondon 
calls the properly universal science of technical Encyclopedism, while Nietzsche’s will to 
power is what Simondon terms “autocratic philosophy of technics”.94 The one thinker that 
is difficult to fit into the Simondonian narrative is Kant, who is explicitly mentioned only 
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once in On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, in reference to his moral and 
political philosophy.95 But, as I will argue, Simondon’s technical thought is explicitly 
aimed against Kant’s Transcendental Philosophy, while it pursues, what is without doubt a 
quasi-Kantian project. 
 
Simondon and Kant 
	
In her widely read book Gilbert Simondon and the Philosophy of the Transindividual,96 
Muriel Combes claims that Simondon’s philosophy of individuation is explicitly aimed 
against “theories of knowledge inspired by Kant.”97 While Kant famously set out to 
establish the a priori conditions of and thus the possibility and the limits of knowledge, 
Simondon argues that such a priori cognitions of conditions are impossible, as “we cannot, 
in the common understanding of the term, know individuation, we can only individuate, 
individuate ourselves, and individuate within ourselves.” 98  Furthermore, Simondon’s 
philosophy of individuation explicitly rejects the a priori distinction between the subject 
and object of knowledge that Kantianism operates with, as he instead situates his approach 
before the bifurcation of the real into subject and object. Furthermore, on Simondon’s 
account Kant’s thought would be seen as intrinsically hylemorphic, as it operates from the 
standpoint of the difference between a priori forms of cognition and the a posteriori matter 
of sensibility. Consequently, Transcendental Philosophy is either too early (a priori) or too 
late (a posteriori), but never contemporaneous with the becoming of technics. From the 
perspective of Simondon’s project, technics is thus the one question that Kant is 
structurally incapable of answering to. His answer will either come too early or too late.  
 
From a structural perspective, Simondon does indeed seem to orient himself strongly 
against Kantianism in all its forms. While there is a surprising absence of explicit 
references to Kant in Simondon’s writings, it would also be difficult to overlook 
Simondon’s proximities to the Kantian philosophical project. One of these instances can be 
found in Simondon’s characterization of his project as calling “upon a mediate and higher 
mode of knowledge, reuniting concepts [the aposteriorism of hylemorphism] and ideas [the 
apriorism of substantialism] in its unity.”99 Simondon’s reference to a higher “third” has a 
distinctly Kantian tone to it, with Kant’s schematism chapter in the Critique of Pure 
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Reason itself looking for “a third thing [ein Drittes], which must stand in homogeneity 
with the category on the one hand and the appearance on the other,”100 at once intellectual 
and sensible. Rather than a transcendental schema, however, Simondon’s “third” is 
specified as knowledge by way of intuition, supposedly capable of grasping in a way “that 
is neither a priori nor a posteriori, but contemporaneous with the existence of the being it 
grasps, and which is at the same level as this being.”101 Generalizing Henri Bergson’s 
method of intuition, Simondon thus argues that philosophy must position itself in the very 
gap separating the Apriorism of the idea and the Aposteriorism of the concept, intuiting the 
real by means of the convergence between these two strands of philosophical thought. 
However, the overall aim of Kant’s Transcendental Philosophy had itself always been to 
“bridge the gap” between Rationalism (Apriorism) and Empiricism (Aposteriorism), and 
the explicit aim of the third Critique, the Critique of the Power of Judgment, was to inquire 
into the power of judgment as the “mediating power” between nothing less than the faculty 
of understanding with its concepts and the faculty of reason with its ideas.  
 
This, however, is not the only complicated overlap between the Kantian and the 
Simondonian project. Looking deeper into Simondon’s account of the history of technical 
thought, we can see that he employs a conceptual distinction that does not feature in either 
Heidegger’s or Stiegler’s work. The technical object, Simondon claims, can be related to 
the human in two fundamentally different ways, both of which continue to exist up to the 
present day, but which were dominant at different points in time. On the one hand, technics 
can be encountered and acquired non-reflectively by the human during childhood, giving 
rise to a relation of “minority,” and on the other hand reflectively learned during adulthood 
giving rise to a “majority” relation between the human and technics. What becomes clear, 
then, is that Simondon employs a distinction first made famous by Immanuel Kant in his 
1784 Prize-essay “An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’” 102 
Enlightenment (Aufklärung) was principally defined by Kant as the “human being’s 
emergence from his self-incurred minority,”103 with minority referring to a difficulty or 
inability in judging without the help of others. While only exceptionally achieved by 
individual people, Kant’s argument ultimately aims to locate the self-emergence from 
minority in the public as a whole, and in its free use of reason by means of the instrument 
of criticism.104  
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Aligned with influential critiques of Kant’s Enlightenment discourse put forward by 
thinkers including Nietzsche, Adorno, and Habermas, Simondon at once employs Kant’s 
Enlightenment discourse, and at the same time, attempts to turn it against itself, since what 
is at stake, according to Simondon, is not pure theoretical or practical reason, but technical 
reason. The minority relation between technics and the human laid open by Simondon 
determines the technical object as “firstly an object of utility, necessary for everyday life, 
belonging to the heart of the environment where the human individual’s growth and 
training takes place. In this case the encounter between the technical object and man [sic] 
occurs essentially during childhood. Technical knowledge is implicit, non-reflective, and 
habitual.”105 Built by habit and thus functioning as a quasi second nature, the minority 
relation relies on having been taught during childhood, with the problem being that it is 
difficult if not impossible to self-reflexively change one’s relationship to the technical 
object after childhood. The knowledge that is said to ensue from the minority relation is 
thus “operational rather than intellectual; it will be an ability rather than knowing; by its 
nature, it will be a secret for others, because it will be a secret for himself, for his [sic] own 
consciousness.”106 Essentially lying outside of conceptual and scientific discourse, there is 
as such no, or at least no direct, relation between science and technics possible from within 
the minority relation. The minority relation to technics is, according to Simondon, lived by 
miners, shepherds, farmers, artisanal technicians in general, and so on. 
On the other hand, however, Simondon claims that there is also a “majority” relation to 
technics, and thus an ‘enlightened’ technics, which “corresponds to an operation of 
reflection and self-awareness by the free adult, who has at his [sic] disposal the means of 
rational knowledge, elaborated through the sciences: the knowledge of the apprentice is 
thus distinguished from that of the engineer.”107 Thus while technical minority is acquired 
during childhood, technical majority is the technical relation acquired by the human during 
adulthood, corresponding to the rational, scientific, and thus universal insight of a studied 
engineer:  
 
It is rational because it employs measurement, calculation, procedures of geometrical 
figuration and descriptive analysis; […] not only is scientific explanation required, but it is 
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required with a clear taste for the scientific spirit. Moreover, this way of teaching is doubly 
universal, both through the public it addresses and through the information it provides.108  
 
Simondon’s example of the majority relation between technics and the human is Diderot 
and D’Alemberts’s Encyclopedia, 109  published between 1751 and 1772 in France. 
Containing prints of schemas and models so that its readers could both build as well as 
develop the depicted technical apparatus further by means of invention, the Encyclopedia 
is said to have freed technical knowledge from the protection of the guild110 and made it 
accessible to the wider public for the first time. At the same time, however, the 
Encyclopedia provides more than just the prime example of the majority relation to 
technics. Simondon’s argument is that in fact the majority relation as a whole is itself the 
effect of what he calls encyclopedic spirit, or Encyclopedism.  
 
Simondon argues that the first appearance of Encyclopedism takes place as early as in the 
Renaissance,111 when technical machines were first introduced into the realm of rationality 
and science.112 Ultimately held back by the immaturity of the sciences, Simondon reads the  
eighteenth century Enlightenment as the second stage of Encyclopedism, a technical 
Encyclopedism which properly “freed” technical thought for the first time.113 Diderot and 
D’Alembert’s Encyclopedia was thus at heart a book moved by a technical spirit or force 
that was first freed by Enlightenment science.114 This technical force, Simondon writes, 
“existed by itself, because it responded to the needs of its time, more than political or 
financial reforms did,”115 realizing nothing less than a society of technical autodidacts who 
could think for themselves and bring forth technical objects by themselves. Simondon thus 
argues that it was technical Encyclopedism that brought about the essential opposition to 
the “tutelage and the status of spiritual minority,” culminating in the moving forces that 
would finally overthrow the “moral and political heteronomy of the monarchy [l’Ancien 
Régime].”116 Understanding the second stage of Encyclopedism to have been a properly 
technical Encyclopedism, Simondon thus argues that it was ultimately “through 
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technics”117 that the eighteenth century managed to free itself from the social, moral and 
political constraints of l’Ancien Regime.  
 
Simondon’s periodization of Encyclopedism reads the history of modernity through a 
technical lens, going as far as to argue that Enlightenment humanism was at heart a 
technical force of liberation. Secondly, however, it has become clear that the periodization 
of Encyclopedism so far centers on the process of a convergence between science and 
technics/technology. While the first introduction of technics into science is said to have 
taken place already during the Renaissance, it was only the enlightened stage of 
Encyclopedism that finally “freed,” in the sense of universalized, technics, making 
possible, for the first time, a majority relation to technics. This second, enlightened, and 
properly technical stage of Encyclopedism was itself, however, held back by “the 
hierarchical aspects of social rigidity.”118 What is needed in order to complete the 
convergence between science and technics, then, is a third type of Encyclopedism, a 
technological Encyclopedism. 
 
The translators of On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects inserted a note into the 
Introduction in order to highlight the difference between technics and technology. While 
technics (la technique, les techniques) refers to both “the practical and particular 
application of technics to a given concrete task” as well as “the theory or study of industry 
and of the mechanical arts,” technology, for Simondon, constitutes the philosophical meta-
theory of technics.119 While Simondon explicitly discusses his notion of technology in only 
a few passages, the entire project of On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects can be 
read as Simondon’s attempt to produce just such a philosophical meta-theory of technics. 
In fact, for Simondon the duty of such a philosophy of technology is “analogous to the one 
[philosophy] fulfilled for the abolition of slavery and the affirmation of the value of the 
human person.” 120  This means that, just like its two predecessors, technological 
Encyclopedism is at heart a humanism aimed at liberation.  
 
Differently from the enlightened humanism of the eighteenth century, however, 
Simondon’s claim is that the twentieth century must seek “a humanism capable of 
compensation for the form of alienation that intervenes within the very development of 
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technics, through a series of specializations that society demands and produces.”121 The 
specific form of alienation that technological Encyclopedism is tasked with liberating is 
thus, according to Simondon, explicitly technical. What is needed in our day and age is a 
humanism that recognizes and becomes aware of the mode of existence of technical 
objects, in order to free “human reality enclosed within the technical object.”122 Such a 
liberation cannot be achieved by a repetition of the universalizing efforts of the 
enlightened, technical Encyclopedism. And furthermore, it is it no longer a problem of 
merely putting science and technics in relation to each other. If technological 
Encyclopedism is to tackle the issue of technical alienation, it first needs to introduce into 
culture “a representation and scale of values adequate to the essence of technical 
objects,”123 in order to then, in a second step, develop a universal symbolism common to 
both the human and the machine. This is a two-fold effort that Simondon finds find in 
Norbert Wiener’s Cybernetics (1948). 
 
Within Simondon’s discussion of Encyclopedism, Kant resurfaces as Simondon’s silent 
interlocutor. Simondon’s account of the two possible relations to technics are undoubtedly 
colored by the terminology of Kant’s famous Enlightenment essay. From the conceptual 
distinction between technical minority and majority (minorité and majorité),124 to the terms 
of tutelage and spiritual minority,125 Simondon makes continual references to the Kantian 
terminology. However, while explicitly employing Kantian terminology, Simodon’s 
implicit critique is that Kant could not see, as he was structurally incapable of seeing, that 
the driving force of the Enlightenment was in fact technical. Kant’s problematic 
reaffirmation of the hylemorphic matter/form distinction that had dominated philosophy 
ever since ancient Greece means that, for Simondon, Kant, despite writing at the time of 
technical Encyclopedism and the advent of the industrially produced technical object, 
remained structurally incapable of thinking technics, even, or especially, in its instantiation 
as universal, technical reason. From Simondon’s point of view, I would like to argue that 
the Critique of Pure Reason should have been called the Critique of Technical Reason. The 
fact that it was not means that technicity remained unaccounted for and thus alienated 
within the efforts of Enlightenment humanism. It is this very occlusion that demands a 
technological Encyclopedism capable of finally attending to the mode of existence of 
technical objects. 
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In the end, Simondon’s critique of Kant thus remains remarkably close to the one put 
forward by Heidegger. On the one hand, Simondon reads the Enlightenment and the 
Industrial Revolution as two historical moments that brought about the conditions for both 
scientific technical thought proper and post-metaphysical thought. But, much like 
Heidegger, Simondon’s claim is that these conditions remained unactualized, and that it 
will be his own contribution to technical thought, and to philosophy at large, through 
which the conditions for post-metaphysical technical thought proper, which had been 









CHAPTER 1.3. Stiegler and the repression of technics 
 
If Heidegger argued that the right questions concerning technics have not yet been asked, 
and if Simondon claimed that metaphysics was out of time with technics in its problematic 
becoming, then Bernard Stiegler must be seen to push both their positions further, as he 
argues that the history of philosophy is nothing less than the history of the repression of 
technics. Stiegler stands as the most prominent living voice within contemporary French 
thought on technics. Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus (La technique et le 
temps, 1: La faute d’Epiméthée), forming the first part of his Technics and Time series, 
was published in 1994, in the wake of deconstruction and at the time of a French 
resurgence of interest in Simondon’s work. The book opens with a familiar refrain, 
according to which technics “is the unthought.”126 Following Simondon and Heidegger, 
Stiegler thus prefaces his own philosophical intervention by articulating the underlying 
techno-phobic constitution of philosophy.  
 
However, a new undertone can be detected in Stiegler’s particular reiteration. The problem 
here does not seem to be one of living in a technological world devoid of the adequate 
conceptual tools for addressing it. It is not that philosophy is out of time with technics, or 
that it simply forgot about technics. Rather, Stiegler explicitly frames the relation between 
philosophy and technics as one of repression. “At its very origin and up until now, 
philosophy has repressed technics as an object of thought.”127 Philosophy, he thus claims, 
has repressed technics since its very beginning, meaning that technics “is not un-identified 
in the sense in which something forgotten is not thought: it is largely thought and felt to be 
unthinkable.”128 The way that justice is to be done in the face of this long history of 
repression is by inventing technical thought anew, which, according to Stiegler, is as much 
an invention as an exhumation.129 Stiegler thus stages his own intervention into the history 
of technical thought as an act of liberation, in which technics is finally set free. As I will 
show, Kant will once again come to play an important role within Stiegler’s liberation 
narrative. While explicitly performing a thorough critique of Transcendental Philosophy, 
Stiegler’s engagement with Kant did not only effect a restructuration of the entire Technics 
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and Time series, it also allowed Stiegler to overcome a “connective fault” 130 at the core of 
his project. As already undertaken in the preceding two sections, I propose to first read 
Stiegler on his own terms, before tracing out his account of the history of technical thought 
and the role in this history assigned, as well as denied, to Kant.  
 
Introducing Stiegler’s framework of exhumation 
 
Stiegler distances himself not only from the metaphysical reading of technics, as do 
Heidegger and Simondon, but furthers his criticism to include the biological classification 
of bodies first undertaken by Lamarck. This is because, from the perspective of the two-
fold distinction into the organic and inorganic, “technical things” are left hanging 
somewhere in the middle, suspended as a quasi-monstrous hybrid. 131  Offering an 
alternative route to the troubling positioning of technics performed by both metaphysics 
and the natural sciences, The Fault of Epimetheus proposes to undertake a cross-reading of, 
on one hand, French anthropology, and, on the other, ancient Greek mythology as kind of 
pre-history to philosophy. Following the French anthropologist André Leroi-Gourhan, who 
famously put forward the thesis of the “originary characterization of the anthropological by 
the technological,”132 Stiegler argues that technics is the originary prosthetic supplement of 
the human. What is specific to Stiegler’s claim here is that this supplement does not 
replace something that has gone astray and is now lacking. The argument is rather that the 
human is in “default of origin,”133 in the sense of originarily being without either quality 
and predestination. Stiegler develops this thesis of the default of origin via Jean-Pierre 
Vernant’s reading of Plato and Hesiod’s accounts of the ancient Greek myth of Prometheus 
and Epimetheus.  
 
In the ancient myth, having been charged with the task of distributing qualities to all 
beings, Epimetheus forgot to give an attribute to the human. In order to make up for the 
initial fault of his brother, Prometheus engages in the cunning theft of fire from Hephaestus 
so as to provide the human with a prosthetic supplement after the fact, whereby doubling 
up on the initial fault of Epimetheus. The concept of prosthesis developed by Stiegler 
engages the human in a threefold relation. It firstly establishes a spatial relation, in the 
sense that the human is placed in front and outside of itself: “In order to make up for the 
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fault of Epimetheus, Prometheus gives humans the present of putting themselves outside 
themselves.”134 At the same time prosthesis also establishes a temporal relation in a double 
sense. The prosthetic both sets in advance – in the sense of what lies in the past – as well as 
giving the human the capacity of anticipation and foresight, and thus its relation to the 
future as its ultimate possibility.135 In this temporal relation, Stiegler argues that technical 
prosthesis in fact functions as a special kind of memory, which he calls epiphylogenesis.136 
Epiphylogenesis designates the accumulation of individual experiences and traces 
inscribed and collected in technical artifacts, through which they can then be passed on 
through time. As such, the technical artifact functions as an external memory-support of a 
past that none of us have lived, but which we have inherited and are to adopt as “our” own: 
it is our “already there.” Performing a powerful critique of Heidegger’s notion of the 
“already there,” 137  Stiegler then argues that Heidegger has forgotten the originary 
prostheticity of the “already there” that is essentially constitutive of Dasein.138 The 
implication of Stiegler’s point is indeed powerful, as it follows that in his Existential 
Analytic Heidegger, despite his own technical critique of Kant, has himself forgotten the 
technical prostheticity constitutive of Dasein. 
 
Stiegler’s account of technics as a prosthetic external memory support in essence puts 
forward a quasi-transcendental account of technics. As both in front and outside of “us” 
while also being our “already there,” the technical prosthetic mediates our relation to the 
world in the sense of first giving us access to the world in the sense of a pro-position.139 
Technics, Stiegler writes, “is what is placed before us [la technique est ce qui nous est pro-
posé] (in an originary knowledge, a mathesis that “pro-poses” us things).”140 Stiegler can 
thus be seen to at once follow Heidegger’s reading of mathesis as enframing (Gestell) 
while at the same time pushing Heidegger’s thought outside of itself. For Stiegler, technics 
is transcendental mathesis, an “originary” knowledge that opens us onto the world. At the 
same time, however, the concept of epiphylogenesis essentially suspends the very 
distinction between the transcendental and the empirical. The prosthetic, always 
encountered in the empirical world and thus in a sense a posteriori, at the same time 
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precedes “this consciousness in time as the possibility of its already-there,”141 revealing the 
a priority of the transcendental to be a strange after-effect of the prosthetic. 
 
Firstly and straightforwardly, Stiegler thus argues that both the metaphysical opposition 
between logos and techne and the natural scientific qualification of technics in opposition 
to both the organic and the inorganic fail to be useful. What follows from this first aspect is 
immense, for if technics is elevated to the status of an originary knowledge and 
rearticulated as a quasi-transcendental, it becomes clear that “religion, speech, politics, 
invention – each is but the effect of the default of origin.”142 According to Stiegler, logos 
and techne are thus both modalities of the originary default of the human, in relation to 
which they engage in a com-position rather than an opposition. They are both, Stiegler 
writes, “the fruit of [humanity’s] incompleteness.”143 Thus from this point on, techno-logy 
is hyphenated. 
 
There is, however, a further point to be made regarding Stiegler’s argument on the com-
position between logos and technics, which concerns their respective statuses of autonomy 
and heteronomy, as assigned by metaphysics. Traditionally, the noetic thought of logos is 
said to be self-moving and autonomous, while technics, since Aristotle, is instead posited 
as moving heteronomously. This is due to the fact that, according to Aristotle, techne lacks 
arkhe as the principle of its own movement and rest. There is here a metaphysical 
denigration of the technical prosthetic, reducing it to a mere means devoid of its own 
proper dynamic. However, Leroi-Gourhan’s quasi-zoological investigation into the 
development of technical artifacts, and Simondon’s concept of concretization, allow 
Stiegler to powerfully contest this denigration. Technics, Stiegler instead claims, possesses 
a universal tendency driving its evolution from within, a point with which Stiegler contests 
the before mentioned Lamarckian natural-scientific distinction of beings into two classes. 
Once a universal technical tendency is at play, technical things can neither be said to be 
organic and thus self-organized, nor can they any longer pass as un-organized and 
inorganic matter. Instead, Stiegler claims that this tendency necessitates the introduction of 
a third kind of being, which, as it stands in a particular and originary relation to the human 
as “the pursuit of life by means other than life,”144 he calls “organized inorganic matter.”145  
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Stiegler’s account of the history of technical thought 
 
Stiegler’s discussion of the concept of technics is supported by way of the reinterpretation 
of two main historical moments. The first moment is that of the ancient Greeks, and 
specifically Plato and Aristotle, marked as the beginning of the history of occidental 
philosophy and thereby the beginning of the repression of technics. The Platonic and 
Aristotelian constellation between philosophy and technics is problematized by Stiegler’s 
return to philosophy’s pre-history: Greek mythology and paleoanthropology. The second 
moment is located closer in time to us today. Focusing on the emergence of industrial 
technics and specifically its articulation in Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, this second moment will push Stiegler to perform a surprising return to 
Kant. 
 
Concerning the first moment, we have already passed through Stiegler’s argument 
regarding philosophy’s self-constitution, since ancient Greece, via the repression of 
technics. In this regard, Stiegler points out that “at the beginning of its history philosophy 
separates tekhne from episteme, a distinction that had not been made in Homeric times. 
The separation is determined by a political context, one in which the philosopher accuses 
the Sophist of instrumentalizing the logos as rhetoric and logography, that is, as both an 
instrument of power and a renunciation of knowledge.”146 In an attempt to cleanse itself 
from the danger of instrumentalization, philosophy thus pitches scientific knowledge 
against technical knowledge, and through this opposition technical knowledge will become 
disparaged for several centuries to come. According to Stiegler, at issue with the Platonic 
resolution to the problem of instrumentality is that it is based on a fundamental 
misinterpretation. If logos is indeed in danger of being instrumentalized, this is because the 
possibility of instrumentalization is inscribed in logos itself, rather than being an effect of a 
corruption by technics. The fundamental problem, then, is not the relation that logos does 
or does not have to instrumentality, nor is it instrumentality itself. Rather, Stiegler locates 
the fundamental problem in the misconception and consequent reduction of the instrument 
“to the rank of means,”147 resulting in the subsequent attempt to distance oneself from the 
instrumental, together with the political intention to master it.  
 
In comparison to this inventive and powerful problematization of Plato and the founding 
distinction between techne and episteme, the subsequent narrative of what follows 
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unfortunately has little to offer in terms of rigor and criticality. Stiegler goes on to loosely 
refer to the Middle Ages, the Reformation with the invention of the printing press, 
Descartes, who he charges with the inauguration of the discourse on technics as 
objectivity,148 and Kant, until finally referencing Marx, who is said to have been the first to 
open the possibility of a “techno-logy that would constitute a theory of the evolution of 
technics.”149 Stiegler’s claim is here supported by a phenomeno-materialist argument, 
according to which it was the invention of technical machines and the phenomenological 
experience of living amongst those machines that demanded the elaboration of a new 
thought of technics. “Since the Industrial Revolution, ‘technical becoming’ […], has 
compounded its systematic dimensions, becoming visible to the naked eye in various ways 
and sensible to the bodies and minds devastated by an entire universe of hellish 
machines.”150  
 
Stiegler’s point is thus that, prior to the experience of the industrially produced technical 
system, the inventiveness, evolutionary logic, and systematic dimension characteristic of 
technics proper had not been thinkable. Suspending judgment for now on whether it was 
truly structurally impossible for anyone to think technics proper prior to the industrially 
technical object, it becomes clear that Stiegler essentially aligns himself with Simondon in 
his argument that it was the industrially produced technical object that challenged the 
metaphysical conception of technics. For both Simondon and Stiegler, the industrially 
produced technical object thus functions as something like the condition of possibility of 
modern technical thought. The revolution in technical thought, first announced by Marx, is 
here conceptualized by Stiegler as the after-effect of the phenomenological experience of 
living amongst these “hellish machines.”  
 
Everything that lies prior to the coming about of the historical possibility of a 
technological science, as announced by Marx, is gathered by Stiegler into two periodizing 
categories. Firstly Stiegler refers to philosophical modernity, with Descartes and Kant as 
opening and closing figures,151 and secondly to the “old metaphysical doxa,”152 with 
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Stiegler’s brief account of philosophical modernity begins with the seventeenth century 
and Descartes, who first posited the “I think” as the constituting subject that faces an 
object constituted by the subject, and which is, in a further step, to be mastered by the 
subject through the instrument of technics. But while this new consciousness of the “I 
think” had been in effect since the seventeenth century, Stiegler’s claim is that it was only 
fully “authorized”153 by the subsequent technoscientific modernity that set in with the 
nineteenth century, characterized by the thermodynamic and industrial revolutions.  
 
Stiegler’s claim about the relation between philosophical and technoscientific modernity is 
complex. Firstly, and in reference to the Enlightenment project of public education and 
discourse, his claim is that the “I think” and its complementary discourse of technical 
mastery over nature was “concretized and generalized during the nineteenth century at the 
heart of the first Industrial Revolution.”154 As such, his argument is one of historical 
continuity between the philosophical invention of modern consciousness and its large scale 
implementation two centuries later, giving rise to the technical consciousness that would 
essentially drive technoscientific modernity. Alongside the role played by public 
education, for Stiegler the full authorization of modern consciousness also stands in an 
important relation to the thermodynamic concepts of energy and metastability, thoroughly 
unsettling, and in fact reversing, the old metaphysical order, according to which stability 
was the rule and change the exception.155 It was thus not until the scientific claim of a 
thoroughly unstable world, in which change is the norm, that the idea of an all-powerful 
subject, who ventures to transform nature, was brought full circle.  
 
Stiegler’s follows up his argument on the continuity between the philosophical invention 
of modern consciousness and its large scale implementation two centuries later by arguing 
that this very continuity would nevertheless lead to the eventual break with the modern 
subject position, and with it the accompanying understandings of science and technics that 
were in place from Descartes until Kant. This is because it was in fact the very experience 
of technoscientific modernity, of living in a technological world in which technics seems 
to have gone out of control and could thus no longer adequately be understood as the 
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application of science, that would reveal – to the “naked eye”156 – the problems with the 
modern understanding of technics. Consequently, what follows is a nihilist techno-
pessimistic discourse, from Nietzsche’s will to power, to Husserl’s Crisis of the European 
Sciences, until Heidegger’s account of technics as Gestell, all of which broke with the 
historical link between technics and objectivity, as well as the modern understanding of 
science, put in place by philosophical modernity.157  
 
The “old metaphysical doxa” 
 
The second periodizing category employed by Stiegler is that of the “old metaphysical 
doxa” 158  which, according to Stiegler, spans the entirety of the history of western 
philosophy that opens with Aristotle and closes with Kant. Stiegler here writes that “at 
least from Aristotle to Kant, technics […] arises from neither the practical domain as such 
nor the theoretical domain, in which it is cancelled.”159 He then goes on to insist that “no 
dynamic proper exists for Aristotle, any more than for any other metaphysician – nor thus 
for Kant: this is their common feature.”160 What is shared by Aristotle and Kant is thus an 
understanding of technics in terms of a means/ends rationality devoid of the systematicity 
of science. Realizing that it would, however, be problematically anachronistic to reduce 
Kant to Aristotle tout court given their vastly different historical contexts, Stiegler points 
out that they are most certainly differentiated by the modern concept of science.161 While 
both Aristotle and Kant consider science to be “what announces and formalizes the real as 
what cannot be otherwise,” 162  modern science sees in technics an “application of 
science,”163 while, for Aristotle, technics was constituted in opposition to science. As 
Vernant points out in Myth and Thought among the Greeks, anything concerning itself 
with the process of becoming and change lacked the essential scientific criterion of 
akribeia (precision) necessary for the scientific episteme.164  
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In a problematic move on the part of Stiegler himself, his designation of the second 
periodization as the “old metaphysical doxa” must be seen as reducing practically all of the 
history of philosophy, from Aristotle to Kant, to a problem of conjecture. Doxological 
critique was historically employed by Plato in order to separate logos from its 
instrumentalization by the sophists. In a strange turn of events, Stiegler himself employs 
the metaphysical distinction between philosophy and sophism, or science and technics, that 
he otherwise aimed to displace. However, given the broad periodization of the “old 
metaphysical doxa,” its efficacy as an actual historiographical category is questionable in 
any case. It seems, nonetheless, to perform a powerful function within Stiegler’s narrative. 
On the one hand, it aligns Kant’s thinking with that of Aristotle, putting forward an 
overwhelmingly Aristotelian Kant (which he might have inherited from Heidegger). On 
the other hand, he also seems to suggest that this “old metaphysical doxa” came to a close 
after Kant, with Marx. His narrative of the end of metaphysics thus differentiates itself 
from those of both Simondon and Heidegger. According to Simondon, the industrial 
revolution surely produced the conditions of possibility for a non-metaphysical thinking of 
technics, but nonetheless no genuine technical insight is said to have come about, due to 
culture’s technophobic constitution. The actualization of this post-metaphysical thought on 
technics is consequently the subject of Simondon’s own philosophical contribution in On 
the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects. Concerning Heidegger, modern metaphysics 
was shown to have begun with Machiavelli until finally coming to a close with Jünger. 
Heidegger thus equally locates his own intervention at the very cusp of the completion of 
metaphysics, which is to be brought about, or at least prepared, by his discourse of 
questioning. 
 
Stiegler and Kant 
 
While the preceding pages have demonstrated that Kant occupies an important role within 
Stiegler’s categories of periodization, this is not the only role that Stiegler ascribes to Kant. 
While Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus mentions Kant only a few times, 
and primarily in pejorative terms,165 Technics and Time, 3: Cinematic Time and the 
Question of Malaise shows just how important Kant is for Stiegler’s overall project. In the 
opening note to Technics and Time, 3 Stiegler points out that after the completion of what 
was initially supposed to be the third and final volume of the Technics and Time series, he 
																																																								
165 See Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1, p.98. 
	 55	
noticed a problem of connection, a “connective fault.”166 This problem of connection could 
only be resolved through an in-depth engagement with the very “heart of modern 
philosophy”: Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. It was Kant who finally brought into view 
“the focal point of the very idea that, despite many attempts had escaped [Stiegler].”167 
Following his reading of the Critique of Pure Reason, Stiegler decided, in the year 2000, to 
push back what was initially supposed to have been the third and last volume of the 
Technics and Time series to a fifth position, inserting new third and fourth volumes.  
 
The new third volume occupies an interesting position in relation to the overall series. 
Essentially performing a reading of Kant, it is said to be both autonomous of the series 
while at the same time functioning as an introduction to the preceding two volumes.168 
This means that Stiegler’s engagement with Kant is important for two reasons. Firstly, it 
demanded nothing less than the restructuring and overall rethinking of the entire Technics 
and Time series, thus revealing Kant’s surprisingly central position within Stiegler’s 
project. Secondly, it is Stiegler’s reading of Kant that now explicitly prepares the ground 
for and serves as the introduction to the entire Technics and Time series. 
 
Stiegler’s reading of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason centers on four main points: 
synthesis, schematization, orientation, and finally critique. Of these four issues, it will be 
the question of synthesis “that will constitute the heart of the reflections [Stiegler] offer[s] 
here through a reading of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.”169 In line with Stiegler’s 
argument, presented in the preceding pages, that the a priori is essentially the after-effect 
of prostheticity, Stiegler accuses Kant of not having seen how the a priori three-fold 
synthesis of consciousness was always already conditioned by a fourth synthesis. This 
fourth synthesis, he argues, is technological170 and synthetic, in the sense in which “we call 
the artifice of prosthetic replication ‘synthetic.’”171  
 
In a complex manner, Stiegler puts forward an exegesis of Kant in order to show how Kant 
himself always already relied on a number of technical “retentional instruments,”172 and 
that it is precisely due to these material, technical traces that Kant’s conscious activity first 
became accessible to both himself as well as his public. On Stiegler’s account, Kant 
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overlooked the material conditions of the production of the unity of his own consciousness 
in his transcendental idealist insistence on the interiority of phenomena, which surrounded 
him in the form of manuscripts, notes, and different versions. Functioning as a prosthetic 
milieu, at once consciousness and its other,173 according to Stiegler the unity of Kant’s 
own thought could only become accessible to Kant through his books and technical traces, 
functioning as the understanding’s “veritable crutch.”174 Stiegler’s argument is thus that 
while Kant always relied on this fourth, technological synthesis, he remained incapable of 
seeing it, let alone conceptualizing it.  
 
Stiegler’s discussion of schematization in Technics and Time, 3 sets off from Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s critique of the culture industry in Dialectic of Enlightenment. Their critique 
of the culture industry, and specifically Hollywood cinema, hinges on the claim that its 
“prime service to the customer is to do his schematizing for him [sic].”175 What they mean 
to say is that Hollywood cinema has finally deciphered and gained control over what, 
according to Kant, was a “hidden art in the depth of the human soul.”176 Stiegler’s 
engagement with Adorno and Horkeimer’s argument asks how it is possible to schematize 
for someone else. Essentially employing a Kantian methodology, inquiring into the 
conditions of possibility while at the same time arguing against Kant, Stiegler’s claim is 
that it was Kant himself who did not acknowledge the primordial role that mnemotechnical 
retentions (technical objects) have always already played in the constitution of 
consciousness. This means that it is only because schematization was always already 
implicated in the play of mnemo-technical retentions that it can now be industrially 
performed by the culture industry.177  
 
Stiegler thus ventures to show how image and schema, material trace and concept are co-
emergent and interrelated, the reality of which is said to have escaped both Kant as well as 
Adorno and Horkheimer. Neither of them recognized the technical “substratum”178 of the 
“third” provided by the schema. According to Stiegler, the schema and its substratum are 
thus “two faces of the same reality,”179 providing the two-fold after-effect of an onto-
epistemological elaboration that takes place prior to the bifurcation into form and matter, 
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the inner and outer, the mental and the material. What this means, then, for Stiegler, is 
there can only be such a thing as an industrial schematism “because the schematics are 
originarily, in their very structure industrializable: they are functions […] of technics, 
technology, and, today, industry.”180  
 
Stiegler’s third and fourth points of engagement with Kant equally do not stop short of 
being thoroughly unsettling. In naming the Critique of Pure Reason “Critique,” without a 
grammatical proposition that would concede the possibility of there ever being other 
possible critiques of pure reason, Kant put forward the performative claim to have 
completed the project of reason’s critique once and for all. However, in his discussion of 
the current technoscientific paradigm, Stiegler joins in the choir of post-Kantian thinkers 
who challenge the Kantian position of having completed the project of reason’s critique 
once and for all. Stiegler’s point is that when it comes to technoscience, by which he 
means contemporary scientific practice, the relation between the real and the possible has 
essentially been reversed. This is the case because technoscience, rather than describing or 
accounting for an already existing reality, aims to “create a new reality.”181 As such, the 
Kantian founding distinction between theory and practice, including the restrictions put on 
theoretical reason, is unsettled and essentially invalidated. The questions at stake in 
Stiegler’s discussion of technoscience thus firstly point to the necessity of a new, post-
Kantian critique informed by technics, which, secondly, asks about the conditions of 
possibility of judging the technological fictions produced by technoscientific practice as a 
problem of how to orient oneself in the “darkness of scientific possibles.”182 
 
Once again, Kant must be seen to occupy a central yet paradoxical role in Stiegler’s 
account of technics. On the one hand, Kant appeared as the closing figure of both the main 
categories of periodization employed in Stiegler’s history of technical thought: 
philosophical modernity and the old metaphysical doxa. At the same time, Kant was 
revealed as the catalyst for the complete restructuring of Stiegler’s entire Technics and 
Time series. Furthermore, Stiegler’s discussion of the Critique of Pure Reason serves as 
the introduction to the entire restructured series, pointing once more to the foundational 
role that Kant plays in Stiegler’s technics-thinking. Despite this, and in a similar fashion to 
both Heidegger and Simondon, Stiegler’s reading of Kant appears thoroughly one-sided.  
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On the one hand, Stiegler explicitly claims that Kant forgot about technics in all of its 
aspects, while, however, always already relying on technical prosthetics. On the other 
hand, and in a similar vein to Heidegger and Simondon, Stiegler only explicitly quotes 
Kant on technics once in order to underscore his point, namely that Kant mistook the 
relation between science and technics as merely a problem of application.183 However, 
given the near absence of consideration afforded to Kant’s own explicit thinking on 
technics, it remains unclear what exactly Stiegler thought that technics could have meant 
for Kant himself. As with the preceding discussions on Heidegger and Simondon, Kant 
occupies what can only, once again, be said to be a paradoxical position. Kant is at once 





183 Immanuel Kant, 1996. “On the Common Saying: That may be correct in theory, but is of no use in 
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laugh at him (for, if the theory of friction were added to the first and the theory of the resistance of the air to 
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CHAPTER 1.4. A future for Kant despite Heidegger, Simondon, and 
Stiegler 
The preceding discussions have shown, that Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler all argue, 
in one way or another, that technics articulates the limits of philosophical thought 
understood as metaphysics. Technics is thus at once philosophy’s fundamental obstacle 
and its possibility. If philosophy is to finally open itself up to technics, it will have to 
undergo a radical transformation, with specific programmes for this transformation to be 
found in Heidegger’s, Simondon’s and Stiegler’s respective philosophical projects.  
 
According to Heidegger, technics is the final stage of metaphysics, meaning that the 
historical present is in a moment of transition (Übergang). Our vocation (Bestimmung), he 
then writes, is to bear witness to this transition and to prepare a different time through the 
act of questioning. “Wenn wir es vermögen das Wesen der Technik sachgemäß zu 
erfragen, wandelt sich dabei das Fragen in das erörternde Sagen, wandelt sich das Denken. 
Wir bewegen uns nicht mehr im Vorstellen von Gegenständen […]. Wir gelangen 
unterwegs – wohin? Solches Denken ist nicht mehr stellbar im Ge-stell und durch dieses 
[…].”184  
 
According to Simondon, technics is both the beginning and the end of metaphysics. It is 
the beginning of metaphysics because metaphysics was always already derived from the 
incomplete technical experience of the ancient Greek master-slave relation. And it is at the 
same time the end of metaphysics because, in being derived from an incomplete, socio-
politically overdetermined technical experience, metaphysics is said to be structurally 
incapable of properly thinking technics. Simondon’s own project, employing the method of 
problematization, aims to bring about a post-metaphysical and genetic philosophical 
thought, capable of thinking technics in its becoming. 
 
In the third and final discussion, Stiegler characterizes the relation between philosophy and 
technics as one of repression. Stiegler’s own contribution, at once Heideggerian and 
Simondonian, attempts to liberate technics through exhuming and thereby inventing 
technical thought anew. Only this way, he claims, can “justice” finally be done to technics.  
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In their respective discussions all three thinkers have been shown to dedicate an important 
place to Kant. Kant himself wrote at the brink of the Industrial Revolution, and thus just 
prior to the widespread occurrence of industrially produced technical objects and the 
corresponding modern conception of technics. According to Heidegger, Kant’s 
Transcendental Analytic laid open the a priori principles of the thingness of things, 
articulating the very moment in which metaphysics “became,” so to speak, modern 
technics. By consequence, I have argued that, according to Heidegger, the Transcendental 
Analytic, could or even should have been called Transcendental Technics. While providing 
the foundations for Heidegger’s own notion of enframing (Gestell), Kant is however not 
read by Heidegger as a thinker of technics himself. Instead, he is read merely 
symptomatically, in the sense that he is said to have implicitly articulated the moment in 
which metaphysics became technics, without, however, self-reflexively “understanding” it 
himself. 
 
Simondon places Kant in an equally prominent position in his critique of metaphysics, 
which, says Simondon, must be left behind once and for all. Simondon claims this is 
necessary as, from within the transcendental restrictions of knowledge so forcefully 
articulated by Kant, thought is either too early (a priori) or too late (a posteriori), but never 
contemporaneous with technical operation. According to Simondon, technics is thus the 
final question for transcendental philosophy, which it is structurally incapable of 
responding to: its answer will either come too early or too late. Due to essentially being out 
of time with technics, Kant could not recognize the inherently technical nature driving the 
Enlightenment, which Simondon also terms technical Encyclopedism. Since Kant argues 
that criticism is the basis of the Enlightenment, one could argue that, from Simondon’s 
point of view, the Critique of Pure Reason should have been called Critique of Technical 
Reason. Since it was not, meaning that Kant remained blind to technicity and technical 
becoming, Simondon’s self-proclaimed aim is to put forward a subsequent technological 
Encyclopedism, which is at heart also a humanism aimed at liberation, only this time, the 
liberation of technics. 
 
Within Stiegler’s project, Kant was shown to have led to the restructuration of the entire 
Technics and Time series. But similarly to Heidegger and Simondon, Stiegler also argues 
that Kant did not “think” technics in its constitutive, prosthetic function, as shown, for 
instance, in his critical discussions of synthesis and schematization.  In his engagement 
with the concept of technoscience, Stiegler takes further issue with the Kantian 
foundational distinction between theory and praxis, which, in a similar argument to 
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Simondon, is said to be “structurally incapable” of thinking techno-science 185 
Consequently, and despite its catalyzing function within Stiegler’s project, Stiegler also 
argues that Kant must ultimately be left behind as he marks a fundamental limit to 
technical thought proper.  
 
Kant is thus given a prominent place in all three accounts of technics. Yet these 
discussions lead again and again to the conclusion that, when it comes to the question and 
problem of technics, there is no future for Kant. All three thinkers claim to be in a 
historically singular position from which technical thought proper can, for the first time, be 
developed, questioned, problematized, exhumed, and invented. Here, I claim that the open 
contradiction of the role occupied by Kant in twentieth century discourses on technics is 
itself a symptom of an underlying methodological problem, in the sense that, for the 
projects of these three self-proclaimed thinkers of technics to work, the history of 
philosophy had to be at once devoid of technical thought proper, while, at the same time, 
harboring the seeds for post-metaphysical thought on technics. Consequently, and as I will 
show in what follows, all three thinkers could themselves not see what it is they were at the 
same time so urgently looking for. Only in this way can the radical oversight regarding 
Kant’s explicit writings on technics make sense.  
 
What remained veiled, or, in a quasi-tragic turn of events, was veiled once again by 
Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler, stands out in ever greater contrast to contemporary 
readers. In a strange turn of events, it is thus Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler, who can 
teach us to read the history of philosophy, including Kant, technically, despite their own 
explicit claims that the history of philosophy remained blind to the problem of technics. 
While the stand-alone engagement with Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler’s projects has 
herewith come to an end, in as much as the following chapters provide an in-depth inquiry 
into the role and meaning of technics within Kant’s system, they are also offering, at the 
same time, an engagement with, and critique of, the histories of technical thought told by 
Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler. 
 
																																																								











Any serious and fair engagement with a philosophical work must start out by articulating 
the problem that at once motivated the philosophical undertaking at hand and shaped the 
ensuing solution. When it comes to Kant, this means articulating the problem that 
motivated Kant to develop the critical method in order to find and justify his 
transcendental conditions of possibility. The point of departure is thus decided. But, one 
might well ask, does embarking from such a general place not risk losing the primary 
vantage point that motivated my inquiry in the first place? Is technics here relegated to the 
background before ever even seeing the light of day? As this chapter will show, it is here – 
at the general level of the problem addressed by Kant’s philosophical project– that technics 
will show itself, in its complex and multifaceted form, for the first time. The investigation 
of the problem addressed by Kant’s philosophical project thus constitutes the first part of 
the my inquiry into the role and meaning of technics in Kant’s works. 
 
Kant discusses his critical approach in the two prefaces and introductions to his seminal 
work, Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft). The double genitive in the title 
of the work points to the complexity of the undertaking. The uncertainty of the who and 
the what in the grammatical structure reveals that this is not only a critique of pure reason, 
in the sense of subjecting pure reason to critique. It is at the same time pure reason itself 
that carries out this critique. We are thus dealing with what could be called a self-critique, 
in which an internally differentiated reason is at once the court of justice, the judge, and 
the accused themselves. But what has occasioned these extraordinary measures? What 
crimes has reason committed to provoke its own trial? Reason’s self-critique, Kant claims, 
is necessary in order to settle once and for all the “endless controversies” fought out in “the 
battlefield […] called metaphysics,”186 which are slowly driving the former “queen of all 
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the sciences”187 into ruin. Brought about by reason’s very own “fate [Schicksal],” reason is 
said to be “burdened with questions which it cannot dismiss, since they are given to it as 
problems by the nature of reason itself, but which it also cannot answer, since they 
transcend every [faculty] of human reason.”188 The questions referred to by Kant are of a 
metaphysical order, questions such as: does God exist? What is the nature of being? When 
did the world begin?  
 
While these questions are given to reason’s inner nature by itself, they simultaneously far 
exceed what reason is capable of answering. The predicament is thus indeed paradoxical, 
since reason has no one but itself to blame for its vexing dilemma. The source of the 
problem, Kant reveals, is to be found in reason’s nature itself. Subject to a “drive for 
expansion [Trieb zur Erweiterung],”189 reason plunges itself into ever further “obscurity 
and contradictions,”190 warranting the extraordinary measures of the Critique of Pure 
Reason. It is in relation to reason’s very own inner drive for expansion that technics will 
show itself, since, as I will show in the following, that reason’s very method of expansion 
is instrumental in nature.  
 
In order to investigate reason’s predicament in more detail, I propose the following course 
of inquiry. The first part of this chapter will look in more detail at reason’s drive (Trieb). 
The second part will then discuss the instrumental problematic of the drive, before the third 
part will finally move from Kant’s pathological diagnosis of reason to his two-fold critical 
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CHAPTER 2.1 Reason’s drive  
	
Emerging in the German language during the thirteenth century, Trieb initially denoted a 
non-human driving force (Kraft) in the broad sense of the term, and could be applied to 
both technically produced objects as well as organic but non-human beings. From the 
sixteenth century onwards the term came to refer to human beings as well, designating an 
internal impulse acting on the body or the mind.191 The 1984 edition of Grimm’s 
Deutsches Wörterbuch states that a drive is, generally speaking, an “internal force that 
impels, that puts into motion [innere treibende Kraft].”192 Within the context of the 
Critique of Pure Reason, the term drive (Trieb) appears in relation either to expansion or to 
the Triebfeder (incentive) of morality,193 which the later Critique of Pure Practical Reason 
will deal with explicitly.194 That Kant’s understanding of Trieb was generally in line with 
the definition given by Grimm’s Wörterbuch is attested to by the various references to how 
reason is driven by its “own needs” (durch ihr eigenes Bedürfnis),195 that it has its drive “in 
itself”,196 and, finally, that it is driven by “its own nature [die Vernunft wird durch einen 
Hang ihrer Natur getrieben].”197 All of these citations point to reason’s drive not being a 
problem of an external inclination, nor to the drive being a mere predicate of reason. 
Rather, it is reason’s inner nature to strive. Autonomously arising from “within universal 
human reason itself [aus der Natur der allgemeinen Menschenvernunft],”198 drive thus 
denotes the originary and continuous moving force that is reason itself.  
 
While the drive is said to be innate to universal reason itself, the term “drive for expansion 
[Trieb zur Erweiterung]”199 points to its general outward orientation. What this means is 
that reason strives towards “ends” or questions. And while these ends arise from “within 
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universal human reason itself [aus der Natur der allgemeinen Menschenvernunft],”200 their 
answer is said to “transcend every [faculty] of human reason.”201 What this means, then, is 
that when it comes to theoretical reason as the primary object of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, it is not within theoretical reason’s power to answer, in the sense of know, its own 
questions. This is the case because the knowledge of these answers are said to lie “outside” 
of theoretical reason’s proper bounds. This applies in a two-fold manner: reason’s 
expansions are either aimed towards places far removed from empirical experience, so as 
to gain access to metaphysical questions, or, on the other hand, to its supposed real world 
referents. Both of these ends go right to the heart of the problem of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, which as a whole sets out to decide “about the possibility or impossibility of a 
metaphysics in general.”202 Metaphysics poses questions that by definition cannot be 
answered by resort to experience, questions such as the nature of being (metaphysica 
generalis) as well as the existence and properties of God, the immortality of the soul, and 
the beginning and end of the universe (the three domains of metaphysica specialis).203 The 
problem articulated by Kant here is thus the following: despite the long history of 
metaphysics no stable ground has been gained so far. Falling into obscurities and 
entangling itself in contradictions, metaphysics failed to establish itself as a science over 
and over again, thereby continually forcing itself to retrace its steps.204 How, then, does 
reason go about achieving these ends? What is this problematic, unsound mode of 
expansion that Kant is talking about, by which reason is trying to answer its own questions 
which at once exceed its capabilities and proper bounds?  
 
The organon of reason 	
 
Kant accuses reason of employing an instrument or tool in order to achieve its expansions, 
for which he uses the German word Werkzeug (instrument), which is otherwise employed 
in contexts of handicraft and technical production.205 Placing reason within a framework of 
instrumentality reveals that there is an underlying instrumental condition to reason’s drive. 
Reason’s drive is purposive (zweckmäßig); consequently it uses means (instruments) in 
order to achieve its ends (the questions of general and special metaphysics). But what is 
the ominous instrument that reason is accused of employing?  
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The most famous organon (ancient Greek for instrument or tool) in the history of 
philosophy is without doubt the collection of Aristotle’s six logical works.206 The name 
Organon was posthumously assigned to these works by Aristotle’s followers. The first 
critique of Aristotle for using judgments, inferences and concepts as tools in order to 
extend knowledge came from Epicurus, who replaced the Organon with his more humble 
Canon (ancient Greek for rule), which “concerns criteria and first principles, or the 
fundamentals of philosophy.”207 Epicurus’s Canon thus aimed to establish a body of rules 
for distinguishing between correct and incorrect judgments, rather than extending 
knowledge.208 In his Jaesche Logik Kant refers to Epicurus’s Canon and characterizes his 
own project as essentially Epicurean in nature. Logic, Kant writes, should be nothing but a 
“canonica Epicuri,” 209  comprised of the correct rules for “passing judgments and 
correcting our cognition, but not for expanding it.”210 The Critique of Pure Reason equally 
proposes to restrict logic from organon to canon, whereby logic is reduced to a mere 
negative utility, “namely that it does not serve for [expansion], as an organon, but rather, as 
a discipline, serves for the determination of boundaries, and instead of discovering truth it 
has only the silent merit of guarding against errors.”211 In Epicurean fashion, Kant thus 
accuses reason of (ab)using logic as an instrument for achieving its ends of expansion.  
 
Kant’s discussion of reason’s drive for expansion takes place at two prominent moments of 
the Critique of Pure Reason: first appearing during the two Prefaces and Introductions, it 
reappears towards the end of the Critique of Pure Reason, in the second of its two books. 
In between the Introductions and the second book we find the disproportionately long 
Transcendental Doctrine of Elements, which contains the promised canon: “a science of 
the mere estimation [Beurteilung] of pure reason, of its sources and boundaries.”212 After 
reason’s elements, “sources and boundaries” have been secured by the canon, Kant moves 
on to the second book of the Critique of Pure Reason, entitled Transcendental Doctrine of 
Method. The nomenclature of the two main books, as well as their internal structuration, 
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corresponds to common modern structurations of logical treatises with genuine 
Aristotelian provenance, such as the 1662 Port Royal logic.213 What the treatment of pure 
reason according to elements and method points to is that reason’s instrumental drive for 
expansion is subjected by Kant to a double treatment.  
 
Elements, sources, and boundaries: the Doctrine of Elements and the canon	
	
Within the context of the canon, reason’s unruly expansions and the instrumental 
employment of logic are dealt with as a problem of proper bounds. The canon addresses 
the problems of bounds through a discourse on the mind’s (Gemüt) immanent faculties 
(Vermögen) and forces (Kräfte), and the role that logic is assigned within that discourse. 
As such, it ventures to restrict what theoretical reason wants, drives, or strives to know to 
what it “can” know, meaning that its ends and questions are set in relation to its own 
proper powers, its faculties (Vermögen). The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements thus 
engages in the quasi-archeological work of first analyzing and then sounding the depth of 
the faculties (Vermögen) and forces (Kräfte), in the sense of legislating their competences. 
This is necessary for Kant since, as we have seen, he accuses theoretical reason of striving 
for ends that far exceed its faculties (Vermögen).214 If reason’s instrumental drive for 
expansion is to be averted, Kant thus claims that one firstly needs to ask, in proto-
Deleuzian fashion, what reason and the faculties and forces of the Gemüt “can do.”215 
  
Derived from both the Latin facultas as well as the Greek dynamis, the concept of 
Vermögen (faculty) in Kant is double-coded as both the “ability or power to achieve an end 
[… and] a potential for change which would be actualized through energeia.” 216 
Concerning the relation between faculty and force (Kraft), Kant adopted the distinction 
from Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, where one finds the following ontological definition: 
“although positing a faculty and receptivity does not posit action or suffering, nevertheless 
such is possible when a power in the stricter sense is posited. This will be the complement 
of a faculty to act, i.e. that which is added to the faculty for the action to come to exist.”217 
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This means that forces are the actualization of faculties, they must be added for a faculty to 
be actualized.218 The Kantian critical project as a whole thus begins by dissecting the 
Gemüt into its different faculties and forces in order to derive its adequate and 
corresponding ends. Consequently, reason’s unruly and transcendent drive is placed within 
a ‘restricted economy’, in which reason’s legitimate ends are deduced from a discussion of 
what it is lawfully capable of, and thus without the instrumental, but ultimately 
illegitimate, use of logic.  
 
The Kantian proposal to set ends in relation to faculties can be seen clearly in his 
discussion of metaphysics. The preceding discussion has shown that the expansions of 
theoretical reason are either aimed towards places far removed from empirical cognition, 
so as to gain access to metaphysical questions, or to its supposed real world referents. 
Kant’s damning diagnosis of metaphysics had already started two decades prior to the 
Critique of Pure Reason, in his essay On the One Possible Proof of the Existence of God. It 
was here that Kant first introduced the proposition that existence is not a predicate.219 This 
proposition is taken up in slightly altered form again in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant 
claims that modal judgments, which are judgments concerning the possibility, existence, or 
necessity of things, do not add anything to the content of any judgment. Instead, a modal 
judgment “concerns only the value of the copula in relation to thinking in general.”220 Kant 
thus fundamentally shifts the grounds of the metaphysical debate, proposing that, from 
now on, judgments need to be reflexively justified internally to thought itself.  
 
In similar fashion to how he shifted the discourse of special metaphysics towards the 
validity of our judgments, Kant also ventures to displace questions about the essence of 
being (general metaphysics), thus effecting a radical reformulation of ontology. His 
transcendental idealist position proposes that “objects of experience […] are never given in 
themselves, but only in experience, and they do not exist at all outside it.”221 What this 
means is that our concepts (as well as space and time as our forms of intuition) as a whole 
do not pertain to things “out there,” as a transcendental realist position would have it. But 
neither does Kant doubt the reality of external objects, like a Cartesian skepticism would. 
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Instead Kant promotes a more complex, two-fold proposition. Taking the place of “the 
proud name of an ontology,” 222  Kant’s Transcendental Analytic articulates his 
transcendental idealist position: while concepts and intuitions are nothing but 
representations, and thus have no existence outside our mind, they are at the same time the 
universal and necessary conditions for the possibility of things “for us.”  
 
Kant thus argues that one must reflexively inquire into how it is that one can judge 
(correctly) in order to address questions concerning both special metaphysics as well as the 
nature of being, and thus general metaphysics. Rather than remaining within the old 
metaphysical discourse, with its question of “What is X?”, the Kantian project 
fundamentally displaces the place of inquiry. In directing our attention to the reflexive 
question of how we can correctly judge X, Kant puts forward a fundamentally novel 
approach to philosophizing, which begins by investigating and securing the elements for 
cognition, and the faculties and forces of cognition, before venturing to employ them in 
philosophical arguments. This undertaking of investigating, delineating, and securing the 
elements of cognition is the explicit subject matter of the canon, which is the first half of 
Kant’s critical remedy to reason’s instrumental drive to expansion by means of logic.   
 
The canon and its technical critiques 
 
As the above has shown, a canon must contain “the sum total of the a priori principles of 
the correct use of certain cognitive faculties in general,”223 since it is to provide a faculty 
with a set of principles (Grundsätze) that allow it to correctly, and thus lawfully, go about 
its business. This firstly means that a canon holds the rules for the correct use of a faculty. 
It secondly lays claim to totality, as being able to enumerate all of the necessary rules of a 
cognitive faculty, be it the faculty of understanding, the power of judgment, or the faculty 
of reason. Thirdly, these rules are characterized as a priori, which means that they lie 
ready-for-use in the mind (Gemüt), rather than coming to us from experience. Being a 
problem of principles means, fourthly, that it is a “starting point.” According to Kant, 
principles contain the grounds for other judgments, while they are themselves not 
grounded in anything higher or more universal,224 thus implying that a principle cannot be 
analyzed or dissolved into further constitutive parts; rather, it must be presupposed for 
everything else. The canon must thus hold the totality of immediately certain, a priori 
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principles pertaining to a cognitive faculty. In this way, Kant’s critical project aims to 
reformulate metaphysics as the search to uncover and delineate the immanent limits of 
human reason by means of the canon, rather than abusing logic as an instrument in the 
search for hidden truths such as the metaphysical objects of God, freedom, and the 
immortality of the soul. 
 
The correlation of a canon with the correct use of a faculty means that, of our three 
faculties of cognition (understanding, power of judgment, and reason), only understanding 
and the power of judgment can have a canon in the positive sense. The canons of the 
faculty of understanding and the power of judgment are both expounded in the 
Transcendental Analytic. Consisting of the Analytic of Concepts and the Analytic of 
Principles, the two-part Transcendental Analytic is said to lay open “the elements of the 
pure cognition of the understanding and the principles without which no object can be 
thought.”225 However, the canon constituted by reason, as our third faculty of cognition, 
consists in a Transcendental Dialectic, rather than an Analytic. Here, the canon functions 
as a “critique of the understanding and reason in regard to their hyperphysical use, in order 
to uncover the false illusion of their groundless pretensions.”226 The Dialectic thus lays 
open the logic of illusion in reason’s misguided attempts to syllogistically expand our 
knowledge of the special metaphysical objects of the soul, freedom, and God. This means 
that, differently to the theoretical faculties of understanding and judgment, reason in its 
theoretical use has only a negative canon, which illustrates the contradictions of reason if it 
fails to proceed according to its critical limits. At the same time, reason nonetheless 
acquires a positive use of its canon, once the discussion moves beyond theoretical reason. 
But since it will then be a canon for reason in its practical rather than theoretical use, it is 
only the second Critique, Critique of Pure Practical Reason, that explicitly expands on 
it.227 As such this positive canon will not feature in the present discussion, which focuses 
on the Critique of Pure Reason. 
 
Within the domain of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant consequently specifies only two 
positive canons: a canon for the faculty of understanding and a canon for the power of 
judgment. Concerning the canon of the faculty of understanding, Kant proposes that 
general logic is nothing but the pure formal law of the understanding. In laying out the 
rules for thinking so that thought is in accord with itself, general logic contains the mere 
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formal rules of thought, and, as such, it is to be sought and tried internally to thought itself. 
As a canon for the merely formal use of the understanding, general logic, however, does 
not suffice to show and secure how the use of the cognitive faculty by itself is possible. 
This is the case because the canon of general logic is not only devoid of content, but, 
furthermore, completely indifferent to any content provided to it from elsewhere. Thus, if 
there is to be a “lawful” relation between reason’s forms and any possible content of 
thought (be it the actual world of objects or metaphysics), which does not rely on the 
transgressive use of logic as an instrument, there needs to be something else, something 
more, to make possible this very relation between theoretical reason and its other. 
 
And indeed, Kant proposes that, complementing the first, purely formal, outline of the 
canon of general logic, there is another side to the canon of the faculty of understanding, 
which comes onto the scene in order to secure precisely a non-instrumental relation of 
reason’s forms to its content. Going by the name of Transcendental Logic, Kant argues 
that it is “a logic in which one did not abstract from all content of cognition.”228 His claim 
is nothing less than that transcendental logic is at once pure and endowed with content at 
the same time. How is such a logic possible? 
 
Famously distinguishing between the understanding and intuition as the two sources of 
cognition, Kant’s transcendental idealism proposes that “in whatever way and through 
whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates 
immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end, is 
intuition.”229 On the one hand, there is thus the understanding, with its universal concepts 
for thinking objects, and, on the other hand, there is sensible intuition (Anschauung), which 
is charged with relating these thoughts to actual objects. This means that Kant’s critical 
remedy to the illegitimate (ab)use of logic as an instrument hinges on his claim that objects 
can only be “given” to us, in the sense of being affected by them in sensibility.230  
 
Of our two faculties of cognition, sensibility (Sinnlichkeit) is thus identified by Kant as the 
faculty through which objects can be given to us. However, the clause “in whatever way 
and through whatever means cognition may relate to objects” indicates that there are 
different ways in which cognition can relate to objects. In fact, intuition is itself said to 
have two sides to it. Differentiating between the form and the matter of intuition, Kant 
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argues that while the matter of intuition is always subject to being empirically given, the 
same does not apply to the forms of intuition. Constituting a curiously non-sensible side of 
sensibility, the forms of intuition are specified as nothing other than space and time, which, 
Kant claims, lie a priori ready in our mind (Gemüt) in a similar way to the concepts of the 
understanding. Thus while the matter of intuition is always dependent on a particular 
experience of a given object, the forms of intuition can never be given in experience.  
 
The receptive character of sensibility is consequently complemented by a non-sensible 
intuition, which, in a similar manner to the concepts of the understanding, can be 
anticipated and enumerated prior to any particular experience.231 Specified as space and 
time, the a priori forms of intuition are what  
 
allows the manifold of appearance to be intuited as ordered in certain relations […]. Since 
that within which the sensations can alone be ordered and placed in a certain form cannot 
itself be in turn sensation, the matter of all appearance is only given to us a posteriori, but 
its form must all lie ready for it in the mind a priori.232 
 
 It is thus intuition’s non-sensible form, which is explicitly said to allow for the given 
content of intuition to be “ordered.” The forms of intuition are thus charged by Kant with 
the action of ordering (ordnen) and placing (stellen) the matter of intuition given to us.233 
Thus, if an object is to be received by us, it is explicitly subject to being placed and 
ordered according to the a priori forms of intuition.  
 
Lingering for a moment on the word placing (stellen), it appears that the preceding 
discussion of the a priori forms of intuition, which are specified by Kant as what allows 
reason to relate to things outside of itself rather than illegitimately extending itself by 
means of logic alone, might have led us to the source of what Heidegger calls enframing 
(Gestell). In the Question Concerning Technics, Heidegger claimed that the essence of 
modern technics as enframing (Gestell) is at once an ordering attitude (bestellendes 
Verhalten) and a quasi-“hunter” that “pursues and entraps [nachstellen] nature”234 to reveal 
itself as standing reserve (Bestand). This ordering attitude of enframing (Gestell) was then 
argued to first have shown itself in modern metaphysics, and specifically in Kant’s 
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Critique of Pure Reason. For Heidegger, the placing and ordering (stellen) of the matter of 
intuition into the forms of space and time thus do not denote neutral or even harmonious 
acts that make the reception of sense objects possible. Instead, they are the transcendental 
condition for the technical domination of nature. The acts of placing (stellen) and ordering 
(ordnen) performed by the pure forms of intuition are, Heidegger argues, fundamentally a 
technics of entrapping and pursuing (nachstellen) nature.235 The verbs stellen, nachstellen, 
bestellen all denote the operations by which enframing (Gestell), as modern metaphysics’ 
heir to the mind (Gemüt), challenges the real to reveal itself as an identifiable and spatio-
locally determinable number of scientific objects. 
 
Heidegger’s reading goes right to the heart of the Kantian problematic, since Kant put 
forward the canon precisely in order to restrict reason’s illegitimate instrumentality. To this 
end, the canon charged intuition, rather than the logic of the understanding, with relating 
reason to its “other.” Heidegger’s point is thus that, in critically avoiding the (ab)use of 
logic as an instrument by charging intuition rather than logic with the responsibility for 
relating to the world of things, Kant came to articulate, in a quasi-ironic fashion, nothing 
less than the very essence of modern technics as enframing (Gestell), an insight which is 
said to have escaped him. 
 
Heidegger was, however, not the only to put forward a radically technical reading of the 
canon. Differently from Heidegger, Stiegler does not identify the essence of modern 
technics as Kant’s remedy to reason’s instrumentality, but instead argues that Kant’s pure 
and a priori canon is made possible by a “subterranean” technics. The crux of Stiegler’s 
argument is that Kant thought it possible to critique the faculty of reason independently of 
its embodiment in “books and systems.”236 Against Kant’s  claim of treating reason in 
general, Stiegler however insists that it is not possible to consider the faculty of pure 
reason in general without its material, technical conditions. For Stiegler, Kant’s insistence 
on a pure faculty of reason did thus not get rid of its technical conditions, but demoted 
them to a subterranean mode all the while relying on them.  Both Heidegger and Stiegler 
thus read Kant’s canon, explicitly put forward in order to restrict reason’s instrumental 
drive for expansion, as either articulating nothing less than the essence of modern technics, 
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Interestingly enough, however, Heidegger and Stiegler were not the first to critique Kant’s 
supposedly pure canon in technical terms. As a matter of fact, this very accusation was 
already directed at Kant during his own lifetime. And, as the following will show, Kant 
furthermore responded to the explicitly technical critique of his canon. It thus appears that, 
in their insistence on the implicit status of a technical problematic in the canon, both 
Heidegger and Stiegler failed to account for a discussion that Kant himself partook in, 
which centered precisely on the question of the canon as a technical problematic.  
 
The canon, an a priori manufacture?	
 
As pointed out by Catherine Malabou in Before Tomorrow: Epigenesis and Rationality,237 
the German Enlightenment thinker and cousin of J.W. von Goethe, J.G. Schlosser, 
critiqued Kant in 1795 for having reduced cognition to “a mere form-giving manufacture 
[Formgebungs-Manufactur].”238 The term Manufactur (Latin: manus hand; facere to make 
and produce) refers to the historical moment in between artisanal and industrial production, 
in which previously decentralized crafts were first united under one roof and according to a 
common aim, as, for instance, in the gathering of turners, metal workers, and goldsmiths 
under the roof of a carriage manufacture. Schlosser’s critique is that Kant’s critical 
philosophy has abstracted from all matter (Materie) of cognition. As a pure system of 
forms, it presents itself as a problem of shaping - of giving form to matter, just like a 
manufacture. Schlosser thus at once accuses Kant, despite the explicit aims of 
transcendental logic, of having lost all content of cognition, of having further transformed 
philosophy and in specific the a priori into a proto-industrial form-giving mechanism that 
shapes the world in its image. 
  
Kant responded to Schlosser’s accusation one year later, in his 1796 essay On a Recently 
Prominent Tone of Superiority in Philosophy. He referred to Schlosser’s critique as 
typifying “the dismissive habit of crying down the formal in our knowledge (which is yet 
the preeminent business of philosophy) as a pedantry, under the name of ‘a pattern-
factory.’”239 Distancing the specific kind of “work” performed by the cognitive faculties 
from the accusation thrown at him by Schlosser, Kant explicitly writes that the work of 
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schematization is neither an “arbitrary form-giving undertaken by design [planmäßig], or 
even machine-made [fabrikenmäßig] (on behalf of the state).”240 While the translators have 
translated fabrikenmäßig as “machine-made,” the original German term refers not to the 
machine but to the factory. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the terms 
manufacture (Manufactur), workshop (Werkstatt), and factory (Fabrik) were often used 
synonymously,241 and the qualification “(on behalf of the state)”242 refers to the French 
model of King Henri IV, by which manufactures were state-founded, a practice that was 
soon adopted throughout Europe.243  
 
Kant’s defense of his system of cognition hinges on the claim that the “work” of 
synthesizing the a priori forms of cognition takes place entirely prior to the “manufacture” 
of dealing with any given, empirical object. It is the “careful work of the subject, his [sic] 
own faculty (of reason).”244 Thus, while, on the one, hand Kant distinctly distances himself 
from Schlosser’s accusations, he objects neither to the characterization of his canon as a 
“making” of a priori forms, nor to the characterization of the empirical cognition of objects 
as a manufacture. What he interestingly does object to is the idea that there might be 
something like a pre-existing pattern that informs and thereby gives the rule to this making 
of a priori forms. Kant’s objection is thus directed against there being a pre-planned and 
anticipated design that is carried out in this a priori making of transcendental forms, but 
not against the making of forms on the transcendental level as such.  
 
A priori operations (Handgriffe)  
 
The exchange between Kant and Schlosser is indeed remarkable, as it includes Kant’s 
response to Schlosser’s technical critique of the canon. As the above has shown, Kant’s 
response insists on the idea of a spontaneous and free production of transcendental forms 
of cognition. This work, which is said to be the responsibility of the subject and its reason, 
can be nothing other than the work of synthesis and schematization. In the Critique of Pure 
Reason Kant explains that synthesis, in the most general sense, is “the action of putting 
different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in 
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one cognition.”245 From the ancient Greek syn, “together,” and tithenai, “to put, to place,” 
synthesis is thus the name for the action of assembling and unifying different 
representations into one. What fundamentally differentiates synthesis from its counterpart 
analysis is that, while analysis aims at clarifying and taking apart something that is given 
in its entirety, synthesis, according to Kant, is always excessive and thus expansive. This 
means that something can, and, in fact, must, always be added to a given concept for a 
judgment to be synthetic rather than analytic. Synthesis thus adds something to the 
concept, something that is true, but this truth cannot be perceived internally to the concept 
itself, according to the formal principle of non-contradiction. The problem of synthesis 
then, is of how to lawfully step outside of the concept, or, to put this differently and in 
reference to the aim of the canon as restricting the (ab)use of logic as an instrument, how 
to lawfully expand a concept by means other than logic.  
 
In its more specific form, synthesis designates the act of schematization, discussed in the 
Schematism chapter. Schematization is the procedure of putting forward, in the sense of 
synthesizing, the famous “thirds,” by which a category of the understanding, is supplied 
with a sense impression. Only by way of the schematism does it thus become possible for a 
category to apply to, in the sense of lawfully connect to, the sensible world. When pressed 
to lay out the precise workings of schematization, however, Kant admits that “this 
schematism of our understanding with regard to appearances and their mere form is a 
hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can divine from 
nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty.”246 Kant thus concedes that it 
is impossible to lay open exactly how it is that schematization in fact takes place. It is, he 
says, a “hidden art [verborgene Kunst].”247  
 
It is remarkable to see Kant take recourse to the word art (Kunst) here, since it is mostly 
used in the Critique of Pure Reason to refer to the undesired organon and in reference to 
sophism, as, for instance, in the characterization of the “logic of illusion – a sophistical 
art.”248 There are, however, three different mentions of the word “art” in the Critique of 
Pure Reason that deviate from these negative uses. The first positive use of the term is 
precisely the characterization of schematization as a hidden art. The second mention of art 
outside the context of sophism can be found in reference to human art (menschliche 
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Kunst).249 The last noteworthy use of the word art can be found in the third chapter of the 
Doctrine of Method, entitled The Architectonic of Pure Reason. The opening sentence of 
this section reads as follows: “By an architectonic I understand the art of systems. Since 
systematic unity is that which first makes ordinary cognition into science, i.e., makes a 
system out of a mere aggregate of it, architectonic is the doctrine of that which is scientific 
in our cognition in general[…]”250 In a seemingly incompatible sense, the general notion of 
art in the Critique of Pure Reason refers to the organon and sophism, schematization, 
human art in general, and the “art of systems” concerning reason’s natural systematicity. 
  
The notion of art employed in the schematism chapter belongs to a general notion of art 
that takes its cues from Können (ability, skill). As ability or skill, this notion of art gains its 
definition in direct relation to Aristotle’s techne (art, technics), which distinguished the art 
of production (poiesis) from theoretical knowledge and science (episteme).251 Kant’s 1790 
Critique of the Power of Judgment will mirror this Aristotelian outline, as it argues that 
ability and skill (Können) is indeed to be differentiated from knowledge (Wissen). Art as 
skill (Geschicklichkeit) essentially denotes a practical faculty  
 
distinguished from a theoretical one, as technique [Technik] is distinguished from theory 
(as the art of surveying is distinguished from geometry). And thus that which one can do as 
soon as one knows what should be done is not exactly called art. Only that which one does 
not immediately have the skill to do even if one knows it completely belongs to that extent 
to art.252  
 
Thus, in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, art (Kunst) that is dependent on skill 
(Können) is part of the practical domain of Technik, rather than that of theory or science. 
But how are we to make sense of this reference to art, and thus the practical domain, that is 
central to the question of the canon, when this is supposedly the “science of the mere 
estimation [Beurteilung] of pure reason, of its sources and boundaries”?253  
 
The schematism chapter is located in the second part of the Transcendental Analytic, and 
as such in the Doctrine of Elements. Its precise place is in the first section of the two-fold 
Transcendental Analytic of Principles. Putting forward a canon for the power of judgment, 
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the Analytic of Principles does not ask about the possibility of judgment, but rather asks 
how judgment, concerning the subsumption of particulars under universals, can be done 
correctly. In surprising fashion, then, the Transcendental Analytic of Principles does not 
ask a transcendental question of possibility, as the preceding Analytic of Concepts did. In 
asking how to correctly judge and give concepts to intuitions, and vice versa, it appears to 
be closer to the problematic at the heart of the Transcendental Doctrine of Method, while 
nevertheless being a part of the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements. Essentially 
consisting of a methodological inquiry into judgment, schematization introduces a notion 
of art as skill and ability into the heart of the canon. According to Kant, there is thus an art 
and technics proper to the transcendental domain, the hidden art (Können) of 
schematization.  
 
The hidden art of schematization thus refers to theoretical reason’s skill for bringing forth 
“thirds” to mediate between concepts and intuitions. In determining schematization as 
hidden, however, Kant forecloses the possibility of true insight into the technics of this 
transcendental art of judgment, this art of subsuming particulars under universals. Thus in 
a certain sense Heidegger and Stiegler are right in their assessment of the implicit yet 
constitutive role played in the canon by technics. The explicit designation of the 
schematism, upon which all knowledge depends in the last instance, as a hidden art and 
thus as not subject to insight means, that rather than solving the aporia of judgment,254 
Howard Caygill writes in Art of Judgment, “the Critique of Pure Reason is founded upon 
an aporia.”255  
 
At the same time, however, schematization is explicitly called an art, be it hidden or not. 
And this hidden art is subject to one more important determination of its functioning. 
Schematization, Kant writes, takes place by way of “Handgriffe.” 256 The translators of the 
Cambridge translation of the Critique of Pure Reason have translated the German 
expression “wahre Handgriffe” as “true operations.”257 However while the English term 
“operation” derives from the Latin opus as a work or product of the general notion of 
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art,258 it lacks reference to the hand, which is one of the stems of the composite German 
term. What is further lost is Kant’s reference to the action of grasping, common to both the 
German term Begriff (concept), which, as a discursive form of unity, “grasps” and unifies 
the matter of presentation, and Handgriff (operation), which designates the action of 
grasping or seizing something by hand. While in German both nouns explicitly refer to the 
act of grasping, the characterization of the act of combination as a Handgriff transfers the 
problematic of unification (grasping) from the domain of discursivity and conceptuality to 
that of the hand and technical-manual skill. The unifying procedure of a Handgriff 
designates both the act of grasping by hand and the form and unity of a grasping hand, 
both of which retain their relation to the skill of working by hand. By determining the art 
of schematization as proceeding by way of Handgriffe, Kant thus insists that 
schematization is not guided in its act of combination by yet another discursive rule, and so 
on ad infinitum. By transferring the rule of unity from the domain of the concept (Begriff) 
to that of the operation (Handgriff), Kant aims to avoi the aporia of judgment, at least in 
theory.  
 
Despite Kant’s explicit refusal to call a priori synthesis a manufactur, schematization turns 
out to be, quite literally, a Manufaktur, as the art of schematization is specified as the 
hidden art of making and fashioning by hand. But rather than referring to the economic 
reality of a pre-industrial workshop or factory, which unified several mechanical arts under 
one roof and according to one aim, the manufacture performed by the art of schematization 
is said to be a free, rather than mechanical production, performed by the power of 
imagination. As such, despite quite literally grasping and making schemas by hand, the art 
of schematization is understood by Kant as free from any pre-planned and anticipated 
design, such as that provided by the conceptual order of the understanding. Consisting of a 
number of Handgriffe, the art of schematization is said to take place without prior 
conceptual form of unity and rule provided by the faculty of the understanding, which is 
the very point that Kant’s 1796 response to Schlosser essentially rests on.  
 
As the previous discussion has shown, Kant’s canon has been read by both Heidegger and 
Stiegler as a fundamentally technical problematic, despite Kant’s explicit designation of 
the canon as the first part of his critical remedy for reason’s instrumentality. According to 
Heidegger, Kant’s canon reveals the essence of the modern concept of technics, which he 
famously called Gestell (enframing). Heidegger argues that enframing shows itself clearly 
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for the first time in Kant’s canon, while escaping Kant’s own explicit awareness. 
According to Stiegler, Kant’s pure and a priori canon is itself made possible by a technical 
milieu, despite Kant’s aim of treating the faculty of pure reason on its own and thus 
independently of its embodiment in books and systems.  
 
When Schlosser accused Kant, during his lifetime, of having reduced cognition to a mere 
form-giving manufacture, the word die Technik was never explicitly mentioned. The 
ensuing discussion between Schlosser and Kant nonetheless circles around an essentially 
technical problematic. And as I have argued in the preceding section, despite Kant’s 
rejection of Schlosser’s accusation, the Kantian canon relies, in the last instance, on the 
“art” of schematization, which proceeds by way of the technical skill of forming by hand 
(Handgriff). And as if that were not enough, it is precisely by way of characterizing 
schematization as a manufacture that Kant believes to have circumvented the aporia of 
judgment. As an art (Können), the circumvention is however excessive to knowledge. The 
difference between Handgriff and Begriff according to Kant means, that schematization 
can take place freely, and thus without taking recourse to ever further conceptual rules 
provided by the faculty of the understanding. In the last instance, Kant’s canon of 
transcendental logic subsequently however derives its self-proclaimed superiority over 
general logic by means of the art of schematization, and thus a set of technical-manual 
Handgriffe, which provide the ground for judgment and the secure knowledge claims that 




CHAPTER 2.2 Instrumental expansion and the Transcendental Doctrine 
of Method 
As I have shown in the preceding section, the first route taken by Kant in his critical 
attempt at restricting reason’s (ab)use of logic as an instrument by means of a canon has 
problematically led to the art of schematization, understood as a skill of grasping by hand. 
While I have argued that this art is essentially a technical problematic, within the Doctrine 
of Elements it is, however, not explicitly called technics (Technik), but instead referred to 
under the more general term of art (Kunst).  
 
However, the canon was only one of the two ways by which Kant aimed to critically 
restrict reason’s instrumental drive for expansion. The second route of critical restriction 
laid out by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason takes place in the second book, entitled the 
Transcendental Doctrine of Method. In distinction from the canon put forward in the 
Doctrine of Elements, the Transcendental Doctrine of Method focuses on method and thus 
on how reason puts its elements to use. While the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements 
was said to take inventory of all of reason’s rightful materials and elements (its faculties 
and forces), the subsequent Transcendental Doctrine of Method follows up by asking what 
we can do with these materials. Engaging with the affordances of reason’s materials 
through the metaphor of building, it is “concerned not so much with the materials as with 
the plan, […], we have to aim at an edifice in relation to the supplies given to us at the 
same time suited to our needs.”259 This means that the Transcendental Doctrine of Method 
engages the sum-total of reason’s secure and a priori elements laid out by the canon as if it 
were a building, and sketches its systematic outline. It thus functions as somewhat of a 
manual for building, addressing both the question of what kind of house reason wants to 
build as well as what it can realistically afford to build.  
 
Kant’s reference to building, sketching plans, and bringing forth systems is by no means a 
mere rhetorical device. In the Jäsche Logik, Kant refers to method as a “logical art 
[logische Kunst]”260 which is said to properly belong to the “technical”261 part of logic. 
Thus, while the canon as the first half of Kant’s critical remedy to reason’s instrumentality 
was already shown to rely on the art (Können) of schematization as the technical-practical 
skill of grasping by hand (Handgriffe), Kant explicitly terms the subsequent method, which 
contains the second part of Kant’s critical restriction of reason’s instrumental drive for 
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expansion, technical. As I will argue in the following, the Doctrine of Method, while itself 
explicitly aimed at restricting reason’s instrumental drive of expansion, is further proof of 
Kant’s explicit engagement with technics (die Technik). As I will show in the following, 
Kant developed his concept of technics out of two different genealogies.  
 
The emergence of the German terms die Technik and die Technologie 
	
In order to understand Kant’s employment of the adjective “technical” (technisch) in the 
above citation, I propose to engage with the work of German linguist Wilfried Seibicke, 
who in 1968 published a study entitled Technik – Versuch einer Geschichte der 
Wortfamilie um τέχνη in Deutschland vom 16. Jh. bis etwa 1830. Seibicke’s historical 
linguistic study traces the German terms die Technik and Technologie from their first 
emergence in the sixteenth century until the first half of the nineteenth century, where their 
usage became so widespread and frequent that a genealogical linguistic study becomes 
impossible. This philological excursion is important as nothing proves a priori that the 
German terms Technik (technics) and technisch (technical) meant the same during Kant’s 
time as they do today. And furthermore, as the preceding discussion has shown, Kant 
introduced a technical part of logic in order to treat reason’s instrumental expansion, 
already indicating that there might be a difference between instrumentality on the one hand 
and technics on the other. What, then, is the specifically German history of the words 
Technik (technics) and Technologie (technology), and what role did Kant play in the 
history of these terms? 
 
By means of an introduction Seibicke sums up the state of literature in four comprehensive 
and partly paradoxical points, which have also surfaced in the preceding discussions of 
Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler’s accounts of the history of technical thought. Seibicke 
argues that, firstly, the German word die Technik is often considered to stand in a direct 
relation to the ancient Greek term techne, which would function as either model or 
counter-model for the modern German term. Secondly, accounts leap from the ancient 
Greek concept directly to the industrial revolution, which is then said to have brought forth 
the modern concept of die Technik. Thirdly, this modern concept of die Technik is either 
treated as a completely new phenomenon or as a mere stage of the development of homo 
technicus.262 And fourthly, lexographical sources are said to state that the German terms 
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have been adopted from French and Germanized during the eighteenth century. 263 
Seibicke’s project aims to systematically refute all four of these points, via a discussion of 
German texts and dictionaries from the first emergence of the word root techn- in the 
scholarly Neo-Latin of the sixteenth century up until the first half of the nineteenth 
century.  
 
With regards to the first and fourth points, he claims that there is no sufficient evidence 
that the German terms have been adopted and developed from the French language. 
Concerning the modern German word die Technologie, Seibecke shows that the term was 
in fact first introduced in writing in Germany in 1777 by the German scholar Johann 
Beckmann, a contemporary of Kant’s. What is important to note about Beckmann’s 
concept is that he explicitly took recourse to the Greek word root as mere “linguistic 
matter,” without, however, seeking to transpose the historical meaning of the term.264 
Instead, Beckmann’s aim was to develop a new concept of die Technologie, which he 
intended to refer to his newly invented science of the comprehensive, systematic treatment 
of the handicrafts and industrial processes, considered from the point of view of 
transforming natural resources into products.265 Due to Beckmann’s lectures, which were 
later published in his book Anleitung zur Technologie (1777), his scientific reputation grew 
rapidly throughout Europe, and it was not long until the new meaning of the German term 
Technologie was subsequently adopted into both French and English. Seibecke’s argument 
is supported by ample lexicographical evidence, which shows that the respective modern 
French and English meanings of the term only begin to appear in French and English 
dictionaries from 1800 onwards, and thus following Beckmann’s new science of 
Technologie.  
 
The French philosopher of science and technology Jan Sebestik also grants an important 
position to Beckmann, as he contextualizes Beckmann’s efforts of establishing a science of 
Technologie in Germany in relation to both France and England. His claim is that 
eighteenth century Germany felt a necessity “to fill the scientific and the technological 
gap”266 after the long wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Next to the quickly 
industrializing Great Britain and its science of Economy, developed by Adam Smith and 
Ricardo, as well as the artisanal and politically advanced France with its Encyclopedie by 
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Diderot and D’Alembert, Germany was economically ruined and politically backwards. 
Unlike the Encyclopedie, Beckmann’s science of Technologie was, however, not meant for 
the wider population or artisans themselves. Rather than dealing with detailed descriptions 
or issues of technical pedagogy, the science of Technologie was initially intended as a 
strategic discipline, and developed by Beckmann for future politicians and state managers, 
most of whom at one point or another passed through his teaching.267  
 
Kant, however, surely did not refer to Beckmann’s empirical science of technology when 
he called methodology the technical part of logic. And indeed, complementing the 
eighteenth century German development of the science of Technologie by Beckmann, 
Seibicke shows that the word Technologie had already lived a long life in an altogether 
different domain. In fact, the Latin term technologia and a whole host of derivative terms 
had been employed since the sixteenth century in scholarly logical and dialectical debates. 
The philosophical term technologia had first appeared in France in 1565, in De methodo 
libellus by Adrianus Turnebus, before the German protestant metaphysician Clemens 
Timpler employed it in his 1606 Metaphysica systema methodicum. The scholarly meaning 
of technologia emerged out of the confrontation between the Aristotelian definition of 
techne, understood as a subjective habit (hexis), and the Stoic definition of techne as a 
system of rules. 268  With the Stoic definition taking the upper hand, from then on 
technologia denoted the systematic organization of the disciplines of the ars liberalis.269 
Heinrich Alsted adopted the term technologia from Timpler in his 1610 work Panacea 
philosophica, id est facilis, nova et accurate methodus docendi et discendi universam 
encyclopedia, in which one section is called De Canonica et Technologia. Two years later, 
Alsted then differentiated between four praecognita in the general theory of knowledge put 
forward in his Philosophia digne restitua. The first praecognita was Archeologia, and as 
such concerned with eternal truths, followed by Hexiologia as the doctrine of habitus and 
the different kinds of knowledges. The third praecognita was called Technologia, dealing 
with the systematic properties of the sciences in relation to one another, with the final 
Canonica containing the pedagogic doctrine of rules.270  
 
In seventeenth century philosophical scholasticism the term Technologia thus designated 
the systematization of the sciences and the arts. This is supported by an entry in the 1653 
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philosophical dictionary Lexicon philosophicum by Joh. Micraelius, which explicates 
Technologia as “doctrina de proprietatibus, deque ordine & numero disciplinarium, sive 
illae sint Philologicae, ut Grammaticae, Rethoricae &c. sive Philosophicae, tam theoreticae 
quam practicae; sive superiorum facultatum, ut Theologicae, Juridicae & Medicae.”271  
 
Apart from denoting the systematization and doctrine of the arts, from the seventeenth 
century the philosophical notion of technologia also begins to designate the terminology 
specific to an art, usually referred to as terminus technologicus. Johann Walch’s entry on 
the newly Germanized term Technologie in his 1726 Philosophisches Wörterbuch reads as 
follows:  
 
Technologie heißt die Lehre von den Kunst-Wörtern, wodurch man insgemein solche 
Wörter verstehet, welche Sachen bedeuten, die in einem gewissen Stand sich befindlichen 
Personen eigen sind. […] Man kann sie in ungelehrte und gelehrte Teilen, davon iene in 
den Handwercken und gemeinen Künsten; diese in den gelehrten Handwercken und 
gemeinen Künsten; diese in den gelehrten Wissenschaften vorkommen, und wieder 
entweder allgemeine oder besondere sind; Die allgemeinen welche von allen Gelehrten 
gebraucht werden, befinden sich in der Philosophie, sonderlich in der sogenannten 
Ontologie, z.E. causa, effectus, principium, principatum, subiectum, adiunctum, substantia, 
accidens u.d.g, die besonderen aber in der Theologie, Rechts-Gelehrsamkeit u. Medicin.272  
 
This means that from the beginning of the eighteenth century onwards the German term 
Technologie also refers to the doctrine of “technical terms” specific to a discipline. As such 
it applies not only to the special sciences and arts, but also to philosophy, in the sense that 
ontology provides the most universal “technology” for all other sciences.  
 
Seibecke shows that it was in the work of German philosopher Christian Wolff, who for 
the most part was writing at the same time as Walch, that the term Technologie was first 
applied to the artisanal crafts, thus providing an important step towards the general, 
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contemporary meaning of die Technik.273 Wolff’s aim was to build a philosophical system 
that would include all human knowledge and rational action. Consequently, this system 
included the mechanical-practical arts. Thus, the Wolffian account of Technologie must 
not be understood as a doctrine of art words or technical terms (Kunstwörterlehre)  specific 
to a science or trade, as was still the case for Walch. Instead, it is explicitly called a 
Kunstlehre (doctrine of art), which concerns the practical, artisanal, and mechanical arts 
themselves.274 
 
Following Wolff, Seibicke then moves on to credit Kant with, firstly, shortening the 
medieval scholastic notion of Technologie into die Technik and, secondly, introducing the 
shortened term into German philosophy. In between the years 1781 and 1800, thus 
excluding Kant’s pre-critical as well as post-critical works, Seibicke finds a total of 71 
explicit references to die Technik, technisch and technicism in Kant’s texts.275 Due to the 
frequency of use, Seibicke concludes that these terms must have belonged to Kant’s steady 
vocabulary. Seibecke roughly identifies two complementary meanings of the term Technik 
in Kant’s works. On the one hand, he argues that Kant employs the term Technik to refer to 
the method of systematization and the doctrine of technical terms. On the other hand, Kant 
will also reintroduce the Aristotelian notion of techne as skill and ability, as was 
demonstrated in the preceding discussion on the canon and the art of schematization.  
 
The first meaning of technics here is explicitly in line with the old scholastic Technologie, 
as the problem of technical terminology and systematization. This meaning of the Kantian 
notion of Technik occurs, for instance, when Kant writes in the Critique of Pure Reason 
that his manner of division and systematization of philosophical categories surely differs 
from that of the “[technics] of the logicians.”276 It is also employed in this sense in the 
previously discussed Jaesche Logik, where Kant writes that “[…] logic would thus have a 
dogmatic and a technical part. The first would be called the doctrine of elements, the 
second the doctrine of method. The practical or technical part of logic would be a logical 
art in regard to order and to logical terms of art and logical distinctions.”277 Both of these 
references show that Kant employed his shortened terms Technik and technisch to refer to 
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the systematization of technical terminology intrinsic to questions of methodology. The 
entire second book of the Critique of Pure Reason thus essentially contains the technical 
part of the Critique. According to Seibicke, Kant’s recourse to the term Technik instead of 
Technologie is the result of the rapid adoption of the new meaning of Technologie after 
Beckmann’s 1777 Anleitung zur Technologie. Kant might have decided to shorten the term 
used to designate the scholarly concept of systemization of concepts and rules to Technik 
in an attempt to differentiate the older, philosophical genealogy of Technologie from 
Beckmann’s newly founded science.278 The employment throughout Kant’s lectures on 
logic of the Latin termini technici, designating the technical terms specific to a science and 
always in reference to problems of method, gives further indication of Kant’s engagement 
with the medieval notion of Technologie.279  
 
In a surprising turn of events, the inquiry into the history of the German word die Technik 
thus revealed Kant as the first to have not only used this shortened German term, but as 
having introduced the shortened term into German philosophy. Following Kant’s frequent 
use of the Germanized and shortened word, Seibicke shows that the term was quickly 
adopted by Kant’s contemporaries and later readers, which can be well observed in the 
works of Schiller, Goethe, and so on. 
  
Seibicke’s study thus shows that within the German university of the eighteenth century 
there were two complementary strands of thought concerning the terms technics (Technik) 
and technology (Technologie). On the one hand, Beckmann invented the new science of 
technology with his 1777 book Anleitung zur Technologie. On the other hand, Kant 
shortened and employed the term Technik in contradistinction to Beckmann, but in direct 
relation to the medieval scholastic notion of Technologie as a problem of philosophical 
methodology. As such, Kant’s use of the term, at least concerning problems of method, 
stems from a history that aligns itself with the Stoic, rather than Aristotelian, notion of 
techne, and thus with an idea of technics that is not intrinsically differentiated from the 
systematicity of science. Rather, technics is here designated a problem of theoretical 
philosophy, as it explicitly refers to the methodological problem of systematization and 
terminology. Essentially, then, for Kant the terms technics (Technik) and technical 
(technisch) are at root not a problem of instrumentality, use, or intrinsically empirical 
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phenomena, already indicating that his explicit notion of technics sits uneasy within the 
narrative of metaphysical technical thought told by Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler, 
since here technics since ancient Greece has always been employed in contradistinction to 
the systematicity of science. Paying attention to the particular genealogy of the German 
term die Technik essentially troubles the simple, narrow account of the history of technical 
thought told by Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler. Seibicke’s prominent inclusion of 
Kant in the development of the German term die Technik challenges Heidegger, 
Simondon, and Stiegler’s assertions that Kant could not, or simply did not, think technics: 
the preceding excursion into Seibicke’s study has clearly shown that Kant thought 
technics. At the same time, however, technics meant something different for Kant than it 
did for Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler, the details and history of which, however, 
escaped all of Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler.  
 
Technics in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method 
 
Returning to the technical Transcendental Doctrine of Method in light of the preceding 
discussion of Seibicke’s study, one can see that Kant’s method - the technical part of logic 
- is organized into four parts: the discipline, the canon, the architectonic, and finally the 
history of pure reason in its theoretical use.280 The first chapter on discipline directly 
addresses reason’s mode of expansion, meaning its method of “building,” while the canon 
lays out the rightful extent of what can be built. The third chapter on the architectonic then 
deals with the form of unity employed in the process of building, while the fourth and final 
chapter concludes the Critique of Pure Reason with Kant’s eclectic history of the chief 
revolutions of theoretical reason according to the concept of the object, modes of 
knowledge, and in respect to method.  
 
As the preceding discussion on the Critique of Pure Reason has shown, Kant only turns to 
discuss methodological concerns after reason has delineated and familiarized itself with its 
legitimate elements, faculties, and forces. Following the Transcendental Doctrine of 
Elements, Kant’s treatment of method is thus aimed directly against Descartes’ Discourse 
on Method and the philosophical practices that take their cues from Descartes, who sought 
to identify the true method and criterion for truth at the outset. In the Critique of Pure 
Reason, method is instead to come last. The post-position of method harbors a radical 
critique and attempt to break away from a long history of philosophizing, from Descartes 
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to Leibniz until Kant’s own teacher Christian Wolff, which as a whole is based on the 
difference between mathematical and philosophical modes of reasoning.  
 
The Discipline of Pure Reason distinguishes between two ways in which theoretical reason 
puts its elements to use. According to Kant, however, these two ways are not equally 
intrinsic and thus proper to philosophy. On the one hand, there is the properly 
philosophical method, which legitimately belongs to the domain of philosophy. And on the 
other hand, there is the geometrical-mathematical method of construction, which 
essentially belongs to the domain of mathematics rather than philosophy. Differently to 
philosophy and its metaphysical objects of being, God, the soul, and the world, 
mathematics concerns itself only with concepts of magnitude. As such, the central 
difference between philosophical and mathematical concepts lies in the fact that, when it 
comes to mathematics, its concept “already contains a pure intuition in itself.” 281 
Consequently, mathematical reason can legitimately move from a concept to its 
corresponding object in pure intuition via construction, just like a geometer who ventures 
to draw a triangle. To a priori construct a concept in intuition means to supply it with its 
corresponding intuition through a priori presentation (Darstellung). Such an a priori 
presentation would be entirely illegitimate if the concept had any relation whatsoever to a 
possible content of intuition, since such a content would always have to be given 
empirically, and thus a posteriori. Since mathematics, however, concerns itself only with 
the pure a priori forms of intuition, which are already contained in a concept of magnitude, 
it “gives the most resplendent example of pure reason happily expanding itself without 
assistance from experience.”282  
 
Hoping to share in the apodictic certainty of such a pure a priori mode of expansion, 
philosophy itself tries to adopt the mathematical-geometrical method for its own 
expansions. However, Kant vehemently argues against the adoption of this externally 
derived method in philosophy, as he claims that “the mathematician can build nothing in 
philosophy except houses of cards, while by means of his method the philosopher can 
produce nothing in mathematics but idle chatter.”283 In attempting to construct according to 
the geometric-mathematical method, meaning by means of concepts alone, philosophy 
aims to build a “tower that would reach the heavens.”284 But in the end it will be left with 
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nothing but a “house of cards.” This is the case, Kant argues, since, in distinction to 
mathematics, when it comes to philosophizing there are no such things as definitions, 
axioms and demonstrations. Firstly, only mathematical reasoning is said to deal with 
apodictically certain definitions, meaning that “the concept is first given through the 
definition, it contains just that which the definition would think through it.”285 Philosophy, 
on the other hand, cannot properly speaking define its concepts a priori. Instead it must 
restrict itself to analytically dissecting concepts into their elements. And, differently than 
deriving from definitions as in mathematics, philosophical concepts only gain their validity 
via their adequacy to objects, which in any case always have to be given empirically.  
 
Secondly, and concerning axioms as intuitive principles that are immediately certain a 
priori, for Kant philosophy has, strictly speaking, no single principle “that deserves the 
name of an axiom.”286 This might come as a surprise, since the first principle in the 
Analytic of Principles carries the name Axioms of Intuition. However, Kant argues that “the 
principle that was introduced there was not itself an axiom, but only served to provide the 
principle of the possibility of axioms in general, and was itself only a principle from 
concepts.”287 Differently to mathematics, philosophy does not have intuitive principles 
(axioms) principles but only discursive principles (acroams), which must always be 
deduced and can never be a priori commanded. 
  
The third and last point concerns demonstrations as apodictic, intuitive proofs. When it 
comes to philosophy, Kant writes, “experience may well teach us what is, but not what 
could not be otherwise. Hence empirical grounds of proof cannot yield apodictic proof.”288 
Consequently, only mathematics is said to contain demonstrations, since its cognitions are 
derived from the construction of concepts in a priori intuition. Philosophy, on the other 
hand, is dependent on “acroamatic (discursive) proofs” when seeking to secure the 
objective validity of its principles. As such, its principles are subject to discussion and 
discursive challenge, “conducted by mere words (the object in thought).”289  
 
What becomes clear, then, is that Kant’s critique of philosophy’s employment of the 
geometrical-mathematical method is one and the same as his critique of reason’s drive to 
expansion by means of the instrument of logic alone. To employ the geometrical-
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mathematical method in philosophy thus essentially means to use logic as an instrument of 
expansion. Seeing the relation between the critique of reason’s use of logic as an 
instrument and Kant’s critique of the history of philosophical method has two essential 
consequences. Firstly, it shows that Kant understands the history of metaphysical 
methodology to be fundamentally the history of instrumental reason. Secondly, however, it 
also shows that the Critique of Pure Reason as a whole and from its outset is essentially a 
critique of philosophical methodology, and thus a critique of the technical part of logic and 
its instrumentality. This is essentially the case despite the fact that the discussion of the 
technical part of logic is short in comparison to the longer and more prominent Doctrine of 
Elements, as well as following after it. What remains to be shown, then, is whether the 
Transcendental Doctrine of Method will, in a similar way to the Transcendental Doctrine 
of Elements, remedy reason’s instrumental use of logic by way of yet another technics. 
 
Instrumentality, technics, and the problem of addiction 
 
Kant’s outright rejection of the geometrical-mathematical method has most certainly been 
underappreciated in Heidegger’s inclusion of Kant in the movement of modern 
metaphysics towards its fulfillment in modern technics. Dedicated entirely to the 
enframing Entwurf (mathematical sketch) of modern metaphysics, Heidegger’s argument 
here is that this can be best observed in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, as it is dedicated 
to a discussion of the universal and necessary conditions for both experience and objects of 
experience, which Heidegger also calls the thingness of things. As the preceding chapter 
has shown, Heidegger argues that the mathematical sketch of modern metaphysics appears 
clearly in the fact that, with the Kantian a priori forms, “the givens of everyday getting 
around in the world [das umgänglich alltägliche gegebene] are construed as mere 
material,”290 which, once ordered and organized, can then come into view as objects of 
mathematical-physical science.  
 
However, the preceding discussion has shown that the site of Kant’s two-fold critical 
intervention in both the Doctrine of Elements and the Doctrine of Method had itself been 
aimed against reason’s instrumentality. The Kantian canon is essentially constituted 
against instrumental reason, as it aims to lay down reason’s proper bounds (famously 
claimed to be experience), restricting logic from organon to canon. The Doctrine of 
Method follows on from the canon by legislating a properly philosophical method over and 
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against the employment of the geometric-mathematical method throughout the history of 
philosophy, which, according to Kant, is testimony to reason’s instrumentality in its ill-
conceived intention of becoming “master over nature.”291 The Kantian critical intervention 
thus explicitly aims to restrict instrumental reason in its intention of becoming 
metaphysical “master over nature,” thus at heart anticipating the Heideggerian critique of 
the mathematical sketch.  
 
We are faced with a complicated situation. On the one hand, Kant would most certainly 
have sided with Heidegger in his critique of the employment of the geometrical-
mathematical method in philosophy. As such, Heidegger appears to have radically 
underappreciated the reflections contained in the Doctrine of Method. At the same time 
however, and as I will show in the following, Kant’s critical restriction of the technical 
Doctrine of Method introduces another notion of technics, a positive technics, since  
reason’s instrumental predicament is far worse than initially assumed. 
 
The current state of reason, Kant writes, is not only characterized by its problematic drive 
for expansion, whereby it pushes itself to instrumentalize logic in its attempt at 
constructing a tower of reason by way of its problematic geometric-mathematical method. 
Theoretical reason is furthermore said to be addicted to its speculative expansions 
(spekulative Erweiterungssucht).292 The characterization of reason as süchtig (addicted) 
engages the relation between reason and its expansions in a pathological setting in a two-
fold manner. Firstly, reason’s addiction points to the fact that, while reason’s metaphysical 
questions are said to arise from the very nature of universal reason itself, the consequent 
act of expanding cannot be said to come deliberately. To be addicted to expansion means 
that reason does not freely “choose” to expand, but that it compulsively expands whether it 
wants to do so or not, simply because it cannot but do so.  
 
In the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Kant refers to addiction293 in his 
discussion of the four levels of the faculty of desire: propensity (Hang, propensio), instinct 
(Instinkt), inclination (Neigung, inclination) and finally passion (Leidenschaft, passio 
animi). Passions are the most severe forms of “inclination that can be conquered only with 
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difficulty or not at all by the subject’s reason.”294 The difficulty in dealing with passions, 
Kant writes, is that they give rise to a number of addictions (Süchte), which pathologically 
push us to purposively strive for an object (honor, revenge, dominance etc.) that is, 
however, forever removed and thus out of one’s reach. The tricky thing about passions and 
addictions lies in their ambiguous proximity to reason. Kant writes that passions “can even 
co-exist with rationalizing.”295 This is the case firstly because it is unclear whether one can 
ever really get rid of passions. Passions are like poison that causes a permanent illness. 
Consequently they do not admit of a cure, but only of palliative care.296  
 
Secondly however, addictions involve a level of deliberation and rational action, which 
means that they can take on a problematic semblance of reason. Kant writes that they take 
on “the appearance of reason; that is, they aspire to the idea of a faculty connected with 
freedom, by which alone ends in general can be attained.”297 Passions and addictions thus 
engage in deliberations about the means best suited to reach an end, with the end itself, 
however, being “prescribed [… by] inclination.”298 As such it would probably be more 
accurate to characterize the deliberation involved in a passion or addiction as a quasi-
deliberation, which in fact comes closer to plotting about how to best achieve an end. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, addictions take on the appearance of reason in its 
aim to acquire all possible means that can lead to its end. As such, they seem to extend 
somewhat beyond particularity, taking on a quasi-universal reach. What remains is 
nevertheless a crucial difference between the quasi-rational appearance of addictions and 
universal reason. Addictions “aim merely at the possession of the means for satisfying all 
inclinations which are concerned directly with the end. […] Possessing the means to 
whatever aims one chooses certainly extends much further than the inclination directed to 
one single inclination and its satisfaction.”299 As such, despite the ambiguous proximity 
between the passions and rational-purposive action, Kant proposes that the two can be 
separated according to the criterion of universality. This is because, concerning universal 
reason, both means and ends are subject to deliberation and rational choice. 
 
In light of the discussion of the quasi-rational appearance of passions and addictions, the 
problem one encounters when approaching the Erweiterungssucht (addiction to expansion) 
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characteristic of reason is that, according to the Critique of Pure Reason, it is universal 
reason itself which is here said to be addicted. What Kant seems to be proposing, then, is 
that reason is addicted to its ends of general and special metaphysics, and that these ends 
“arise from the nature of universal human reason.”300 Thus, differently to the addictions in 
the Anthropology, where ends are set by inclinations, the metaphysical ends of reason arise 
from within universal reason itself. Reason, then, is characterized as driven and addicted to 
answering these questions, with the history of metaphysical inquiry being denigrated into a 
quasi-rational semblance of plotting about the instrument best suited to achieve these ends.  
 
The B-Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason describes the problematic in the following 
way. Metaphysics, meaning the inquiry into objects like God, the immortality of the soul, 
and freedom, is indeed a “natural predisposition [Naturanlage],”301 meaning that human 
reason naturally engages, always has and always will engage, in metaphysical inquiry. It is 
naturally driven towards metaphysics. However, if reason is to overcome what have so far 
been mere “groundless assertions,” 302  metaphysics must be raised from a natural 
predisposition, and thus from the level of the drive and addiction, to the level of a free 
science. It is in this sense that the explicit aim of the Critique of Pure Reason, circling 
around the question “How is metaphysics possible as a science?”,303 must be understood. 
And it is this very process of transition, from metaphysics as reason’s addiction to 
metaphysics as a science which is to be brought about by the Critique of Pure Reason. 
How, then, is this transition to be achieved? 
 
The disciplining of reason 
 
The problem that addiction poses to Kant’s critical project is that the boundaries between 
reason’s proper elements and its other are blurred to a much greater extent than initially 
anticipated. The Anthropology articulates this difficulty of distinguishing between inner 
and outer when it comes to the passions and addictions in the following way: “the unhappy 
man groans in his chains, which he nevertheless cannot break away from because they 
have already grown together with his limbs, so to speak.”304 Kant’s point here centers 
around reason’s instruments. While instruments initially seem to allow reason to expand its 
faculties and competences, and thereby it bounds, reason is at the same time said to have 
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become dependent and addicted to them, to the point of making the distinction between 
body and instrument impossible. Thus the same instrument at once allows reason to 
expand itself while also binding and enchaining it. Reason is bound to these instruments 
and has grown together with them: the organon as instrument has become an organ in a 
quasi-organic sense.  
 
The problem that Kant has to confront as a consequence of reason’s addiction is then two-
fold. On the one hand, the problem remains to be one of a careful delineation of reason’s 
legitimate elements and their proper bounds, which is the responsibility of the canon. On 
the other hand, however, reason’s addiction to the instrument of logic reveals that the 
careful delineation of reason’s proper elements undertaken by the Doctrine of Elements 
would never have sufficed to change reason’s mode of conduct. Simply delineating and 
“knowing” about reason’s legitimate elements and its proper bounds are not enough in the 
face of reason’s addiction. Knowledge alone seems to be powerless here, since reason 
cannot but impulsively (ab)use logic as an instrument, simply because it is addicted. Since 
most of the Critique of Pure Reason is filled with considerations of elements, faculties, and 
forces, and thus problems of the canon, it has hitherto appeared that method might be 
somewhat of an afterthought, and indeed of secondary importance to the Kantian critical 
endeavor. For most of the Critique of Pure Reason it appears that the canon suffices in 
order to change reason’s instrumental and constructive mode of conduct and bring 
metaphysics “on the secure course of a science.” 305  Due to reason’s addiction to 
speculative expansion, the Discipline of Pure Reason now introduces the need of further 
subjecting reason to a discipline in order to overcome its method of constructing by means 
of instruments. The discipline is to work on reason’s inner nature, subjecting reason and its 
natural dispositions to a program of rehabituation, so as to allow it to become capable of 
proceeding according to the rules laid out by the canon. The discipline is to work on 
reason’s ability or skill in following the rules laid out by the canon, whereby reason is to 
rise from its natural state of addiction to that of a free science of metaphysics. 
 
In working on reason’s ability, the second book of the Critique of Pure Reason is now the 
theatre in which the specifically German, philosophical meaning of Technologie as 
Kunstwörterlehre, and thus terminology and systematization, meets the notion of general 
art (Kunst) that derives from Können (ability, skill), which was previously introduced in 
the discussion of the art of schematization. Rather than employing, as Walch does, the term 
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Kunstwörterlehre, which denotes the terminology specific to a domain, be it the sciences 
or philosophy, Kant speaks of method as logische Kunst (logical art). Employing the term 
Kunst as well as Technik, rather than Kunstwörter (art words, technical terms) or 
Kunstwörterlehre (the doctrine of technical terms), consequently indicates that for Kant 
method does not only denote a meta-discourse on Kunst and Technik, but refers to the 
general notion of art (Kunst) itself, designating the practical ability [Fertigkeit]306 to 
proceed and bring forth according to rules.  
 
In the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790) Kant employs the Aristotelian distinction 
between science (episteme) and technics or art (techne) in the sense that there is a 
fundamental difference between what one can do and what one knows. “Only that which 
one does not immediately have the skill to do even if one knows it completely belongs to 
that extent to art.”307 When Kant thus speaks of method as a logical art - the properly 
technical part of logic - he refers to that aspect of logic which “one does not immediately 
have the skill to do even if one knows it completely.”308 Conjoining this notion of Kunst 
with the adjective logisch (logical), however, reveals that this notion of art is not 
determined in contradistinction to the systematicity of science. As an explicitly logical art, 
it designates theoretical reason’s ability (or inability) to follow rules and put forth logical 
systems according to these rules. Taking this thought to its conclusion then means that the 
system of reason, at stake in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method, must as a whole be 
understood as a “work” of the transcendental Technik of theoretical reason.309  
However, in this work of building and systematizing, Kant reintroduces a difference 
between the forms of unity employed by reason. Technical unity, he writes, follows from 
empirical and therefore outer ends, due to which it is only ever capable of producing 
contingent unities of aggregation. Architectonic unity, on the other hand, has its end inside 
itself, according to which its parts are articulated through affinity rather than mere 
resemblance. Only architectonic unity is universal and necessary and thus properly worthy 
of the systematicity of science, relegating its technical counterpart to the empirical world 
of contingency and chance. While the Critique of Pure Reason upholds this distinction 
between the architectonic and technics, the later Critique of the Power of Judgment will 
revisit this very distinction as it explicitly aligns systematicity with technics. 
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The discipline in question is thus meant to work on reason’s “talent”310 and skill of 
proceeding according to rules. As such, according to Kant reason’s talent is subject to 
discipline and formation [Bildung], just like any other talent “that already has by itself a 
tendency to expression [Antrieb zur Äußerung].”311 We thus encounter the word-root trieb 
(drive) again, which the translators of the Cambridge Edition have here chosen to translate 
as tendency, with Äußerung (expression) referring to reason’s technics of bringing forth 
logical systems (objectivation). What is to be disciplined and subjected to formation is thus 
reason’s addiction to expansion and thus its compulsion to step beyond and outside itself in 
the process of constructing a house of reason. Kant suggests that the disciplinary formation 
that reason is to be subjected to is different from culture because culture produces skills 
additively, “without first cancelling out another one that is already present.”312 What this 
means is that while culture works towards the formation of ever more skills next to one 
another, discipline works on an existing skill itself and changes it in the sense of both 
diverting its ends and shaping the very skill of achieving these ends. Discipline, Kant 
writes, wields “the compulsion [Zwang] through which the constant propensity to stray 
from certain rules is limited [eingeschränkt] and finally eradicated [vertilgt].”313  
 
As such, there appear to be two consecutive steps when it comes to discipline. At first, 
discipline only ever imperatively says “No!” to reason’s present drive of expansion and 
objectivation (Antrieb zur Äußerung).314 The first step of discipline is thus to whip reason 
into line. The martinet (Zuchtmeister)315 doing the whipping is reason itself, which means 
that reason subjects itself to the practice of self-disciplining in order to shape its technical 
ability of proceeding according to rules. And while it is certainly “humiliating for human 
reason that it […] requires a discipline to check its extravagances […],” the fact “that 
reason can and must exercise this discipline itself, without allowing anything else to censor 
it, elevates it and gives it confidence in itself.”316  
 
In a second step then, reason is said to undergo a change. As a result of being disciplined, 
reason no longer seems to have the same compulsive drive to step outside itself. Its 
previous addiction to expansion and objectivation via the instrumental use of logic has 
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been cancelled [aufgehoben]. It has, Kant writes, been exterminated [vertilgt]. 317  
Differently to the Anthropology, where passions could only ever be dampened and 
admitted to palliative care, the Critique of Pure Reason thus proposes a more optimistic 
outlook on reason’s addiction. Kant seems to suggest that reason can indeed be 
successfully disciplined, through which the transition from metaphysics as an addiction to 
a science could be accomplished. After being disciplined, reason is said to want what it 
should have, namely to proceed according to the laws, limits, and boundaries determinately 
laid out by the canon. Reason, he writes, “is not like an indeterminably extended plane, the 
limits of which one can cognize only in general, but must rather be compared with a sphere 
[…] from which its content and its boundary can also be ascertained with certainty.”318 
Kant’s point here is thus that after reason’s technical talent has been disciplined, the sphere 
(of experience) will have become reason’s proper bounds, and thereby its adequate object. 
Reason will no longer aim to expand itself beyond its proper bounds by means of the 
instrument of logic. The German word abrichten captures the double meaning of 
disciplining that Kant is referring to. At once denoting the compulsive measures of 
disciplining and habituation, it also evokes the work of re-orientating one’s view and the 
change of perspective that necessarily comes with it. To be disciplined means precisely to 
change the orientation of one’s ends. 
After reason’s technical talent for proceeding according to rules has been disciplined and 
reason has acquired the skill of following the rules set by the canon, reason’s horizon will 
be congruent with the sphere of experience. What reason will want will be one with what it 
can and should have. Its transcendent drive to step outside itself via the instrument of logic 
will have been eradicated, and now reason will be fully content with immanence: it will 
want only what it can have in terms of what it is legitimately capable of. Philosophy as a 
whole, Kant tells us, “consists precisely in knowing its bounds,”319 at once pointing to 
Kant’s general Epicurean outlook on philosophy while also referencing Rousseau, who 
equally claimed that “a truly free man wills only what he can do, and does what pleases 
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CHAPTER 2.3 The many faces of technics in the critical framework 
The point of departure of this first chapter, which began my investigation of the role and 
meaning of technics for Kant, was the identification and discussion of the general problem 
that motivated Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in the first place. I have argued that this 
general problem was reason’s illegitimate and instrumental addiction to expansion. Kant’s 
starting point was thus nothing less than reason’s instrumentality, due to which reason 
compulsively employed logic as an instrument to expand itself towards places far removed 
from empirical experience, so as to gain access to metaphysical questions or to its 
supposed real world referents, which it wanted to master.321 Instrumentality and the 
corresponding geometric-mathematical method of construction were shown to lie at the 
heart of reason’s pathological predicament, prompting the Kantian critical intervention. 
 
The consequent discussion of the critical framework, which aimed to place this unruly, 
instrumental, and ultimately pathological reason into a restricted, critical economy, was 
organized according to the two-fold route undertaken by Kant. Both of these routes took 
themselves recourse, in one way or another, to a technical remedy.  
 
The canon was discussed as the first half of the critical remedy to reason’s addiction to 
expansion by means of the instrument of logic, and the primary question posed to it was 
whether, with regards to reason’s elements, it indeed succeeded in averting the intrusion of 
the instrumentality of technics. Heidegger, Stiegler, and Schlosser were all shown to have 
argued that, while the canon was intended as reason’s path to emancipation from logical 
instrumentality, Kant implicitly articulated nothing else but technics. According to 
Heidegger, the canon harbored Kant’s silent articulation of enframing (Gestell), and thus 
the essence of modern technics. According to Stiegler, the canon silently relied on a 
number of technical substrata in order to secure reason’s non-instrumental course of 
conduct, which Kant believes to have analytically separated reason from. The subsequent 
elaboration on Schlosser considered both Schlosser’s critique, charging Kant with reducing 
cognition to a mere form-giving manufacture, as well as Kant’s answer to this charge. 
While the term Technik was not explicitly employed in this debate by either Schlosser or 
Kant, I argued that their encounter nevertheless circles around a technical problematic, 
meaning that Kant defended his canon from the charge of technics. The problem that I 
articulated is that, ultimately however, Kant relies on an art (Können) in order to secure 
schematization. I have argued that as an art, schematization is excessive to knowledge. It 
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proceeds by way of the technical skill of forming by hand (Handgriff), and is thus quite 
literally a manufacture. In the last instance, Kant’s canon of transcendental logic thus 
derives its self-proclaimed superiority over general logic by means of the art of 
schematization, and thus from a set of technical-manual Handgriffe, which, in the last step, 
secure the ground for judgment and the knowledge claims that flow from it. 
 
The second path of critically restricting reason’s instrumental (ab)use of logic took place in 
the second book of the Critique of Pure Reason, entitled Doctrine of Method. It was in the 
context of method that Kant’s first explicit engagement with technics as technics (die 
Technik), rather than a general notion of art, took place. My argument concerning the role 
and meaning of method in Kant’s critical aim at restricting the (ab)use of logic as an 
instrument focused on the role of discipline. The problem that discipline responded to was 
that simply knowing and stating the laws (the canon) according to which reason is to 
proceed lawfully was said to not be enough to keep reason from following its drive to 
expansion by means of instruments. This is the case because reason was diagnosed by Kant 
as being addicted to expansion. Consequently, reason is to be disciplined in order to 
“internalize,” as it were, the law of the canon as its second nature. This internalization is a 
process of formation and habituation, after which reason’s instrumental drive to stray from 
the law is supposed to be eradicated. And that which is to be formed and disciplined, is 
reason’s skill, it’s talent of proceeding and bringing forth according to the canon, reason’s 
technics. 
 
In the Critique of Pure Reason there are thus two different strands of technical thought at 
play in the problematic of discipline and the formation of reason’s very own “talent” for 
proceeding and bringing forth according to rules. On the one hand, Seibicke has shown 
how Kant was both aware of and intervened within the German concept of Technologie as 
the methodological problem of systematization and terminology, which derives from the 
medieval scholastic notion of Technologia. Kant was the first to shorten the Germanized 
term Technologie into Technik, most likely in order to distance this notion of technics from 
Beckmann’s newly founded science of Technologie. On the other hand, this notion of 
method as a logical art and technics also employs a notion of a general concept of art 
(Kunst) that derives from skill and ability (Können), as “that which one does not 
immediately have the skill to do even if one knows it completely.”322 This is ultimately the 
case because method, the technical part of logic, subjects reason to a discipline in order to 
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rehabituate its inner nature to be able to follow the rules and respect the boundaries set by 
the canon. Only in this double-coding of technics as both systematization and ability 
(Können) can the Kantian engagement with method, addressed in the second book of the 
Critique of Pure Reason, be properly understood.  
 
However, with a total of only six explicit mentions in the Critique of Pure Reason,323 the 
majority of which are to be found in the Doctrine of Method, my inquiry into the role and 
meaning of technics in the Critique of Pure Reason has been severely restricted. It is only 
in Kant’s practical and aesthetic philosophy that technics will finally emerge from its 
shadowy existence, as the general notion of art as ability and skill (Kunst and Können) is 
aligned with and explicitly called Technik from then on. At the same time, the open 
contradiction between the systematic technics internal to methodological problems and the 
non-systematic technics of art as general skill continues to persist as it is subject to further 
renegotiation. The following chapter will thus critically trace how the positive notion of 
technics that Kant put forth in order to secure his critical restriction of reason’s 
instrumental use of logic is subjected to further, explicit development from the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals until the Critique of the Power of Judgment.  
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CHAPTER 3. TECHNICS BETWEEN THEORY AND 







The preceding chapter, on the role and meaning of technics in Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason, presented a two-fold picture. Firstly, as the Doctrine of Method shows, Kant was 
familiar with the medieval scholastic notion of Technologie. Shortened to die Technik, the 
concept was employed by Kant to refer to the methodological task of the systematization 
and organization of science. Method was here explicitly called a “logical art [Kunst],” 
providing the ‘technical’ part of logic.324 This logical art was shown to be subject to a 
double-determination as both systematization and ability (Können), as reason’s talent or 
skill of systematization was subjected to a discipline. Secondly, the canon, providing the 
counterpart to the method, also revealed itself to harbor a technical problematic. While 
explicitly designed as the remedy to the problematic, instrumental organon of logic, the 
canon was itself shown to rely on the art (Kunst) of schematization, and thus, quite 
literally, the technical skill (das Können) of grasping and unifying by hand (Handgriff). 
What was at stake, then, was ultimately a technics of pure theoretical reason.  
 
When it comes to the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), technical 
imperatives will be approached by Kant as a problem of practical philosophy.  In the 
subsequent Critique of Practical Reason (1788) Kant will however explicitly bring them 
back into the jurisdiction of theoretical philosophy. This move, however, raises the 
question of whether the alignment of the technical-practical with theoretical reason does 
not simply correspond to the distinction between pure and applied philosophy, in the sense 
that the technical-practical designates the mere application of theoretical knowledge, as 
argued, for instance, by Bernard Stiegler.  
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I will show in the following, that the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790) affirms that 
technics is indeed the responsibility of theoretical rather than practical philosophy. This 
can be clearly seen when Kant writes about the second part of the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment, which explicitly elaborates a transcendental, rather than empirical technics, that 
it “could have always been appended to the theoretical part of philosophy.” 325 
Furthermore, Kant charges the idea of a technics of nature with the task of orienting and 
securing the understanding and its knowledge claims, whereby acknowledging that the 
aporia of judgment cannot be overcome by the schematism alone. What in the previous 
chapter was discussed as Kant’s problematic recourse to technical skills and a hidden art of 
grasping by hand, is thus now explicitly discussed by Kant under the name of a 
transcendental technical power. I will show that in the end it is neither nature, nor our 
judgments about it, which are properly speaking technical. What is “properly technical,”326 
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CHAPTER 3.1 The system of philosophy and the place of technics within 
it 
	
As the previous chapter has shown, the Critique of Pure Reason principally deals with 
pure, theoretical reason, thus implying that it is written from the point of view of a 
preceding distinction of reason into theoretical reason on the one hand, and practical 
reason on the other. Kant however only begins his investigation of a pure practical reason 
with the later Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) before finally writing his 
Critique of Practical Reason (1788). The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 
prefaces its discussion of practical reason with a systematic reflection on the ancient Greek 
classification of philosophy in general: “Ancient Greek philosophy was divided into three 
sciences: physics, ethics, and logic.”327 While general logic, as we have seen, is to function 
as a canon for the understanding and reason as the pure form of thought in general, both 
physics and ethics each have their own proper objects as well as sets of laws, belonging to 
what Kant calls material rather than formal philosophy.328 Physics sets out to determine the 
laws of nature, and ethics lays out the laws of the will as a causal actor within nature. Since 
each of these two sciences can have an empirical part as well as a pure a priori part, Kant 
concludes that metaphysics, as the pure a priori investigation of a determined set of 
objects, is in fact a two-fold affair. On the one hand there is a metaphysics of nature, and 
on the other hand a metaphysics of morals, the latter of which “has to examine the idea and 
the principles of a possible pure will and not the actions and conditions of human volition 
generally, which for the most part are drawn from psychology.”329 Following this fateful 
distinction, the subject of Kant’s investigation of practical philosophy consequently centers 
around the possibility of a pure will. 
 
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant had already offered a preliminary anthropological 
definition of the will when he wrote “in the human being there is a faculty of determining 
oneself from oneself, independently of necessitation by sensible impulses,”330 meaning 
that, while the human is certainly in nature, one of its faculties is simultaneously not 
subject to natural causality. The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals then moved on 
to extend this anthropological determination of the will to that of living beings in general 
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“insofar as they are rational,”331 meaning that the will is a power found in the human as 
well as in possible other rational beings, leaving one to wonder who he might have had in 
mind (angels, aliens, etc.). The causal power of such a will is said to be two-fold. Firstly, 
representations can become the determining ground of the will, which then works on 
bringing forth – in the sense of causally producing – the object corresponding to this 
representation in actuality. This is the case in all kinds of purposive actions where 
empirical objects are brought forth, as in the handicrafts or arts, for example. The will is 
here determined by the determinate representation of, for instance, a table, which 
purposively works on putting forth the means (wood, paint, screws, etc.) as well as making 
a table out of these means according to the end: a table. What in general is called technical 
production can here be seen to refer to the conscious end-realization through the 
determination of the will.332  
 
The will is however also the faculty by which a subject determines its causality 
independently of one’s physical capacity or technical expertise to do so or not – the will is 
the power of self-determination within rational beings.333 The difference between these 
two employments of the will is that, while they are both purposive, in the first case the will 
is determined by a concept belonging to the realm of nature, as the will works on bringing 
about an object in actuality that is possible according to the laws of nature, while, in the 
second case, the causality is equally purposive, but here the will is said to be free in the 
sense that it spontaneously determines itself. As such, the obligation is said to originate 
within itself, and has no end outside of itself, like in the first instance. Furthermore, the 
determining concept of the will does not belong to the realm of nature or sensible 
appearance at all. It is rather the idea of freedom that is determining here, the objective 
reality of which as “only an idea of reason” remains essentially uncertain.334 And while the 
first kind of technical purposiveness is thus properly speaking a matter of psychology, the 
second kind of employment of the will is the concern of metaphysics. 
 
Were this self-determination of the will to take place without any sensuous or worldly 
interference, then the will of such a (however non-human and rather godly) rational being 
would be “the capacity to choose only that which reason independently of inclination 
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cognizes as practically necessary, that is, as good.”335 Such a being would have no needs 
for imperatives – for what it ought to do – since its will would fully coincide with the 
moral law of practical reason. The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals proposes, 
however, that when it comes to the human there is only a partial overlap between the will 
and reason, since the human is determined by both aspects of its two-fold worldly and 
intelligible existence. For Kant, this dichotomy or double determination between nature 
and freedom is an essential characteristic of the human being, who most certainly exists in 
nature and is thus subject to the heteronomous laws of nature, while also standing under a 
wholly other set of laws, namely that of freedom, which are founded in reason only.336  
 
The human, for Kant, is thus dependent on imperatives, a number of “oughts,” which are 
the representations of objective principles that are compelling to our ambiguous human 
will. There are two kinds of imperatives. On one side there are hypothetical imperatives, 
which represent “the practical necessity of a possible action as a means to achieving 
something else that one wills.” 337  On the other side of this group of hypothetical 
imperatives Kant situates just one counterpart, which represents an act as objectively 
necessary in itself without relation to any end – the categorical imperative.338 While the 
categorical imperative is said to command objectively and universally, the hypothetical 
imperatives contain a certain level of contingency, as they are always oriented towards an 
end outside themselves (to satisfy a need or inclination). They represent a practical rule in 
relation to the will “that does not straightaway do an action just because it is good.”339 The 
imperatives are then classified in a three-fold scheme into “rules of skill [Regeln der 
Geschicklichkeit]”, “counsels of prudence [Ratschläge der Klugheit],” and “commands 
(laws) of morality [Gebote der Sittlichkeit]”.340 The first of these, Kant writes, can best be 
called  “technical (belonging to art),”341 the second pragmatic, and the third moral.  
 
Only five years after the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, the unpublished first 
introduction to the Critique of The Power of Judgment (1790) contains the following 
reference to the classification of imperatives undertaken in the Groundwork:  
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This is the place to correct an error which I committed in the Groundwork for the 
Metaphysics of Morals. For after I had said that imperatives of skill command only 
conditionally, under the condition of merely possible, i.e. problematic, ends, I called such 
practical precepts problematic imperatives, an expression in which a contradiction certainly 
lurks. I should have called them technical imperatives, i.e., imperatives of art.342 
 
In a curious manner, Kant seems to have forgotten that in the Groundwork he had already 
termed the first kind of imperatives “technical.” Furthermore, in the intervening Critique of 
Practical Reason (1788) Kant again referred to them as technical, in the following 
passage:  
 
Propositions that in mathematics or physics are called practical should properly be called 
technical. For in these teachings it is not at all a question of the determination of the will; 
they only point out the manifold of the possible action that is sufficient to produce a certain 
effect, and are thus as theoretical as any proposition that asserts the connection of a cause 
with an effect. Whoever approves the effect must also be willing to approve the cause.343  
 
Apart from twice insisting that the proper terminology for conditional imperatives, as well 
as precepts from mathematics, is to call them technical, the above quotations bear witness 
to Kant’s explicit attempt to re-organize the tripartite schema of the will into a two-fold 
structure, which, according to the Groundwork, was still said to be technical, pragmatic, 
and moral. The subsequent Critique of the Power of Judgment continues by proposing that 
technical imperatives do not belong to the field of practical philosophy, since, properly 
speaking, they concern the practical application of a concept of nature:  
 
If the concept determining the causality is a concept of nature, then the principles are 
technically practical [technisch-praktisch], but if it is a concept of freedom, then these are 
morally practical; [...] the former will belong to theoretical philosophy (as a doctrine of 
nature), while the latter will entirely by itself constitute the second part, namely practical 
philosophy (as a doctrine of morals).344  
 
This point is repeated again in the later Metaphysics of Morals (1797). Here, in reference 
back to the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant asserts that everything that is possible 
according to the laws of nature “depends for its precepts entirely upon the theory of 
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nature.”345 Consequently it is from the Critique of the Power of Judgment onwards that the 
hitherto tripartite schema of the practical imperatives is replaced by the two-fold 
distinction between technical-practical (technisch-praktisch) principles and moral-practical 
(moralisch-praktisch) principles. 346  And while moral-practical principles belong to 
practical philosophy properly speaking, dealing at once with the determination of the will 
and the concept of freedom, technical-practical precepts are explicitly said to be dealt with 
internally to theoretical philosophy.  
 
In Technics and Time, 3 Bernard Stiegler argues that Kant considered technics as a 
problem of application, signalling Kant’s subordination of technics to theoretical 
philosophy tout court. Technics, Stiegler writes, “is here indeed applied science: it has no 
opacity by rights; it can remain in the darkness of reason only in fact – by the fact of 
science’s incompleteness.”347 Understood as the mere application of science, Stiegler thus 
reads the Kantian notion of technics as essentially dependent on the state of development 
of science. Technics, for Kant, is said to be a mere stepping stone on the way towards the 
development of apodictic scientific knowledge, with Stiegler likening the Kantian relation 
between technics and the incompletion of science to the ancient Greek Aristotelian 
determination of techne in relation to the incompletion of nature (physis).348  
 
Contrary to Stiegler’s arguments, however, and as I will argue in the following, the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment explicitly relies on a concept of technics that cannot be 
properly understood as the mere application of theoretical philosophy. I will show that in 
the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant charges the technical with a transcendental 
function. As such, and in contrast to Stiegler’s proposition, technics does not only not 
follow from science, but it is also introduced and employed by Kant as what ultimately 
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CHAPTER 3.2 The Critique of the Power of Judgment and the problem of 
nature’s unruly things 
	
Despite Kant’s adamant claim to have enumerated, in the Critique of Pure Reason, and 
specifically in the Analytic of Principles, all of the universal and necessary principles of 
the objectivity of objects, the Critique of the Power of Judgment explicitly deals with the 
problem of “unruly things.” There are, Kant claims, some things that successfully resist the 
supposedly universal and necessary conditions of objects of experience put forward in the 
canon of the Critique of Pure Reason. In the face of these unruly things, the canon 
becomes powerless. Posing a problem in the properly philosophical sense, these unruly 
things are neither something, which would subject them to the canon, nor nothing, 
according to which we could treat them as ideas of reason. Upon encountering one of these 
unruly things we are puzzled. But how is it possible to encounter such unruly things in 
experience and thus as part of nature, while it is at the same time impossible to a priori 
account for their possibility by means of the canon?  
 
While indeed problematic within the order of knowledge, Kant claims that there is a 
specific sense in which one can nonetheless “make sense” of these unruly things. It might 
not be possible to cognize these unruly things, specified as living and beautiful things, but, 
by introducing a difference between determining and reflecting judgment, Kant argues that 
it is nevertheless possible to reflectively judge (beurteilen) unruly things according to an 
altogether different principle. This principle, he claims, is called purposiveness 
(Zweckmäßigkeit).  
 
Properly speaking, Kant offers two accounts of purposiveness. According to the first 
account of purposiveness, an end “is the object of a concept insofar as the latter is regarded 
as the cause of the former (the real ground of its possibility); and the causality of a concept 
with regard to its object is purposiveness (forma finalis).”349 This first, objective account of 
purposiveness is complemented by a second, subjective account, according to which and 
end is the “concept of an object insofar as it at the same time contains the ground of the 
reality of this object […], and the correspondence of a thing with that constitution of things 
that is possible only in accordance with ends is called purposiveness of its form.”350 
Distinct from the principles of the understanding for determinate judgment, which the 
Critique of Pure Reason expounded in the Analytic of Principles, the subjective principle 
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of purposiveness is said to allow the power of judgment to reflexively judge (beurteilen) 
things in the absence of universal rules and principles supplied by the understanding, as it 
reflexively judges a thing as purposive for us. What this means is that, in a first step, upon 
encountering an unruly thing the power of imagination can take up the manifold of what is 
given in intuition. However, this very first step already proves problematic from the 
perspective of the Critique of Pure Reason: has Kant not explicitly claimed in the Critique 
of Pure Reason that the manifold of what is given must essentially be orderable and 
placeable by the a priori forms of intuition, which are, however, themselves always already 
pre-ordered by the categorical order of the understanding?  
 
The A-Deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason specified that the understanding enters in 
the third mode of the three-fold synthesis.351 The synthesis of recognition, performed by 
the understanding, thus renders the previous two modes of synthesis intellectual, as it is the 
concepts of the understanding that ultimately provide synthetic unity to a manifold of 
intuition. Thus, in the last instance, the synthesis of recognition must be said to precede 
even the ground provided by the power of imagination, as it essentially synthesizes under 
the rule of the understanding in as much as the unity of the a priori forms of intuition are 
the effect of the understanding.  
 
While the synthesis of recognition is presented as the last step in the three-fold synthesis, it 
is at the same time the “transcendental principle of all the manifold of our representations 
(thus also in intuition).”352 In its function as first principle, the synthesis of recognition 
precedes the first synopsis of apprehension. This means, however, that the manifold of 
intuition, even in its pure and a priori form, is always already pre-shaped by the 
understanding. Sensibility’s skill for ordering and arranging the manifold of sensation 
according to its a priori forms of intuition is thus in fact preceded by the understanding’s 
act of ordering and arranging the a priori forms of intuition. It is thus the understanding’s 
prefiguration of the forms of intuition that makes the forms of intuition capable of ordering 
and placing the matter of intuition to begin with. This means that while the understanding 
is indeed dependent on intuition for objects to be given to it, in the Critique of Pure 
Reason Kant ultimately holds that only that which is thinkable by the understanding and its 
concepts can be given in intuition.353 How, then, can Kant say that we can apprehend one 
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of those unruly things in a manifold of intuition?  
 
The crucial point here is that Kant seems to propose both that unruly things can be given to 
us, and that a mode of apprehension different to the three-fold synthesis laid out in the 
Critique of Pure Reason is possible. The problem posed by these unruly things thus goes to 
the heart of the a priori synthesis between intuition and understanding, and, as I will argue 
in the following, will be the place, in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, that Kant 
designates to the technical. How, then, are unruly things taken up, and what does technics 
have to do with it? 
 
Despite having no corresponding concept, the strange apprehended “form of a given object 
in empirical intuition” 354  brings about an agreement between the first synthesis of 
apprehension and the third of “presentation of a concept of the understanding (though 
which concept be undetermined).”355 This means that, rather than corresponding to any 
particular concept, the apprehended form of the unruly object corresponds to the form of 
concepts as such, their conceptuality, so to speak, such that it is in agreement with the 
faculty of understanding as a whole rather than with any specific concept. This agreement 
between apprehension and presentation according to indeterminate concepts is significant, 
since it allows for a judgment to take place despite the lack of any corresponding concept. 
But if the judgment is not warranted by a determinate concept, allowing the power of 
judgment to subsume a manifold of intuition under it, what is the ground of this judgment?  
 
Kant tells us that the apprehended form of unruly things, in surprising fashion, effects a 
certain kind of lucky relation between our cognitive faculties of imagination and 
understanding. This relation gives rise to a pure a priori pleasure, by which the mind 
(Gemüt) can feel itself.356 We thus learn that reflective judgment allows for the mind to 
feel itself. But the self in question here is nothing like the selfsameness of the merely 
logical and numerically singular transcendental unity of the “I” necessary for determining 
judgments. The feeling of self that we encounter here is instead one in which the Gemüt 
feels itself to be alive, as an embodied being.357 Kant claims that it is this feeling of self 
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and its accompanying pleasure that provides the ground for reflective judgment. This 
means, says Kant, that the apprehended form of the unruly thing  
 
is related entirely to the subject, indeed to its feeling of life, under the name of the feeling 
of pleasure or displeasure, which grounds an entirely special faculty for discriminating and 
judging that contributes nothing to cognition but only holds the given representation in the 
subject up to the entire faculty of representation, of which the [Gemüt] becomes conscious 
in the feeling of its state.358  
 
Something remarkable has thus occurred here. Despite the argumentative force of the 
Critique of Pure Reason, we can now see that, first of all, the mind (Gemüt) has access to a 
certain set of things the objectivity of which is not a priori determinable by the Analytic of 
Principles. Furthermore, the apprehension of such unruly things allows for a different 
access to the self than that provided by transcendental self-consciousness. Secondly, the 
feeling of self is crucial for another reason, since it is the ground of an “entirely special 
faculty for discriminating and judging.” 359 This means that, despite not being able to make 
any objective knowledge claims about unruly things, the feeling of life becomes the 
ground for a judgment nonetheless. The feeling of life allows us to judge the given 
representation as purposive (zweckmäßig) for us, meaning as purposive for our subjective 
cognitive faculties. What this ultimately means is that, in the absence of concepts of the 
understanding giving the law to nature, nature “specifies”360 itself.  
 
In its logical coding, species denotes the mediating term between genus and individual, and 
thus corresponds to the schema, which sits between universal concept and particular 
object. This means that, in the absence of transcendental laws of the understanding, nature 
nevertheless “schematizes” or “specifies” itself – it provides its own schema. It forms 
itself. And when this form is then taken up by the imagination, the imagination finds itself 
in accord with the understanding. This accord does not take place on the level of concepts, 
but on the level of the faculties themselves. The unexpected agreement between the faculty 
of imagination and the understanding reveals a structural adequacy of empirical nature to 
our cognitive powers. This structural adequacy does not, however, only take place in 
relation to individual unruly things, which are here judged as beautiful. Kant claims that 
the judging of unruly things “prepares” the understanding to apply the principle of 
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purposiveness to nature as a whole. Expounded in detail in the second part of the Critique 
of the Power of Judgment, entitled Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment, Kant 
writes that “the self-sufficient beauty of nature reveals to us a [technics] of nature [Technik 
der Natur].” 361 Thus while schematization in the Critique of Pure Reason already relied on 
the technical-practical skill of grasping by hand - a hidden art, the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment now introduces the idea of a technics of nature in order to account for the self-
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CHAPTER 3.3 A technics of nature 
	
The term Technik der Natur (technics of nature), introduced by Kant in the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment, is a peculiar and idiosyncratic term as the German philosopher Ulrike 
Santozki points out in her Die Bedeutung antiker Theorien für die Genese und Systematik 
von Kants Philosophie. Developed from the ancient Greek τέχνη φύσεως and the Latin ars 
naturae,362 Seibicke could also find no predecessors in German philosophy for the Kantian 
concept of a technics of nature. Grammatically speaking, the term technics of nature is a 
double genitive, a grammatical form often employed by Kant. What this means is that it 
can be read in a double sense, designating both a nature that proceeds technically and a 
technics that proceeds naturally. In the following, I propose to proceed systematically, 
considering not only the composite term, but also the two stems that make up the 
composite. I will begin my investigation into technics of nature from the perspective of 
nature, as first put forward in the Critique of Pure Reason, before moving on to the term 




The Critique of Pure Reason had famously put forward the concept of nature as the sum 
total of all possible objects of experience. Having been organized in relation to the one 
numerically identical and transcendental unity of apperception, nature’s unity and 
systematicity was thus claimed to be cognizable entirely a priori.363 However, as distinct 
from nature as the sum total of all possible objects of experience, the systematization of 
actual objects of empirical knowledge seemed to be somewhat of an afterthought, and had 
to do more with reason’s own demand for unconditioned completeness rather than any 
shortcoming on the side of the unity and systematicity provided by the understanding.364 
On the one hand, in the Critique of Pure Reason particular laws were presented as flowing 
unhindered from ever higher and universal laws. On the other hand, however, “empirical 
laws, as such, can by no means derive their origin from the pure understanding […]. But 
all empirical laws are only particular determinations of the pure laws of the understanding, 
under which and in accordance with whose norm they are first possible, and the 
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appearances assume a lawful form.”365  
 
This means that the Critique of Pure Reason ultimately left behind a problematic relation 
between its universal and particular laws, which it could not overcome. This is because 
while the universal and necessary formal requirements for any possible object of nature are 
indeed supplied by the understanding, the particular object itself must in any case always 
be supplied by actual experience. From the standpoint of the lawful understanding, the 
particular is then always considered as a source of contingency rather than universality and 
necessity. The object’s particularity is precisely that which the understanding can under no 
circumstances anticipate; it will always come as a surprise. The understanding can only 
anticipate those aspects in the object that the particular shares with the universal, leaving 
its differences untouched. In the context of the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant 
picks up this problem when he writes that “the a priori derivation of the particular laws 
from the universal, as far as what is contingent in the former is concerned, is impossible 
through the determination of the concept of the object.”366 Thus, on the one hand, nature is 
a priori subject to the necessary and universal laws of the understanding, while, however, 
on the other hand, there is a “contingency of the agreement of nature in its products in 
accordance with particular laws”367 in determining judgments. 
 
Without mentioning that the problematic supplementary systematization of the contingent 
empirical objects of experience in order to secure the relation between universal and 
particular laws of nature had previously been assigned to reason, the Critique of the Power 
of Judgment poses the contingency between universal and particular as a problem of and 
for the power of judgment itself. In its reflective use, the power of judgment is thus tasked 
with showing how, and securing that, nature in its particularity, and not only in its 
universality, is indeed adequate, and, thus, purposive for our cognitive faculties. This is 
ultimately the function of Kant’s investigation of nature’s unruly things, as well as the idea 
of a technics of nature. What Kant’s articulation of what the German philosopher Lehmann 
calls “system-adequacy of the particular”368 entails is thus nothing less than the reduction 
of the – previously claimed to be sufficient and complete – competence of the 
understanding “to bring the existence of appearances under rules a priori.”369  
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The Critique of Pure Reason claimed to contain all of the constitutive principles for 
objects of experience. As such it presented itself as fully capable of a priori dictating the 
universal conditions according to which undetermined appearances could become objects 
for us. From the point of view of the Critique of the Power of Judgment, it now appears 
that the all powerful constitutive principles of the Transcendental Analytic are no longer 
sufficient by themselves to a priori secure the subsumption of appearances under universal 
forms. This means that it is not only unruly things that the constitutive principles of the 
understanding cannot seem to grasp: even when it comes to what were previously believed 
to be “ruly things,” the understanding now seems to be dependent on something further in 
order to, in the last step, secure the adequacy of the particular object of nature to our 
cognitive faculties. The term “nature” in the composite “technics of nature” thus does not 
refer to the concept of nature in its universality as stipulated by the understanding, but it 
rather concerns nature in its particularity and actuality, and the problem of its structure-
adequacy and purposiveness for our cognitive faculties both when it comes to determining 
and reflecting judgments. Kant’s aim, then, is to complement the unity of nature, a 
possibility provided by the constitutive principles of the understanding, with the regulative 




Facing the term “nature” in the double genitive stands the complementary term “technics.” 
As we have already seen that the term nature refers to actual nature’s contingency from the 
perspective of the understanding and the need to simultaneous secure its system-adequacy 
by way of the power of judgment, the term technics must also have something to do with 
systematicity. In the history of philosophy the very relation between technics and system 
has, however, been notoriously difficult to reconcile. Aristotle famously distinguished his 
notion of techne from the necessity, universality, and thus systematicity of science 
(episteme). According to Aristotle, techne is situated between empeiria (experience) on the 
one hand and episteme (science) on the other, arising when “[…] from the many cases of 
thinking in experience a single assumption is formed in connection with similar things.”370 
As such, techne is differentiated from the systematicity of science in the strict sense, since 
for Aristotle science deals with what “is of necessity in the unqualified way”371 – the 
eternal. Even though in practice science and techne are sometimes used interchangeably, 
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as, for instance, in the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle refers to a 
number of technai as sciences,372 theoretically and logically techne and science are strictly 
separated. While techne deals with the domain of the variable, science concerns the 
domain of the invariable and eternal. Aristotle writes: “[there] is a sense in which [techne] 
and chance operate in the same sphere, as Agathon says: ‘[Techne] has a love for chance, 
and chance for [techne].’”373 In contrast to the eternal, systematic objects of science, which 
can neither come into existence nor ever cease to be, technical objects belong to the field 
of contingency and are connected to chance. 
  
We have already seen in the previous chapter that there are two genealogies of technics 
that Kant draws from. On the one hand there is the Aristotelian notion of techne, which 
also features in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, when Kant argues that there exists a 
fundamental difference between technics and art, understood as generalized skill and 
ability (Können), and knowledge. Art, Kant writes, is “distinguished from a theoretical 
[skill], as technique [Technik] is distinguished from theory (as the art of surveying is 
distinguished from geometry).”374 At the same time, however, Kant also employs the 
medieval scholastic notion of Technologie. This notion is located within theoretical 
philosophy as it explicitly refers to the methodological problem of systematization and 
terminology. As such it explicitly concerns the skill of systematizing. However, the 
Architectonic of Pure Reason also affirms in quasi-Aristotelian fashion, as already pointed 
out in Chapter 2, that there are two forms of unity with which the system of a science can 
be built. Architectonic forms of unity, Kant writes, are provided by reason entirely a priori, 
since reason is itself essentially architectonic: “Human reason is by nature architectonic, 
i.e., it considers all cognitions as belonging to a possible system.”375 Technical unity, on 
the other hand, is outlined “empirically, in accordance with aims occurring 
contingently.”376 Consequently, in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant ultimately claimed 
that science could never “arise technically, from the similarity of the manifold or the 
contingent use of cognition in concreto for all sorts of arbitrary external ends, but arises 
architectonically, for the sake of its affinity and its derivation from a single supreme and 
inner end, which first makes possible the whole.”377  
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However, when it comes to the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant seems to have 
distanced himself from the metaphysical distinction between science and technics and the 
two forms of unity that he held on to in the Critique of Pure Reason. Ulrike Santozki 
points out that technics, as employed in the Critique of the Power of Judgment in the term 
technics of nature, is testimony to the disappearance of Kant’s earlier efforts to distinguish 
between the architectonic and the technical.378 Santozki shows how, instead of speaking of 
an “architectonic understanding”379 or an “architectonic of an intelligent world-author,”380 
Kant could equally have employed the terms technical and technics, as well as that of art. 
From the Critique of the Power of Judgment onwards, Kant consequently employs the 
terms architectonic and technics interchangeably, as also illustrated by the fact that the 
“intelligent world-author” is in the same passage also called “the highest artist.”381 
Essentially, then, technics here cannot designate the application of theoretical notions and 
rules. And neither does technics here designate the contingent counter-part of systematic 
science. Rather, Kant introduces the idea of a technics of nature to designate the systematic 
self-specification of nature for the purpose of securing the system-adequacy of nature in its 
actuality.382 
  
A hypothetical restriction 
 
There is, however, one important restriction to the idea of a technics of nature. Kant writes:  
 
we shall in the future also use the expression ‘[technics]’ where objects of nature are 
sometimes merely judged as if their possibility were grounded in art, in which cases the 
judgments are neither theoretical nor practical (in the sense just adduced), since they do not 
determine anything about the constitution of the object nor the way in which to produce it; 
rather through them nature itself is judged, but merely in accordance with the analogy with 
an art, and indeed in subjective relation to our cognitive faculty, not in relation to the 
objects.383  
 
Thus the idea of a technics of nature can be employed in relation to nature, but it can under 
no circumstance function as a constitutive principle for the possibility of certain products 
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of nature or nature as a whole. Instead, Kant writes, it is only a means of “elucidation 
(exposition).”384 Judging nature technically, according to the reflexive principle of a 
systematic ordering of nature in its particularity (technics of nature), allows us to proceed 
with the following presupposition: we can reflexively judge nature as if its forms were the 
purposive product of the representations of a synthetic universal, and thus of God. What 
this ultimately means is that Kant arrives at the notion of a technics of nature through 
relativizing our discursive human understanding in contradistinction to the understanding 
of the Christian God of creation.  
 
Our discursive understanding, as the Critique of Pure Reason demonstrated at length, can 
only go from the universal to the particular, and this is why the contingency of the 
particular first arises to begin with.385 God’s understanding, however, is claimed to be 
intuitive rather than discursive, and as such it is essentially independent of the need for 
both concepts and images.386 Intuitive here means that the Godly understanding can go 
directly from the intuition of the given whole as a synthetic universal to its particular parts, 
because God, Kant writes, immediately creates what he intuits. Consequently, God’s 
representation of the whole contains “no contingency in the combination of the parts.”387 
Kant’s proposition is then that the ground of the idea of technics of nature, which aims to 
secure the systematicity of nature in its actuality, is nothing other than the representation of 
such a synthetic universal “in accordance with the rule of ends.”388 However, in being 
derived from a relativization of our understanding in contrast to the intuitive understanding 
of God, the representation of the synthetic universal is valid only with a hypothetical 
restriction. This means that we can only judge nature as if God had brought forth certain 
natural products in “analogy with an art,” 389 and thus in accordance with ends, the 
representations of which are synthetic universals and thus systematic wholes, which can 
then be extended to nature as a whole. 
  
While subject to this important hypothetical injunction, the idea of a technics of nature 
nevertheless gives us the assurance “that even with regard to its empirical laws nature has 
observed a certain economy suitable to our power of judgment and a uniformity that we 
																																																								
384 CJ 5:412. 
385 CJ 5:407. 
386 CJ 5:408. 
387 CJ 5:407. 
388 CJ 5:379. 
389 CJ 20:200-201. 
	 120	
can grasp.”390 And while only designating a regulative ground for our power of judgment, 
this regulative ground is essentially presupposed in any judgment whatsoever, 
supplementing the unity of nature in its possibility (provided by the understanding) with 
that of a systematic technics of nature in its actuality (provided by the power of judgment). 
What this ultimately means is that without the idea of a technics of nature, the 
understanding “could not find itself in [nature],”391 even when it came to determinate 
judgments. As such, the regulative idea of a technics of nature performs an essential 
orienting and grounding function for any judgment whatsoever, in the sense that it fills us 
with the assurance that we are indeed in the right place, and equipped with the right 
faculties for grasping nature in both its possibility and actuality.  
 
What the preceding line of argumentation has shown is that Kant introduces the idea of a 
technics of nature in order to secure nothing less than the possibility of science as a whole. 
The possibility of science in its systematicity is thus in the end premised on a condition 
that cannot be objectively secured. The hypothetical restriction of technics of nature as 
being a regulative idea means that, while we can never be sure that nature has indeed been 
made “for us,” we must nevertheless proceed as if it was nevertheless the case.392 As such, 
Kant’s idea of a technics of nature in the end reveals more about us than about nature 
itself, since it is no one but ourselves who put the idea of technics into nature. “We put, it 
is said, final causes into things, and do not as it were draw them out of their perception.”393 
There must then, in a way, be two kinds of technics at work in Kant’s argumentation, both 
a technics of nature in its actuality, which works itself out on the surface, as well as an 
underlying condition for it. The Critique of Pure Reason has already been shown to take 
recourse to a transcendental technics when it came to securing schematization by way of 
the hidden art of grasping by hand or the technical part of logic. Does Kant’s claim, that it 
is ultimately us who put the idea of technics into nature, point to an underlying, 
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CHAPTER 3.4 Three kinds of technics 
 
The preceding discussion has argued that the idea of a technics of nature, which Kant 
introduces to overcome the problematic relation between universal and particular laws that 
would otherwise threaten the possibility of science as a whole, is subject to a hypothetical 
restriction. This means that we can only reflexively judge nature as if there were a technics 
of nature. It is thus ultimately ourselves who put the idea of finality into things (as in the 
case with living things) and, by extension, technics into nature as a whole. What, then, is 
the underlying condition that allows us to judge nature technically?  
 
The first candidate to take into consideration is the aforementioned notion of technical-
practical purposiveness. Differentiated from science as a skill and ability (Können) as “to 
be able from to know,”394 this notion of technics is purposive. Purposiveness in its 
technical instantiation designates the causality of a concept with respect to its object, with 
the concept functioning as the determining ground for the will to bring about that object.395 
It thus designates all kinds of purposive actions where empirical objects are brought forth, 
as in, for example, the handicrafts, referring thus quite literally, to the application, or rather 
realization, of a concept of nature by means of technical-practical reason. But, as Lehmann 
has pointed out, there is a fundamental difference between such an idea of purposive 
technics and the idea of a technics of nature. A purposive technical-practical act designates 
a conscious end-realization by means of the will. The idea of a technics of nature, 
however, merely designates the unconscious presentation, rather than the realization, of 
ends in nature.396 As such, the two technical instances appear too heterogeneous to justify 
their analogous use without a third, mediating instance. And, indeed, there is a third 
concept of technics at work in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, which stands in a 
double analogy with the objective purposiveness of technical-practical acts and the 
purposiveness that ultimately leads to the idea of a technics of nature. It is third technical 
instance which, as I will show, functions as the underlying condition of both.  
 
The Critique of the Power of Judgment, as stated above, consists of two books. The first 
book deals with aesthetic judgment, while the second book is termed Critique of the 
Teleological Power of Judgment and deals with the complementary teleological judgment. 
While the first book shows that self-sufficient beauty “reveals to us a [technics] of nature 
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[Technik der Natur],”397 it is only the second book, which deals with natural, living things, 
and directly engages the idea of a technics of nature. In the second book Kant proposes that 
upon encountering a natural, living thing, the power of judgment freely apprehends the 
form of the given object, just like in aesthetic judgment. However, differently to the 
judgment of beautiful things, which effects an agreement of the faculties rather than any 
specific concept and intuition, with regards to natural things the power of judgment is said 
to compare the thing “with reason and its principle of the possibility of a system, […] if 
this form is found in the object, the purposiveness is judged objectively and the thing is 
called a natural end.”398 In employing a systematic idea of reason as a measure (a 
representation of a synthetic universal) the power of judgment does not lawfully subsume 
particular cases under determinate rules of the understanding as it does in determining 
judgments, where the power of judgment is said to work just “like an instrument”399 under 
the schematized rules of the understanding. Subsequently, the enacted judgment is defined 
in explicit contradistinction to problems of mechanism, instrumentality and application. In 
comparing a given empirical thing with “reason and its principle of the possibility of a 
system,”400 the power of judgment is instead defined as a properly technical power. What 
is technical, according to the Critique of the Power of Judgment, is thus neither nature, nor 
our judgments of it, but rather “the power of judgment, on whose laws they are grounded, 
and in accordance with it we will also call nature technical.”401  
 
The search for the underlying condition that allows us to judge nature technically has thus 
arrived at Kant’s claim for a technical power of judgment, which is termed technical 
precisely because it measures given things according to reason and its systematic form 
rather than working under the law of the understanding. In the last step, this technical 
power of judgment thus leads us back to the question of reason, the discussion of which 
formed the first part of this chapter. How so? In a problematic sense, the technical power 
of judgment is free from the mechanical relation to the understanding that it is subjected to 
in determining judgment. On the other hand, it is not free in the same way as aesthetic 
judgments are, where “no determinate concept of the object at all is required.”402 And yet, 
no determinate judgment is generated either. Distinct from both determining and aesthetic 
judgments, the technical power of judgment appears to stand in a problematic relation to 
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reason, since it is both free from prior rule and gives itself a rule, while at the same time 
referring to a measure derived from reason. In a strange way, then, the technical power of 





403 Gerhard Lehmann thus argues that the technical power of judgment is technical-practical reason. See 
Lehmann, Kant’s Nachlasswerk. p.355. 
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CHAPTER 3.5 The return of the problem of technics 
	
As I have argued, the Critique of the Power of Judgment can both be read as placing 
technical-practical reason “after” science as a problem of application while, at the same 
time, technics is also placed “before” science, in the sense that the idea of a technics of 
nature, put forth by the technical power of judgment, is necessary to secure the possibility 
of science in the last step. Thus, while the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and 
the Critique of Practical Reason systematically aligned technical-practical reason with 
empirical philosophy of nature due to which it did not need a critique, I have argued that 
the Critique of the Power of Judgment is the place in which Kant discusses a technical 
power, the technical power of judgment, as the common denominator for both technical-
practical action and the idea of a technics of nature. However, differently to the first part of 
the Critique of the Power of Judgment, which concerns the aesthetic power of judgment, 
the second critique of what Kant comes to call ‘teleological’ power of judgment “could 
have always been appended to the theoretical part of philosophy.”404 As such, it doesn’t 
properly belong to the Critique of the Power of Judgment. The investigation of this 
technical/teleological power, Kant reveals, belongs rather to the Critique of Pure Reason, 
with the exact place of insertion remaining unaddressed.  
 
If this situation was not complicated enough already, it is troubled further by the fact that it 
is only the longer first introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment that names as 
technical the power of judgment when it compares particular natural things with the form 
of a system. The shorter and eventually published introduction, as well as the body of the 
text of the Critique of the Power of Judgment, changes the technical power of judgment 
into teleological power of judgment, while the term “technics of nature” is retained.  
 
Rather than reading Kant’s change of terminology as a mere problem of presentation, I 
would like to propose a different reading. My argument is that both Kant’s practical and 
aesthetic philosophies are testament to the development and dynamic internal to Kant’s 
thinking of technics, which takes place across both his theoretical, practical and aesthetic 
philosophy. In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, nature in its actuality is called 
technical even though it is, properly speaking, not, while in the final print version of the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment the technical power of judgment as the properly 
technical instance is no longer called technical. What is now called “teleological power of 
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judgment” does however not belong to the Critique of the Power of Judgment, properly 
speaking, but should have been added to the Critique of Pure Reason. And what has 
already been called technical, is insisted upon again and again by Kant, that it should 
properly be called technical. Kant’s writings from the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals up to the Critique of the Power of Judgment thus provide the stage for the strange 
dance performed in Kant’s thought by technics, at once reduced and pushed back to a 
problem of mere application of science while at the same time pulled out into the open in 
order to secure the possibility of science, at once explicitly called into question while at the 
same time silenced into obscurity.  
 
While both the systematic place and role of the technical power of judgment and the idea 
of a technics of nature ultimately remains instable from the perspective of the Critique of 
the Power of Judgment, the last, unfinished manuscript that Kant worked on from 1796 
until shortly before his death in 1803, entitled Opus Postumum, takes as its starting point 
the transition (Übergang) between the metaphysical concept of matter and the physical 
concept of matter, and thus in effect continues the earlier work, addressed in the Critique 
of the Power of Judgment, of bridging nature in its universality and particularity. As Kant 
works on this transition he encounter a cascade of problems, which finally lead him back 
to the critical philosophy that he initially believed to have concluded with the Critique of 
the Power of Judgment.405 As he mercilessly turns, at the very end of his life, to rethink the 
critical project anew, most if not all of the critical terms will be subjected to scrutiny, while 
technics, and specifically technical-practical reason, will be entrusted with an ever-
increasing role within the system. As I will argue in the following, what thus remains in 
unfinished form as the Opus Postumum is nothing less than the outline of what would have 
become Kant’s philosophy of technics.  
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The preceding discussion has shown that technics occupied a central yet uneasy place 
within the Critique of the Power of Judgment. This next chapter will move on from the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment to the Opus Postumum, the last, unfinished manuscript 
that Kant worked on from 1796 until 1803, and thus shortly before his death in 1804. 
While Kant initially intended the Opus Postumum to provide the keystone (Schlussstein) 
that would finally bring systematic closure to his doctrinal system, the development of this 
keystone did not so much as effect the sought after systematic closure as did it lead to the 
dynamic reworking of the entire system. Little would remain as it was, and, as I will argue 
in the following, technics finally stepped out into the open and revealed, at last, its 
systematic role and position in Kant’s system of transcendental philosophy.  
 
I will begin this chapter by way of an introduction into the publication history of the Opus 
Postumum, and the role played by Gerhard Lehmann in this context. Lehmann was not 
only one of the editors of the Akademie-Ausgabe of the Opus Postumum, but also, in his 
own philosophical work, specifically focused on the concept of technics in Kant. The 
chapter will then continue with a discussion of technical-practical reason within the 
restricted context of the Opus Postumum. Technical-practical reason appears substantially 
for the first time in Fascicle VII, which was written between April and December of 1800 
and consists of Kant’s writing on self-positing, and thus concerns the way in which the 
subject makes itself into an object of experience. Outlining the context in which the 
discussion of technical-practical reason both emerged and developed, I will reconstruct 
Kant’s account of self-positing in order to locate the role and responsibility assigned to 
technical-practical reason within it. In most cases, Kant argues that self-positing consists of 
two acts, a first merely logical and analytic act, which is then followed by a second, 
synthetic act, in which the subject posits itself as an object in space and time. I will argue 
that these two acts are subject to a transition, according to Kant. And it is in and as this 
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very transition between the first and second act of self-positing that Kant introduces reason 
in its two-fold mode as technical-practical reason, and moral practical reason. The second 
act of self-positing, I argue, is thus determined by reason in its two-fold form, due to which 
I will argue that the second act of self-positing can take both a moral-practical and 
technical-practical form. In order to account for the intricacy of Kant’s argument about 
technical-practical self-positing, as the act by which the subject posits itself as an empirical 
object, it is necessary to outline Kant’s renewed engagement with the doctrine of ideas and 
in specific the idea of world as the subject of cosmology. Following a discussion of the 
idea of world, knowledge of the world (Weltkenntnis), and philosophy in the world-
concept, I will show that technical-practical self-positing in the Opus Postumum always 
already takes place within a world, as technical-practical reason brings forth the idea of 
world for the sake of the second act of self-positing. The world, I will argue, is thus the 
first and most important product of technical-practical reason, forming at once the domain 
in which the human, as a technical-practical subject appears to itself, as well as what in 
another register makes science possible. Cosmology, I will thus argue, becomes cosmo-
technics in the Opus Postumum.  
 
It is my contention that Kant’s recourse to the technical as both technical-practical skill 
and the methodological systematization of logical and real systems, first encountered in the 
Critique of Pure Reason before being further developed under the name of technics of 
nature and the technical power of judgment in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, is 
now, in the Opus Postumum, subject to explicit and systematic development under the 
name of technical-practical reason. What in the Critique of Pure Reason appeared as the 
first tentative steps of Kant’s engagement with a transcendental technical remedy to 
reason’s abuse of logic as an instrument of expansion, is now explicitly developed under 




CHAPTER 4.1 Kant’s Opus Postumum and Gerhard Lehmann 
	
The Opus Postumum (Nachlasswerk) is a collection of 527 handwritten pages of 
manuscript that Immanuel Kant worked on primarily between the years 1796 and 1801, 
with some pages dating back as early as 1786 and some as late as 1803.406 The manuscript 
contains what Kant is reported to have claimed to be his “Hauptwerk” or “Chef d’oeuvre,” 
encompassing nothing less than the “Schlußstein seines ganzen Lehrgebäudes.”407 After 
Kant’s death in 1804, his executor Ehregott Andreas Christoph Wasianski handed over the 
unfinished manuscript for inspection to Johann Friedrich Schulz, who concluded that the 
manuscript was incomplete to the point of making an edition impossible. Subsequently, the 
manuscript disappeared into relative obscurity for most of the nineteenth century. Due to 
rumors about Kant’s state of mind towards the end of his life, it slowly became the object 
of much speculation. 
 
In 1890, the Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften commissioned the philosopher 
Erich Adickes to edit and prepare Kant’s Handschriftlicher Nachlass for publication in the 
encompassing academy edition of Kant’s work. As part of his research Adickes also 
inspected the Opus Postumum. During a four-week long investigation into the manuscript 
in 1916, Adickes claimed to have established its chronological, genetic structure. Arguing 
that the very final Fascicle I was virtually complete by 1801, and thus at a time when Kant 
had still been in good health, Adickes advised the Akademie der Wissenschaften to include 
the manuscript within its edition. However, due to a change of ownership of the 
manuscript, a situation arose in which the manuscript was going to be transcribed by a 
young assistant editor to Artur Buchenau at the publishing house of De Gruyter, with 
Adickes functioning as mere external editor. The name of the assistant editor was Gerhard 
Lehmann, a young student of philosophy who would later become known for his 
contribution to Kantian scholarship, having put forward both important editions of the 
Kantian text408 and insightful Kant commentary. The relation between the editors of the 
Opus Postumum proved, however, to be difficult, and soon deteriorated. Most importantly, 
Buchenau and Lehmann decided to steer away from Adickes’s editorial principles that had 
hitherto been applied to all of Kant’s Handschriftlicher Nachlass, which also meant that 
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they did not adopt Adickes’s chronology. Adickes himself critiqued the reliability of the 
transcriptions of the 23-year-old Lehmann, and both accused the other party of having 
further damaged the reputation of Kant’s last work. Thus, in 1926, Adickes finally decided 
to resign from the project altogether, before passing away in 1928.  
 
Another decade passed before the Opus Postumum would finally be published, in 1936 and 
1938, with Buchenau and Lehmann functioning as sole editors.409 While the conflict 
between Adickes on the one hand and Buchenau and Lehmann on the other was likely 
unrelated to political differences, the delay of the publication of the two volumes after 
Adickes’s departure from the project in 1926 stands under a different light. According to 
biographical details provided by Christian Tilitzki in his Die Deutsche 
Universitätsphilosophie in der Weimarer Republik und im Dritten Reich,410 the delay of the 
publication might have been part of a political struggle between Eduard Spranger, the head 
of the Kant-commission of the Akademie der Wissenschaften, and the young Gerhard 
Lehmann, who increasingly exhibited National Socialist tendencies in both his thought and 
politics.411  
 
Given that there has been no re-edition of the Opus Postumum, readers are up to this day 
reading Kant’s last manuscript through Lehmann and Buchenau’s edition.412 At the same 
time, however, there is a conspicuous silence around Lehmann within present day 
scholarship on Kant. It seems that Lehmann came to stand for the last, unfortunate chapter 
in the long, problematic reception history of Kant’s Opus Postumum, in which the 
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After 1945, Lehmann’s Der Einfluss des Judentums auf das französische Denken der Gegenwart and Die 
deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart were set on the list of censored books in the Soviet Occupation zone, 
due to their explicit National Socialist content. It would, however, only take until the 1950s for Lehmann to 
be commissioned by the now restructured and perhaps too hastily de-Nazified Deutsche Akademie der 
Wissenschaften to edit the fourth section of the Kant edition of Kant’s lectures. Lehmann thus found himself 
politically rehabilitated a mere decade after the end of the war, while two of his books were still censored.  
412 Since 2002, the Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften is working on a new edition of 
the Opus Postumum, headed by Eckart Förster. An exact date of the publication has not yet been announced. 
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publication finally turned out to be a quasi-achievement of National Socialism. This 
difficult constellation, with the Opus Postumum being both published and properly 
received for the first time during a particularly dark chapter of German history, cannot be 
undone, and should furthermore not be forgotten. Consequently, it is my stance that to 
discuss the Opus Postumum means to engage, in a critical manner, in the political context 
of its publication and the writing that resulted from it.413 
 
Gerhard Lehmann is important for my project beyond his role as editor of the Opus 
Postumum. Lehmann was without doubt the first thinker who has paid attention to the 
explicit role that technics played in Kant’s philosophy. Lehmann thus argues together with, 
but substantially earlier than, Seibecke, and against Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler, 
that Kant “knew” something about technics, taking it upon himself write about it. Thus, to 
perform a reading of the meaning and role of technics in Kantian thought necessarily 
implies dealing with the difficult contribution to Kantian thought of Gerhard Lehmann. 
 
Regarding Lehmann’s explicit writing on Kant and technics, there are two main pieces of 
writing to take into consideration. The first is a short essay called Die Technik der Natur 
(1938),414 and the second is Lehmann’s habilitation, Kants Nachlasswerk und die Kritik 
der Urteilskraft (1939)415. In both of these works Lehmann argues for continuity between 
the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790) and the Opus Postumum (1796-1803). He 
also puts forward a number of claims about the role and meaning of technics in both of 
these works. When read in relation to each other, Lehmann argues, that these two works 
reveal Kant’s late intention to write yet another critique of reason. Complementing the 
																																																								
413 In this respect, it is important to distinguish between, on the one hand, the publication details of the Opus 
Postumum, and, on the other, the writing on the Opus Postumum undertaken during that same period, a 
distinction that finds itself doubled in the difference between Lehmann, the Kant-editor, and Lehmann, the 
Kant-commentator. Lehmann’s philosophical contributions remained inseparably entwined with Kantian 
philosophy, and in particular with the Opus Postumum. His most extensive original work on Kant is without 
doubt his Habilitationsschrift from the year 1939, entitled Kants Nachlasswerk und die Kritik der 
Urteilskraft. See Gerhard Lehmann, 1969. Kants Nachlasswerk und die Kritik der Urteilskraft. In Beiträge 
zur Geschichte und Interpretation der Philosophie Kants. Berlin: De Gruyter, p.295-373. It was Lehmann’s 
second attempt at acquiring his habilitation. Following a first attempt in 1934, in which Lehmann tried to put 
forward nothing less than a sociological foundation for National Socialism under the name “Masse und 
Macht,” Lehmann’s second habilitation attempt appears at first glance as the less explicitly political of the 
two pieces of writing. At the same time, the example of Lehmann’s Habilitationsschrift shows just how 
difficult it is to read Lehmann the Kant-researcher as distinct from Lehmann the National Socialist thinker, 
with his most comprehensive piece of writing on Kant falling within the same period in which he tried to 
transform himself into a National Socialist thinker.	
414 Gerhard Lehmann, 1969. Die Technik der Natur. In Beiträge zur Geschichte und Interpretation der 
Philosophie Kants. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co. First published in 1938 in: Forschungen und 
Fortschritte, 14. Jg. Nr. 18, p.212-214. 
415	Gerhard Lehmann, 1969. Kants Nachlasswerk und die Kritik der Urteilskraft. In Beiträge zur Geschichte 
und Interpretation der Philosophie Kants. Berlin: De Gruyter, p.295-373.	
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critique of pure theoretical and pure practical reason, this third “critique of reason,” he 
argues, would have dealt with none other than technical reason.416  
 
According to Lehmann, Kant’s thought on technics was non-unified and extended across 
four domains (Bereiche).417 The first domain, according to Lehmann, concerns the idea of 
a technics of nature, which was first introduced in the Critique of the Power of Judgment 
before being further explored in the Opus Postumum. The second domain is that of 
technical-practical reason more generally. The third domain is, according to Lehmann, the 
first to have been investigated exclusively in the Opus Postumum. Regarding this domain, 
Lehmann argues that for the late Kant the world of appearances itself is technical, as it is 
posited, constructed, and formed by technical acts of the subject. These technical acts are 
then further said to be the responsibility of the transcendental subject itself, which forms 
the fourth technical domain in Lehmann’s view. On Lehmann’s account, the Opus 
Postumum thus shows how the transcendental subject itself is technical and engages in the 
technical act of self-positing.418 
  
Lehmann’s reading of technics in Kant, and in particular his account of the technical 
transcendental subject, aimed to show nothing less than that Kant’s technical thought in the 
Opus Postumum extended into the depths of transcendental philosophy. Thus, while 
Seibicke showed that Kant introduced the shortened and Germanized term die Technik into 
German philosophy and combined the medieval scholastic notion of Technologie as 
systematization with the Aristotelian notion of techne as skill and ability, Lehmann further 
proposes that Kant’s thinking of technics took place at the very heart of transcendental 
philosophy itself.  
 
The following chapter will work with the 1936 and 1938 Akademie-Ausgabe of the Opus 
Postumum edited by Lehmann and Buchenau. I will also refer to some of the philological 
work that Lehmann undertook as editor of the Opus Postumum. And finally, concerning 
Lehmann’s philosophical work on the Opus Postumum, the subsequent chapter will follow 
a route in which Lehmann plays a multifaceted role. Differently to Lehmann, who focused 
on the narrow relation between the Critique of the Power of Judgment and the Opus 
																																																								
416 Lehmann, Die Technik der Natur, p.289 
417 Lehmann, Die Technik der Natur, p.293. Lehmann employs the term “technische Regionalität” to 
designate his outline of technics as a whole, which he then distinguishes into four Bereiche (domains, areas, 
sections). I understand Lehmann’s account of domains to mean that these different occurrences of the 
technical in Kant’s thought are ultimately connected, in the sense that they form a landscape, a technical 
region, within the system of transcendental philosophy, even though how exactly is left open, 
418 Lehmann, Die Technik der Natur, p.293. 
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Postumum, my discussion of the role and meaning of technics for Kant’s transcendental 
philosophy has taken a larger frame of reference, as it traces technics from the Critique of 
Pure Reason until the very last Opus Postumum. It is my understanding, that Lehmann 
ultimately underestimated the technical problematic underlying  Kant’s critical project as a 
whole. Lehmann presented Kant’s occupation with technics as a feature of the ‘late Kant’, 
whereby both conceptually and systematically failing to account for the important point 
that method, has always already designated the technical part of logic for Kant, not only 
when it comes to the Opus Postumum.  
Furthermore and regarding the Opus Postumum, my reading of self-positing takes the 
transition between the first and second act of self-positing as its key, meaning that, as the 
following will show, my reading of technical-practical reason develops from the middle of 
self-positing. The role of the transition, and the role of reason as both moral-practical and 
technical-practical reason in this transition, I contend, has been overlooked by Lehmann 
(and others).  
At the same time however, and despite a number of fundamental differences between 
Lehmann and my own reading of the Opus Postumum, I will, in the following, pick up 
important points from Lehmann. Of particular significance here will be Lehmann’s precise 





CHAPTER 4.2 Technical-practical reason in the Opus Postumum 
	
As the previous discussion has shown, in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant identified the 
problematic overstepping of theoretical reason’s competences as the essential problematic 
that his critical method was to overcome. The discussion of this problematic revealed not 
only that reason uses logic as an instrument to achieve its expansions, but, further, that the 
two-fold critical remedy of the canon and method laid out by the Critique of Pure Reason 
is at heart a problematically technical remedy, as it relies on the technics of systematization 
and skill. The peculiarity of the subsequent discussions in both the Critique of Pure Reason 
and the Critique of the Power of Judgment was, then, that Kant’s discussions of technics 
took place within his critique of theoretical rather than practical reason, raising a difficult 
question concerning the place of the technical within Kant’s system. This can be seen 
particularly well in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, in which Kant developed the 
systematic notion of a technics of nature (Technik der Natur), which, while performing the 
difficult task of bridging the abyss between theoretical and practical philosophy, could 
equally have been “appended to the theoretical part of philosophy.”419  
 
The Opus Postumum substantially increases the scope of technics, as well as rearticulating 
anew its systematic position as internal to theoretical reason. Kant’s re-elaboration of the 
former tripartite distinction of the imperatives of practical reason into the two-fold 
technical-practical and moral-practical reason, the first of which is said to belong to 
theoretical philosophy, is thus far from being exhausted by the Metaphysics of Morals 
(1797). Tellingly, reason in its two-fold use features prominently in what has become 
known as the Opus Postuum. The term technical-practical reason occurs as early as in the 
XIIth Fascicle, dated between February and May 1799:  
 
Hieraus läßt sich auch der absolute Wert der Mathematik in Vergleichung mit der 
Philosophie in Ansehung des Practischen beurtheilen. Der erstere ist der der 
technisch//practischen (Geschicklichkeit zu Erfindung der Mittel zu beliebigen 
Zwecken) der andere der moralisch//practischen Vernunft und ist auf den 
Endzweck der schlechthin (categorisch) gebietend ist, nämlich in Gesinnungen 
gebesserte Menschen zu schaffen, gerichtet.421 
																																																								
419 CJ 5:170. 
421 OP 22:545. “Hereby may be judged the absolute value of mathematics, in comparison with philosophy, 
with respect to the practical. The former is that of technical-practical reason (skill in the discovery of means 
for whatever ends), the latter is moral-practical reason and is directed to the final end, which is absolutely 




Here, Kant revisits his critical differentiation between, on the one hand, technical-practical 
reason and its technical imperatives belonging to the theory of nature, and, on the other 
hand, moral philosophy with the one categorical imperative proper to moral philosophy. 
The difference centers, once again, on the nature of the end in question. While technical-
practical reason concerns the “Geschicklichkeit zu Erfindung der Mittel zu beliebigen 
Zwecken,” 422 and thus literally the skill to invent the means to any ends whatsoever, 
moral-practical reason is oriented towards one single and final end, the categorical 
imperative, which commands categorically. This difference between technical-practical 
and moral-practical reason is then analogically compared to the relationship between 
mathematics and philosophy. Analogous to the difference between technical-practical and 
moral-practical reason, mathematics and philosophy are equally distinguished regarding 
their ends. While both are sources of a priori cognition, mathematics does not constitute a 
system as an absolute whole, as a later quotation vividly affirms. Mathematics, and thus 
indirectly also technical-practical reason, is “ein bloßes Kunstproduct des Rechnens und 
indirect und nur mittelbar (bedingt) auf Zwecke gerichtet dagegen Philosophie auf 
absolute Zwecke gerichtet ist […] und sich nicht mit Wissenschaft (der Mittel zu Zwecken 
begnügt).”423  
 
The second occurrence of the adjective ‘technical’ can be found in Fascicle X, dated by 
Erich Adickes to the period between August 1799 and April 1800. Here, one can find the 
following, remarkable observation: 
 
Die bewegenden Kräfte der Materie sind also entweder technisch oder blos 
mechanisch bewegend.- Die letztere sind 1) physisch/mechanisch und setzen die 
dynamische Möglichkeit als Maschinen voraus.424 
 
Kant proposes an explicit differentiation between the technical and the mechanical in a 
similar vein to the Critique of the Power of Judgment, where the power of imagination was 
said to work mechanically under the law of the understanding in determining judgment, 
and freely under the technical power of judgment. And similarly to how the corresponding 
notion of a technics of nature was shown to be the underlying condition of possibility for 
																																																																																																																																																																							
the following be taken from Rosen and Förster’s partial translation of the Cambridge edition of the Opus 
Postumum. 
422 OP 22:545. “The skill in the discovery of means for whatever ends.”  
423 OP 21:108. 
424 OP 22:399. 
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the unity of nature prescribed by the mechanism of the understanding, the technical forces 
of nature are here said to be the condition for the physical/mechanical forces of nature.  
 
Kant’s explicit differentiation in the Opus Postumum between technical and mechanical 
moving forces is remarkable, since a large part of the Opus Postumum is dedicated to a 
continual investigation of and struggle with ether, the concept of a primordial and dynamic 
matter. His aim is to use this universally distributed and all-penetrating matter, referred to 
under the name of ether, caloric, or world-matter, to account for the fundamental 
characteristics of material bodies (like cohesion, rigidity, fluidity). Until around April 
1799, Kant sought to deduce the elementary system of the moving forces of matter from 
the table of categories under the presupposition of the dynamical forces of ether. After 
April 1799, however, Kant can be seen to have changed his approach, as he no longer 
treats ether as a problem of physical phenomena. Instead, he now ventures to deduce it as a 
condition of possible experience.425 Ether, Kant now claims, is “wirklich weil der Begriff 
von ihm (mit den Attributen die wir ihm beylegen) die Gesammtheit der Erfahrung 
möglich macht nicht als Hypothese für wahrgenommene Objecte um ihre Phänomene zu 
erklären sondern unmittelbar um die Möglichkeit der Erfahrung selbst zu begründen ist er 
durch die Vernunft gegeben.”426 The whole of possible experience is thus said to rest upon 
the condition of ether. And it is this very same ether that is called technical by Kant, when 
he writes “die bewegenden Kräfte der Materie sind also entweder technisch oder blos 
mechanisch bewegend.”427 Ether, Kant thus claims in Fascicle X, is a technical force, and 
is known to be actual as it makes possible the whole of experience in the mechanical 
realm. 
 
After ether is identified as a transcendental condition of possibility and called technical, 
the term technics, in all its grammatical forms, enters Kant’s terminological arsenal with 
increasing frequency. From Fascicle VII onwards, written between April and December 
1800, one encounters numerous references to technical-practical reason. The first mention 
appears in a discussion of God’s activity, which is here said to be analogous to our human 
technical-practical reason: “die Thatigkeit desselben ist nach der Analogie der technisch 
practischen Vernunft.”428 In the following pages, one can then find a number of formal and 
																																																								
425 Compare Eckhart Foerster, Kant’s Selbstsetzungslehre in Kant’s Transcendental Deductions, p.224. 
426 OP 22:554. “Ether is actual, because the concept of it (with the attributes we ascribe to it) makes possible 
the whole of experience; it is given by reason, not as a hypothesis for perceived objects, for the purpose of 
explaining their phenomena, but rather immediately, in order to found the possibility of experience itself.” 
427 OP 22:399. 
428 OP 22:48. “Its activity is on the analogy with technical practical reason [breaks off]” 
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anthropological definitions of technical-practical reason. Technical-practical reason, we 
are told, aims at “die Erkenntnis der Mittel zu allen beliebigen Zwecken,”429 it is “eine 
Beziehung seines [des Menschen] Willens auf Zwecke welche in Ansehung seiner 
bedingterweise nöthigend (neceßitantia) sind: wenn er dieses oder jenes zu bewirken die 
Absicht hat so muß er dieses oder jenes Verfahren ausüben.”430 Kant can thus be seen to 
circle again and again around what has by now become a common refrain, according to 
which our human will is subject to two kinds of mean-ends relation, one legislated by 
technical-practical reason, and the other by moral-practical reason. 
 
With the beginning of the very last Fascicle, Fascicle I, written between December 1800 
and February 1803, one can see a number of interesting terminological fluctuations. Kant 
employs the terms technical-theoretical reason (technisch-theoretische Vernunft)431 for the 
first time on page 19 of Volume 22 of the academy edition, after which he returns to 
employing the notion of technical-practical reason (technisch-praktisch Vernunft). A few 
pages further along, however, he then employs the terms technical-practical and technical-
theoretical in a seemingly undifferentiated manner.432 In total, moral-practical reason is 
opposed to technical-practical reason on 29 occasions in Fascicle I.433 At the same time, 
however, the term theoretical-speculative reason is employed as moral-practical reason’s 
counterpart on 24 occasions,434 with five mentions of the simple speculative reason,435 two 
mentions of technical-theoretical reason,436 and one mention each of theoretical-practical 
reason437 and technical-speculative reason.438 Readers of the Opus Postumum thus find 
themselves in a dilemma. Namely, what kind of reason is Kant talking about here?  
 
The vacillating terminology suggests two interrelated things. Firstly, and most importantly, 
it should be noted that Fascicle I is witness to an ongoing and substantial discussion of 
technical-practical reason. Secondly, the terminological variations reveal Kant’s explicit 
struggle to find the proper nomenclature for something that had seemingly hitherto escaped 
his systematic grasp. The fact that reason in its totality is here subjected to terminological 
																																																								
429 OP 22:64 
430 OP 22:122. “There is in man a principle of technical-practical reason, a relation of will towards purposes, 
which, with regard to himself, are unconditionally necessitating (necessitantia); if he intends to bring about 
this or that, then he must use this or that procedure: The imperative is conditional.” 
431 OP 21:19. 
432 OP 21:22. 
433 OP 21:11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 31, 32, 43, 44, 45, 47, 51, 53, 54, 78, 95. 
434 OP 21:55, 58, 67, 73, 79, 89, 91, 92, 95, 97, 100, 108, 108, 113, 115, 118, 122, 124, 126, 152. 
435 OP 21:69, 77, 96. 
436 OP 21:19, 22. 
437 OP 21:93. 
438 OP 21:130. 
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variation and experimentation in nomenclature shows that Kant is indeed dealing with a 
systematic problem that affects reason as a whole, rather than a mere aesthetic struggle for 
the adequate word for purposiveness not explicitly legislated by morality. That this is 
indeed a larger structural problem can also be observed in Kant’s numerous 
experimentations with new titles for the manuscript. Importantly here, and as many readers 
of the Opus Postumum have pointed out, the titles sketched out in Fascicle I seem to now 
have little to nothing to do with the project of a transition from metaphysics to physics, and 
thus the project that Kant had initially set out on. While the historically first Fascicle IV, 
written in 1796, begins with the title “Uebergang von den metaph. Anf. Gr. der 
Naturwissenschaft zur Physik,”439 the titles that one can find in Fascicle I now read as 
“System der Transcendental//Philosophie in drei Abschnitten,”440 or the later “Der höchste 
Standpunct der Transcendental Philosophie im System der Ideen. Gott die Welt und der 
seiner Pflicht angemessene Mensch in der Welt.”441 But the title of the work in question is 
not the only thing that has changed drastically: so has Kant’s projected table of contents. 
Fascicle I presents the following layout: 
 
Titelblatt u Vorrede 
Die Welt als Universum 
In allen diesen Objecten ein Maximum Idee ergo unicum in allen 3 Fällen 
1. Die theoretisch//speculative 
2. Die technisch practische 
3. Die moralisch practische Vernunft 
 
Aus Anschauungen, Begriffen a priori u Ideen 
Die Idee der Freiheit führt durch den categor. Imperativ auf Gott 
1. die speculative 
2. die practische 
3. die technisch//practische 
4. die moralisch//practische Vernunft in einem System442 
																																																								
439 OP 21:373. “Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics“ 
440 OP 21:27. “System of transcendental philosophy in Three Sections.“ 
441 OP 21:54. 
442 OP 21:44. 
“Titlesheet and Preface 
The world as universum 
In all these objects, a maximum: idea, ergo unicum in all three cases 
1. theoretical-speculative [reason] 
2. technical-practical [reason] 




The new table of contents shows that technical-practical reason is here projected as being 
given its own explicit treatment in a dedicated chapter, couched between reason in its 
purely theoretical and moral guises. On one side, Kant places theoretical also called 
theoretical-speculative reason, concerned with nature as an object of theoretical 
philosophy, which the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) attended to. On the other side, 
there is moral-practical reason, and thus the subject of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics 
of Morals (1785) and the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), the main object of which is 
freedom as the object of moral philosophy. And in between these two, Kant now places 
technical-practical reason. Thus, while the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790) had 
explicitly treated and supposedly secured a bridge between theoretical and practical 
philosophy by way of the power of judgment, the Opus Postumum suggests that Kant 
deemed it necessary to rethink and extend the problematic of the bridge. Indeed, it appears 
that his initial transition (Übergang) project of the Opus Postumum, to which Kant gave 
the title “Uebergang von den metaph. Anf. Gr. der Naturwissenschaft zur Physik,”443 has 
not disappeared, but rather diversified and multiplied.  
 
By the time Kant arrives at Fascicle I, he will now speak of four necessary and 
complementary transitions: “1) Ubergang von den metaphysischen Anf. Gr der N.W. zur 
Physik. 2) Ubergang von der Physik zur Tranc: Philos. 3) Ubergang von der Transc. Phil. 
zum System zwischen Natur und Freyheit. 4) Beschlus von der allgemeinen Verknüpfung 
der lebendigen Krafte aller Dinge im Gegenverhältnis Gott und die Welt.”444 Within this 
cascade of necessary transitions and bridges, technical-practical reason, as the following 
will show, will be charged with the responsibility of providing the necessary transition 
from transcendental philosophy to the System between nature and freedom. Both nature 
and freedom, Kant writes a few lines earlier in the same passage, need to be treated 
theoretically and practically: “Das System der Erkenntnis welches von der Erfahrung (also 
																																																																																																																																																																							
 
From intuitions, a priori concepts, and ideas. 
The idea of freedom leads, through the categorical imperative, to God 
1. speculative [reason] 
2. practical [reason] 
3. technical-practical [reason] 
4. moral-practical reason in one system” 
 
443 OP 21:373. “Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics“ 
444 OP 21:17. “(1) Transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics. (2) Transition 
from physics to transcendental philosophy. (3) Transition from transcendental philosophy to the system of 
nature and freedom. (4) Conclusion. Of the universal connection of the living forces of all things in 
reciprocal relation: God and the world.”  
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a priori) dem Formalen nach vorher geht und die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der 
Erfahrung überhaupt enthält theilt sich in die zwei Hauptstämme Natur und Freyheit, deren 
beyde theoretisch und practisch behandelt werden müssen und das Product aus 
technisch//practischer oder moralisch//practischer Vernunft und ihren Principien 
(Neigung/Instinct und Sitten/Verstand) hervorgeht.” 445 Both nature and freedom are to be 
treated theoretically and practically, and it is technical-practical reason that is to supply 
this two-fold treatment to nature.  
 
However, the above quotations perform an important, systematic, omission. For did the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment with its idea of a technics of nature and the 
corresponding technical power of judgment,446 not already perform the sought after 
transition function between nature and freedom, and thus between theoretical and practical 
reason? As Chapter 3 has shown, the idea of a technics of nature as the product of the 
technical power of judgment was to reassure us that we are indeed at home in the world, 
and that we are equipped with the right cognitive resources and faculties in order to 
cognize it. At the same time, however, the technical power of judgment was said to be 
technical precisely because it compared a given natural thing with the form of a system, 
provided by reason, thus opening the question of the role of reason for the technical power 
of judgment. 
 
With regards to Fascicle I, the technical power of judgment is not mentioned, and now it is 
explicitly technical-practical reason that is said to be necessary to, as it were, treat nature 
technically-practically, thereby “completing” theoretical philosophy. This point was, 
without a doubt, already indicated by the previously mentioned vacillation of terminology 
from theoretical to speculative, to technical, and as to the practical, which already 
indicated that there must be a structural affinity between theoretical reason and reason in 
its technical-practical employment. The question is, then, what exactly technical-practical 





445 OP 21:16. “The system of knowledge which formally (thus a priori) precedes experience and contains the 
conditions oft he possibility of experience in general, divides into two main branches: nature and freedom, 
both of which must be treated theoretically and practically; the product of technical-practical or moral-
practical reason and their principles (inclination and morals/instinct-understanding) emerges.” 
446 CJ 20:243. 
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On the relation between Fascicles VII and I 
 
I have claimed in the preceding section that a more systematic employment of the term 
“technical-practical reason” first arises with the second-from-last Fascicle VII, which as a 
whole is dedicated to Kant’s own discussion of self-positing. However, Kant’s inquiry into 
technical-practical reason is not limited to Fascicle VII, but continues in the following and 
final Fascicle I. Self-positing, however, is seen as having already been given its explicit 
treatment within the context of Fascicle VII. Most, if not all, readings of self-positing in 
the Opus Postumum limit their discussion to Fascicle VII, with occasional references to the 
preceding Fascicles X and XI, as in work by Eckhart Foerster, Dina Emundts, Bryan Hall, 
and others.448 Kant, after all, seems to have started a whole new Fascicle to address the 
topic of reason and its ideas, in which one further encounters Kant’s extensive 
experimentation with new titles for his work. This has led many a Kant scholar to argue 
that Fascicle I might contain sketches for a second, altogether different book. Furthermore, 
Fascicle I is certainly a difficult piece of writing. Consisting of a mere 155 pages in print 
while written over the duration of more than two years, the reader is witness to Kant’s 
slowly growing difficulties, from the fourth Folio onwards, with bringing longer and 
continuous lines of thought to paper. Towards the last pages, one then encounters a 
growing number of single words, which seem to have gained the upper hand over the 
decreasing number of full sentences, as an aging and at times suffering Kant appears on the 
page. At the same time, however, when Kant does manage to bring his thoughts to paper 
one encounters a lucid mind, which aims to expand self-positing to reason and its ideas, as 
well as developing a plan to a full system of, rather than the mere conditions of possibility 
for, transcendental philosophy.  
 
It is my view that the discussion of Fascicle I, which focuses on reason and its ideas, does 
not stand in an external relation to Fascicle VII. Consequently, I do not think that it is 
possible to leave Fascicle I aside in a discussion of self-positing on structural claims. 
Fascicle VII is organized in eight parts that are entitled Beilagen (additions), after which 
the very last section, which no longer carries the name Beilage, carries the simple heading 
“Ich bin.”449 This last section consists of Folios 9 and 10, which are generally considered 
to contain the transition from Fascicle VII to the very last Fascicle I. It hence comes as no 
																																																								
448	See	Förster, E., 2000. Kant’s Final Synthesis, Cambridge: Harvard Unversity Press. Emundts, D., 2004. 
Kants Übergangskonzeption im Opus Postumum: zur Rolle des Nachlasswerkes für die Grundlegung der 
empirischen Physik. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Hall, B., 2015. The PostCritical Kant: Understanding the 
critical philosophy through the Opus Postumum. New York: Routledge, Taylor ] Francis Group.	
449 OP 22:115. “I am.” 
	 141	
surprise that some of the language as well as issues that Kant will discuss in Fascicle I find 
themselves anticipated on the last pages of Fascicle VII. The same, however, also applies 
to Beilage V of Fascicle VII, which, while placed at the center of Fascicle VII in the 
academy edition, is in fact written on the back of a letter written by Wasianski to Kant on 
December 19, 1801, meaning that it falls within the writing period of Fascicle I rather than 
Fascicle VII, and might have been placed into Fascicle VII by mistake.450 While technical-
practical reason is mentioned a handful times in Folios 9 and 10, it is in Beilage V that one 
encounters it within increasing frequency, while furthermore, self-positing is discussed 
from the perspective of technical-practical and moral-practical reason. 
 
It is understandable that one might hesitate to read reason, as the subject of Fascicle I, and 
self-positing, as the main subject of Fascicle VII, through one another. After all, did Kant’s 
critical philosophy not discuss reason only after the completion of the Transcendental 
Analytic, and in an entirely different section entitled Transcendental Dialectic, and did the 
entire critical project not center on the essential restriction of reason’s contribution to 
cognition? In the Opus Postumum, reason now seems to have transgressed its critical limits 
set by the understanding, as reason comes onto the stage within a discussion of self-
positing, and thus within Kant’s re-elaboration of self-consciousness and the 
transcendental apperception. Rather than reading Folio 9 and 10, as well as Beilage V, as 
de facto belonging to Fascicle I rather than VII, the next part of this chapter will read self-
positing and reason and thus reading Fascicle VII and I in continuity within one another. I 
believe this move is warranted by nothing other than technical-practical reason, as its 
function and role, according to the Opus Postumum, is essentially within and for the 
process of self-positing. What, then, is technical-practical reason’s contribution to and 
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CHAPTER 4.3 Technical-practical reason and the doctrine of self-
positing 
As noted earlier, Kant’s deliberations on technical-practical reason systematically set in 
with the transition from Fascicle VII to I. The explicit topic of Fascicle VII itself is what 
has commonly become known as Kant’s doctrine of self-positing (Selbstsetzungslehre), 
meaning that Kant’s engagement with technical-practical reason emerged within his 
discussion of self-positing, and thus the process by which the subject makes itself into an 
object of experience. The following chapter thus essentially consists of a discussion of 
self-positing. I will show that Kant’s own account of self-positing structured self-positing 
according to two acts. Before moving on to the second act in the following chapter, the 
present chapter will focus on the first act of self-positing, and more importantly, the 
transition between the first and second act, as it is in the very transition that reason, as both 
technical-practical and moral-practical reason, enters the discussion. In order to appreciate 
the full contribution of technical-practical reason to self-positing, my argument will in the 
following focus on three points. Firstly, I will present an account of Kant’s renewed 
engagement with the doctrine of ideas at the center of the transition. Secondly, then, I will 
specifically focus on the idea of world, and Kant’s discussion of knowledge of the world 
(Weltkenntnis) and philosophy in the world-concept, both of which will bring us back to 
essentially methodological questions addressed by the transition. Thirdly, I will show how 
these transcendental, methodological discussions take on a function previously discussed 
under the name of transcendental reflection. Following the discussion of these three points, 
I will then, in the final part, move on to the second step of self-positing, which, I will 
argue, consists of both moral-practical and technical-practical self-positing. 
 
Erich Adickes, in his Kant’s Opus Postumum dargestellt und beurteilt (1920), 
characterized Kant’s reflections on positing (setzen) as a quasi-response and admission to 
absolute idealism. 451  Adickes claim is that after students and readers of Kantian 
philosophy, such as Beck, Reinhold, Abicht, Maimon, and in specific Fichte set out in 
search of a highest principle of transcendental philosophy – with each of these thinkers 
aiming to deduce the elements of our faculties from a single unifying and supreme 
principle – Kant himself, in his last work, embarked on just such a search for a highest 
principle. Concerning Kant’s relation to Fichte, Kant had been an avid reader of Fichte’s 
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early writings, and the two had exchanged letters since 1791.452 The 1794 publication of 
Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, however, caused Kant to publicly distance himself from 
Fichte, denouncing the Wissenschaftslehre as “ein gänzlich unhaltbares System.” 453 
However, while Kant’s own explicit engagement with positing in the Opus Postumum does 
indeed begin after the public distancing of Kant from Fichte, with positing first appearing 
in Fascicle X and XI which were written from 1799 onwards, suggesting that Kant might 
have written his own doctrine of self-positing with and against Fichte, Eckhart Förster is 
right to insist that Kant had already engaged with positing as early as in his 1763 The Only 
Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God.454  
 
It was in this text that Kant first proposed that existence is not a real predicate of a thing 
and that “the concept of position or positing [setzen] is completely simple and identical 
with the concept of being in general.”455 Here, Kant differentiates between two modes of 
position, on the one hand a relative position and on the other an absolute position. In a 
relative position, a predicate is related to a subject in a judgment via a copula, as in “S is 
P.” In such a judgment, what is posited is a property or predicate of the subject. 
Consequently, Kant explains, relative positions are identical to “the copulative concept in a 
judgment,”456 in which a thing is predicated as a property to the subject through the copula 
“is,” and thus as belonging to and determining the subject. An absolute or existential 
position, however, would be formulated as “S is,” and as such it is the subject itself, which 
is posited absolutely, thus indicating that it cannot be considered a predicate or property of 
anything. Existence, according to Kant, is thus the absolute position of the thing.  
 
Förster further points to the following important note, written between 1788 and 1790 
during Kant’s ongoing discussions with J.G.C. Kiesewetter:457 “I posit my own existence 
[…] for the sake of empirical consciousness and its possibility […] myself as a being that 
exists in a world.”458 Kant can here be seen to directly refer to the amendment undertaken 
in the 1787 B-Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, where the representation of myself 
as a subject of thought (“I think”) was shown to be itself dependent on something 
																																																								
452 see I.H. Fichte, 1862. Johann Gottlieb Fichte's Leben und literarischer Briefwechsel. Leipzig: Brockhaus, 
p.143-165. 
453 Kant 12:371, Briefwechself Band III (1795-1803). 
454 Eckhart Förster, 2002. Kant’s Final Synthesis: An Essay on the Opus Postumum. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, p.77. 
455 Kant, The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God, 2:73. 
456 Kant 2:75. 
457 Eckhart Förster, 1989. “Kant’s Selbstsetzungslehre,” in Kant’s Transcendental Deductions: the three 
critiques and the Opus Postumum, edited by E. Förster. Stanford: Stanford University Press, p.218. 
458 Kant 18:615, Reflection 6313. 
	 144	
empirical being given to it, since, without this, thought and combination would have 
nothing to exercise its spontaneity on. Thus, Kant claims, “the proposition ‘I think,’ insofar 
as it says that I exist thinking, is not a merely logical function, but rather determines the 
subject (which is then at the same time object) in regard to existence.”459 This also means 
that the determination of my consciousness in time thus essentially presupposes that I exist 
and occupy a position in space, to which other things can, therefore, be external.  
 
However, as Förster showed, how exactly such a position of externality can be thought 
remained unresolved within the context of the Critique of Pure Reason, since space, 
according to the transcendental idealist point of view, is the mere form of outer intuition, 
rather than designating something actually “outside” myself. Förster’s point, then, is that, 
in order to renegotiate the relation between the “I think” of the spontaneous thinking 
subject and myself as a spatially extended, corporeal and existing being in space, self-
positing, as the act by which the subject posits itself in the sense of making itself into an 
object of experience, needs to address both the problematic of space and my position in 
it.460 Thus, as concerns the relation between the Opus Postumum and the Critique of Pure 
Reason, one can broadly say that self-positing deals with the problem of synthesis, the 
copulative concept in a judgment, and thereby, in a second step, with the relation between 
the transcendental apperception of the “I think” and the empirical consciousness “I am,” a 
subject matter which had hitherto been the explicit subject of the Transcendental 
Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
 
Self-positing in the Opus Postumum 
	
Kant begins his re-investigation of self-positing within the context of the Opus Postumum 
in Fascicle X, written from August 1799 to April 1800. The first important mention of self-
positing states the following: “Daß wir nichts einsehen als was wir selbst machen können. 
Wir müssen uns aber vorher selbst machen.”461 This quotation stands in a clear relation to 
two moments of the Critique of Pure Reason. On the one hand, it recalls the B-Edition of 
the Transcendental Deduction, where Kant proposed that “I exist as an intelligence that is 
merely conscious of its faculty for combination.”462 On the other hand, it further refers to 
Kant’s so-called “Copernican turn,” according to which  “we can cognize of things a priori 
																																																								
459 CPR B429. 
460 Förster, “Kant’s Selbstsetzungslehre,” p.218. 
461 OP 22:353. “That we have insight into nothing except what we can make ourselves. First however, we 
must make ourselves. Beck’s original representing.” 
462 CPR B158. 
	 145	
only what we ourselves have put into them [in sie legen].”463 Here the Opus Postumum 
thus ultimately does not take a point of view that could not have been found in the Critique 
of Pure Reason. The Critique of Pure Reason had already claimed that self-consciousness 
means being conscious of one’s faculty of combining, and, furthermore, that objects 
conform to our knowledge rather than the other way around.  
 
The quotation from the Opus Postumum does, however, seem to contain an intensification, 
in the sense that “what I can combine” is reformulated into the more general “what I can 
make,” and the previous “consciousness is consciousness of my faculty of combination” 
becomes “consciousness is consciousness of my ability to make myself.” This means that 
the terminology of machen (to make) and können (to be able to), and thus one’s acts, skills 
or abilities, has taken over from the previous focus on combination more broadly that Kant 
employed throughout the Critique of Pure Reason. In the Opus Postumum, the conditions 
of possibility thus appear to have become conditions of what we can make. And in order to 
be able to delineate that which we “can make,” we first need to “make ourselves,” in the 
sense of positing oneself as existing. How is it, then, that we “make ourselves”? 
There are a multitude of terms employed by Kant that designate the act of positing. 
Alongside setzen (to posit), Kant also employs machen (to make), vorhermachen (to pre-
make), constituieren (to constitute), zum Object machen (to make into an object), as well 
as sein Selbstbewußtsein determinieren (to determine one’s self-consciousness), and 
others.464 In Fascicle VII Kant offers a systematic breakdown of the different elements and 
moments that together make up self-positing. Firstly, Kant differentiates between our self-
consciousness as facultas representativa and “die Bestimmung seiner selbst als Function 
seiner selbst als vis representativa.”465 Secondly, in critical fashion he further differentiates 
between the subject in appearance and the subject as a thing in itself objectively=x. This 
means that with regards to positing we have to attend to four interconnected, but 
nonetheless differentiated, elements: firstly the facultas representativa (faculty of 
representation), secondly the vis representativa (power of representation), thirdly the 
subject as appearance, and fourthly the subject as a thing in itself.466 These different 
elements are produced by acts (Akte), which in most places are said to be two in number.467  
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The first act of self-positing 
	
The first act, performed by the faculty of representation, is said to be “die Vorstellung 
seiner selbst (apperception) wodurch das Subject sich selbst zum Object macht.”468 
Apperception is said to be originary in two interconnected ways. Firstly, it “entspringt 
nicht aus einem vorhergehenden Akt.”469 Consciousness of myself as an object of thought 
is thus said to be a spontaneous and originary act which is not triggered or caused by 
anything preceding it. As such the consciousness of myself as object is not subject to 
syllogistic reasoning. Similarly to in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant consequently 
continues to distance himself from the conception of the Cartesian cogito. Secondly, this 
first act of self-positing is said to be an act of self-differentiation, in the sense that the 
faculty of representation “geht von innen hinaus mit etwas was sie selbst setzt.”470  
 
At the same time, however, Kant claims that this first act is merely logical and analytical, 
rather than synthetic. It is a merely formal undertaking, and as such as yet contains no 
content or material.471 That which is posited is “das Formale des Urteilens nach der Regel 
der Identität.” 472  Proceeding according to the formal rules of identity and non-
contradiction, the first act of self-positing is thus an act of pure and mere thought, which 
concerns itself with our mode of cognition in general and the object of which is nothing 
but the faculty of representation itself. Kant’s point here is that the formal conditions of 
judgment itself, the “subject-copula-predicate” form, are the result of something that is 
done. They are made possible by an originary act, rather than being “native” or immanent 
to our faculty of representation as a pre-requisite for judgment. This originary act, in its 
first moment, is an act of separation and differentiation, in which one reflexively inquires 
into (erkunden) and measures (ausmessen) one’s own faculty of representation.473 In so 
doing, one differentiates oneself into a subject (I, the one who acts) and an object (I, the 
one who is being inquired into, my faculty of representation). Relating these two purely 
formal terms to one another is the copula sum,474 Latin for “I am,” which, equally to 
myself as predicate, is being pulled out of “I.” The first act of self-positing thus results in 
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the differentiation of myself into a merely formal subject and object, which was already 
identically contained in the subject, albeit in less distinct form. 
 
This discussion so far coincides with Kant’s claims in the Critique of Pure Reason, where 
the transcendental apperception was specified as consciousness “of myself not as I appear 
to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am. This representation is a thinking, not 
an intuition.”475 But the B-Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason has also shown that the 
thought “I am” essentially presupposes something given, since without it there would be 
nothing to exercise my spontaneous thought upon. And rather than only the apperception 
of myself as an object of thought, it is this very relation between myself as an object of 
thought and an object in space and time that is, properly speaking, the problem of self-
positing.  
 
The transition between the first and the second act of self-positing 
 
In order to address this relation between myself as an object of thought and an object in 
space and time, we must move on from the first to the second act of self-positing. While 
the first act was said to be undertaken by the faculty of representation (facultas 
representativa, Vorstellungsvermögen) and carried out by the transcendental apperception, 
the second act is the doing of the power of representation (vis representativa, 
Vorstellungskraft), which is in general charged with the responsibility of synthetically 
combining intuitions and concepts.  It is thus in this second act that the merely logical form 
of judgment is to be supplied with content (intuition) that will allow the merely logical 
object that I am to become an object (Gegenstand) in the proper sense.  
 
There is, however, a transition between the first and the second act of self-positing, which 
Kant calls a progression (Fortschritt): “Nur dadurch dass das Subject sich selbst Object 
wird schreitet die Apperzeption zur Apprehension und schreitet von der Metaphysik zur 
Transzendentalen Philosophie, vom Analytischen zum Synthetischen a priori.”476 The 
progression between the first and the second act of self-positing thus passes from 
metaphysics to transcendental philosophy, and from analytic to synthetic judgment. How, 
then, is this transition conceptualized? 
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The terms that Kant employs to describe the transition or progression from the first to the 
second act of self-positing are schreiten (to step or progress), 477  hervorgehen (to 
emerge),478 führen (to lead), 479 and sich reihen (to follow in a series)480. The second act of 
self-positing is thus said to emerge out of the first, the first is said to “lead to” to the 
second act, “das logische Bewußtsein führt zum Realen,”481 es reihet sich (constitutes a 
series).482 Thus a second act emerges out of the first act, and this second act must provide 
the empty and merely logical form of the object I am with content. This means that content 
(intuition) is yet to be introduced into the equation, and that, in a consecutive moment, 
these heterogeneous elements of intuitions and concepts are then to be combined and 
applied to one another.  
 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, the mutual preparation and combination of intuitions and 
concepts was the explicit responsibility of the power of judgment (Urteilskraft). When it 
comes to the Opus Postumum, the second act of self-positing is equally said to be the 
responsibility of the power of judgment (Urteilskraft), the forms of which are said to 
emerge analytically from the faculty of representation, meaning that they are to be pulled 
out of the faculty of representation in yet another judgment of clarification.483 However, 
Kant proposes that next to the forms of the power of judgment there is a second element, 
which equally emerges in the transition from the first to the second act of self-positing. 
Here Kant introduces a radical difference to the Critique of Pure Reason: “Die Prinzipien 
der Möglichkeit Erfahrung anzustellen liegen identisch im Vorstellungsvermögen 
überhaupt (facultas repraesentativa) woraus die Formen der Urteilskraft analytisch und die 
Prinzipien der Vernunft apodiktisch hervorgehen.”484 The transition from the first to the 
second act is thus said to also be the place where the principles of reason apodictically, 
meaning necessarily, come onto the stage.  
 
Fascicle I repeats that the place of reason and its ideas must be somewhere in the transition 
between the first and second act of self-positing. Ideas, Kant writes here, come onto the 
scene “noch vor einer Selbstbestimmung im Raume und der Zeit (obzwar, zum Behuf 
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derselben).”485 This means that “out of” the purely logical consciousness I am, and before 
any further act of determination of the object that I am as an object of possible experience 
in time and space, both reason and the power of judgment emerge. And while the Critique 
of Pure Reason claimed that the power of judgment is the responsibility of the Analytic of 
Principles, which famously contains the principles “without which no object can be 
thought,”486 including myself as an object in time and space, it is yet to be seen why reason 
needs to enter in the transition from the first to the second act of self-positing. All that is 
known so far is that reason apodictically emerges in the transition between the first and 
second act of self-positing.  
 
Ideas, ideals, original images 
	
Subsequently, then, reason, within the Opus Postumum, is said to “make” ideas, just like 
the faculty of representation in the first act of self-positing was seen to make itself into a 
formal object of thought. Ideas, Kant writes, are self-made (selbstgeschaffen).487 Reason 
thus comes onto the scene between the first and second act of self-positing explicitly as a 
source of creation and invention, as the originator of ideas, meaning that ideas originate 
autonomously and spontaneously within reason, rather than following, as a reaction, from 
any form of outward affection.488 As such, the Opus Postumum however deviates further 
from the path of ideas laid out in the Critique or Pure Reason, since there reason was 
hitherto denied any role as a creative, generative force: in the Antinomy of Pure Reason 
Kant had famously claimed that “reason really cannot generate any concept at all, but can 
at most only free a concept of the understanding from the unavoidable limitations of 
possible experience, and thus seek to extend it beyond the boundaries of the empirical, 
though still in connection with it.”489  
 
Thus while in the Critique of Pure Reason the understanding is affirmed as a generative 
faculty, the faculty of reason is at the same time denied a productive function, as ideas 
themselves are specified as “nothing except categories extended to the unconditioned.”490 
It is thus in distinction to the Critique of Pure Reason when, in the Opus Postumum, ideas 
are now explicitly subject to being made by reason, as they enter the scenario of self-
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constitution prior to the second act of self-positing. Since ultimately the horizon of this 
discussion concerns the role and meaning of technical-practical reason for self-positing, 
what remains to be shown in the following is whether reason in its entirety is productive of 
ideas, meaning that technical-practical reason “makes,” or whether this transcendental 
“making” is restricted to moral-practical reason. 
 
Reason, Kant writes, “geht voran mit der Entwerfung ihrer Formen.”491 And in the last 
Fascicle I he repeats that “Ideen gehen vor den Erscheinungen in Raum u. Zeit vorher,”492 
affirming once again the placement of reason prior to the understanding and any further act 
of self-determination. At the same time, Kant still holds that, as concepts of reason, ideas 
are thought-entities, and thus “Gedankenwesen, subjective Producte der eigenen 
Menschenvernunft, die das Subject auf sich selbst bezieht.”493 Thus, not only do ideas 
originate within our own human reason, they are, secondly, restricted to the realm of 
thought (Gedankenwesen), and are, thirdly, reflexively directed only towards ourselves. 
What being directed towards itself means is, that they effectively function as “Gesetze des 
Denkens die das Subject ihm selbst vorschreibt. Autonomie.”494  
 
Ideas thus can still be seen to perform the role of immanent self-legislation. But differently 
to Kant’s position in the Critique of Pure Reason, ideas are here said to organize our 
system of thought and legislate it prior to having received any content, or object, or even 
developed full self-consciousness. This means that there must be an essential relation 
between reason’s ideas and the second act of self-positing, in the sense that reason’s ideas 
essentially contribute to and work towards the second act of self-positing.  
	
While the Critique of Pure Reason had explicated ideas of reason as essentially discursive 
in nature, meaning that they belong to the conceptual realm, according to the Opus 
Postumum “Ideen sind nicht Begriffe sondern reine Anschauungen nicht discursive 
sondern intuitive Vorstellungen, denn es ist nur Ein solcher Gegenstand.”495 This last point 
on the status of ideas as intuitions is repeated frequently in slightly different iterations: 
“Ideen sind a priori durch reine Vernunft geschaffene Bilder (Anschauungen) welche vor 
der Erkenntnis der Dinge vorher blos subjective Gedankendinge und die Elemente der 
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letzteren vorhergehen. Sie sind die Urbilder (prototypa) [...].”496 Thus, while in the 
Critique of Pure Reason Kant positioned his own thinking of ideas somewhere mid-way 
between Aristotle, who restrained the idea to the empirical, and Plato, who considered the 
idea to be a form of archetype,497 the Opus Postumum now suggests that Kant’s conception 
has moved a considerable step closer to the Platonic archetype, towards what in the 
Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of the Power of Judgment was called an ideal.  
 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, an ideal was defined as “the idea not merely in concreto 
but in individuo, i.e., as an individual thing which is determinable, or even determined, 
through the idea alone.”498 As such, ideals are archetypes, with the Stoic sage and God 
functioning as examples.499 Ideals also surface in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, 
where they are said to be  
 
the representation of an individual being as adequate to an idea. Hence the archetype of 
taste, which indeed rests on reason’s indeterminate idea of a maximum, but cannot be 
represented through concepts, but only in an individual presentation, would better be called 
the ideal of the beautiful, something that we strive to produce in ourselves even if we are 
not in possession of it.500  
 
As such, in the production of beautiful art, the products of genius are said to be singular 
examples of the ideal of beauty, and thus to function as exemplary archetypes for further 
production.  
 
When it comes to the Opus Postumum, Kant now claims that ideas are presented in 
intuition as ideals or Urbilder (original images).501 Each one of these original images is, 
firstly, numerically singular, “ein jeder dieser Gegenstände ist schlechthin Einer 
(unicum).”502 Secondly, each is a maximum. In continuity with the Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant proposes that one of reason’s ideas is that of the world, which is a 
																																																								
496 OP 21:51. “Ideas are images [Bilder] (intuitions), created a priori through pure reason, which, [as] merely 
subjective thought-objects and elements of knowledge precede knowledge of things. They are the archetypes 
(prototypa), by which Spinoza thought all things had to be seen, according to their forms, in God: that is, in 
what is formal in the elements out of which we make God for ourselves.” 
497 CPR A313/B370. 
498 CPR A568/B596. 
499 CPR A569/B597. 
500 CJ 5:232. 
501 OP 21:51. 
502 OP 21:40. “Each of these objects is absolutely one (unicum). If there is a world in the metaphysical sense 
then there is only one world; and if there is man he is the ideal, the archetype (prototypon), of a man 
adequate to duty.” 
	 152	
quantitative maximum, while the idea of God is a qualitative maximum.503 Thirdly, both of 
these ideas are “unendlich; der erste als Größe der Erscheinung im Raum und der Zeit der 
zweite dem Grad nach (virtualiter).”504 This means that the world is the idea of an infinite, 
singular maximum in the phenomenal realm of space and time, while the idea of God is its 
noumenal counterpart. Thus, there is, on the one hand, God, who is said to have only rights 
but no duties and who, as it were, unites all objects of pure reason. On the other hand there 
is the idea of world, which concerns all empirical objects and effects their unification.  
 
While the concept of ether does surface occasionally during the very last Fascicle I, 
Eckhart Förster is thus in an important manner right to point out that the idea of world 
must essentially be understood as “the successor to the ether conception of the earlier 
fascicles.”505 Similarly to how Kant had arrived at a conception of ether “given by reason, 
not as a hypothesis for perceived objects, for the purpose of explaining their phenomena, 
but rather immediately, in order to found the possibility of experience itself,”506 the idea of 
world (and all self-made ideas in general) are explicitly said to not be “hypothetisch 
(problematisch oder assertorisch) sondern apodictisch indem sie [reason/Vernunft] sich 
selbst schafft.”507 Thus, in as much as all objects are intuited within the absolute whole 
called God, Kant asserts that “ebenso können wir sagen sie [alle Gegenstände] müssen 
ihrer Realität nach in der Welt angetroffen werden.”508 This is the case because the 
essential difference between the objects intuited in God and the objects intuited in world 
does not lie within the objects themselves, but is rather to be located “in der 
Verschiedenheit des Verhältnisses wie das den Sinnengegenstand apprehendierende 





503 OP 21:11. “Both are a maximum: the one determined according to degree (qualitative), the other 
according to volume [or] space (quantitative); the one as object of pure reason, the other as sense object. 
Both are infinite: the first as magnitude of appearance in space and time; the second according to degree 
(virtualiter), as limitless activity with regard to forces (mathematical or dynamic magnitudes of sense 
objects). One as thing in itself or appearance.” 
504 OP 21:11. 
505 Förster, Kant’s Final Synthesis, p.162. 
506 OP 22:554. “It is given by reason, not as a hypothesis for perceived bodies, for the purpose of explaining 
their phenomena, but rather, immediately, in order  o found the possibility of experience itself.” Kant then 
goes on to explain the unique and singular proof of the existence of ether. 
507 OP 21:93. 
508 OP 21:43. 
509 OP 22:43. “This difference does not lie in the objects, but merely in the difference of the relation in which 
the subject apprehending the sense object is affected for the production of the representation in itself.” 
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God, the world, and the human 
 
Complementing reason’s original images of God and the world Kant places a copula, 
meaning a further mediating concept capable of reconciling the heterogeneous wholes of 
God and the world. Consequently, it becomes clear that reason’s self-made ideas are 
internally differentiated, in the sense that they are characterized by uneven relations to one 
another:  
 
Gott u die Welt sind beide Objecte der Transc. Phil und (Subject, Praed u copula) ist 
der denkende Mensch. Das Subject der sie in einem Satze verbindet. – Dieses sind 
logische Verhältnisse in einem Satze nicht die Existenz der Objecte betreffend 
sondern blos das Formale der Verhältnisse diese Objecte zur Synthetischen Einheit zu 
bringen Gott, die Welt, und Ich der Mensch ein Weltwesen selbst, beide 
verbindend.510 
 
Gott, die Welt, und der Mensch als Person d.i. als Wesen das diese Begriffe 
vereinigt.511  
 
Gott, die Welt und was beide zu einem System vereinigt das denkende einwohnende 
Prinzip des Menschen (mens) in der Welt.512  
 
Concerning the doctrine of ideas, there is, then, another fundamental change undertaken in 
the Opus Postumum, since complementing God and the world, the Critique of Pure Reason 
had hitherto placed the soul. Now, however, the ideas of God and the world are both 
complemented as well as combined by the idea of the human.  
 
Looking back to the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had argued that ideas “are not 
arbitrarily invented, but given as problems by the nature of reason itself, and hence they 
relate necessarily to the entire use of the understanding.”513 These problems were then said 
to be three-fold in nature, meaning that there are three different classes of ideas, which are 
derived from the three categories of relation when extended to the unconditioned. The first 
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idea “contains the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking subject, the second the 
absolute unity of the series of conditions of appearance, the third the absolute unity of the 
condition of all objects of thought in general.”514 This means that the first idea contains the 
relation to the thinking subject, the second to the world as the sum of all appearances, and 
finally the third to all things in general. From these three classes of ideas, Kant then 
deduces the three sciences of special metaphysics – rational psychology, cosmology and 
theology – which are treated in the Transcendental Dialectic of Pure Reason. Kant had 
inherited this three-fold structure of special metaphysics (Rational Psychology, Cosmology 
and Theology) from Leibniz and Wolff. Rational Psychology was famously given privilege 
within the overall structure of the Critique of Pure Reason, in the sense that the entire 
Transcendental Analytic must be understood as referring to the operations of a 
transcendental subject, which was restricted and further qualified in the Transcendental 
Dialectic.  
 
When it comes to reason’s ideas within the Opus Postumum, Kant carries out a 
fundamental change to the metaphysica specialis. Reason is still said to make three ideas. 
On the one hand there are still God and the world as the objects of Theology and 
Cosmology, respectively. The third idea, however, has now become the object of 
Anthropology rather than Rational Psychology, as it concerns the human, rather than the 
soul.  
 
The growing importance of anthropology within Kant’s thought had been announced 
earlier. Kant can famously added a fourth question to what the Critique of Pure Reason 
had articulated as reason’s three-fold interest in his lectures on Logic (1800). In addition to 
What can I know?, What can I do?, and What may I hope?, the Logic adds the question of 
What is the human?515 This fourth question must not be misunderstood as merely an 
external addition. Rather, the first three questions are said to be related to, and are thus 
themselves aiming at, the fourth question. In essence, “we could reckon all of this as 
anthropology, because the first three questions relate to the last one.”516  
 
This important change to the critical program was first raised by the German philosopher 
Max Scheler in Die Stellung des Menschen im Cosmos (1928), where he argued that every 
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speculative philosophy, including the one put forward by Kant, must eventually ask the 
question concerning the essence of the human. The importance given to anthropology by 
the late Kant has shaped the course of twentieth century post-Kantian philosophy 
dramatically, leading to a bifurcation into, on the one hand, a philosophy aiming to found 
itself on anthropology, and, on the other, a philosophy aiming to overcome this 
anthropological dimension. However, and as pointed out by Christian Bermes in his Welt: 
Vom metaphysischen zum natürlichen Weltbegriff (2004), one would do well to doubt that 
Kant had in mind the same notion of anthropology that would later be developed by 
Scheler, Plessner, Gehlen, or even Heidegger.517 According to Bermes, what is important is 
that Kant both introduces and explicates the fourth question within the context of his 
discussion of philosophy as a world concept (Weltbegriff), a point also made by Foucault 
in his Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, which noted that the Opus Postumum made 
clear that “all reflection on man involves reflection on the world.”518 
 
World and knowledge of the world  
 
As the previous discussion has shown, the world is one of reason’s problems addressed in 
the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason. What this means is that, 
according to the specification of ideas versus concepts of the understanding, the world 
cannot be known in the sense of determinately cognized, and the world is also not an 
ontological presupposition. Instead, the world essentially only exists in thought, as it is to 
begin with an idea of reason. Reason employs the idea of world to situate appearances, 
which are under the rule of the categories, in the world, and to connect their conditions to a 
world. Thus, as Eugen Fink points out in his 1985 Einleitung in die Philosophie, after 
Kant’s intervention into cosmology in the Critique of Pure Reason the world is no longer a 
“Seinendes, kein Ding […], daß jeder Versuch sie dinghaft zu denken […] die menschliche 
Vernunft in einen unauflöslichen Widerspruch verwickelt.”519 As an idea, the world does 
not exist as a something that can be given, but only as aufgegeben (a task). Foucault also 
noted that in the later Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Kant envisaged the 
world “more as a republic to be built than a cosmos given in advance.”520 
 
																																																								
517 Christian Bermes, 2004. Welt: Vom metaphysischen natürlichen Weltbegriff. Hamburg: Felix Meiner 
Verlag, p.64. 
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It was thus already in the Critique of Pure Reason that Kant problematized cosmology by 
arguing that the world must be taken at once as a problem and a task (Aufgabe). Following 
Kant, Hegel and other German idealists would treat what Kant started under the name of 
world as a problem of speculation and the system.521 Differently to Hegel, for whom the 
movement of at once the world and reason raised the important question of history, Kant 
addresses the world by way of two complementary forms of knowledge. On the one hand, 
the world as a task is the responsibility of scientific knowledge proper. Secondly, however, 
it is also the responsibility of another form of knowledge that Kant calls Weltkenntnis 
(knowledge of the world), and which is essentially a propaedeutic and pre-scientific 
Kennen (knowledge) of the world.522 This notion of knowledge of the world (Weltkenntnis) 
must not be understood as separating off and treating an altogether different domain of 
being, but is merely a methodologically and epistemologically different approach to the 
world than the one provided by science. How, then, is one to imagine this propaedeutic, 
pre-scientific knowledge of the world?  
 
Kant taught seminars on knowledge of the world (Weltkenntnis) throughout his entire 
career, having on numerous occasions been vocal in underlining the necessity of providing 
his students with the essential “knowledge of historical matters which could make good 
their lack of experience.”523 Initially, these seminars were held under the all-encompassing 
title of geography. In the year 1765 Kant decided to divide the encompassing seminar on 
geography into the three disciplines of physical, moral, and political geography. The 
second, moral part of geography concerned the human, and from 1772 onwards came to 
form a standalone lecture course on anthropology, before being published in book form in 
1798 under the title Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. It was not until 1802 
that the longer and more encompassing lectures on Physical Geography finally 
followed.524  
 
The introductions to both of these lecture courses provide important insight into the nature 
of knowledge of the world. There is, Kant writes in the Introduction to Physical 
Geography, “a great need for instruction in how to apply one’s knowledge and make use of 
it in a manner appropriate to one’s understanding and present situation, or to provide a 
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practical use for one’s knowledge. This constitutes knowledge of the world.” 525 
Knowledge of the world thus addresses the problem of application and use of theoretical 
knowledge in the world: “The world is the foundation [Substrat] and stage [Schauplatz] on 
which our ingenious play [Spiel unserer Geschicklichkeit] is performed. It is the ground on 
which we obtain and apply our knowledge.”526 The world is here explicated as the stage 
and thus ground for theoretical knowledge, and it is only by being situated in relation to 
this stage that theoretical knowledge is given both its meaning and purpose.  
 
While itself a natural form of knowledge, pre-scientific and presupposable in every human, 
the notion of world at work in this form of knowledge is nevertheless itself systematic and 
architectonic. We have to, Kant writes, “become acquainted with the objects of our 
experience as a whole. Thereby our knowledge is not an aggregation but a system.”527 As a 
propaedeutic, the study of anthropology and physical geography thus aims to cultivate the 
“idea for knowledge of the world. What we are doing here is making an architectonic 
concept for ourselves, which is a concept whereby the manifold parts are derived from the 
whole,”528 rather than the whole being assembled from its parts. As such, it anticipates  
 
our future experience in the world, giving us, as it were, a pre-formed conception 
[Vorbegriff] of everything. We say of someone who has travelled widely that he has seen 
the world. But knowledge of the world is more than merely seeing it. Anyone who wants to 
derive benefit from a journey must make a plan in advance, and not regard the world 
merely as an object of the outer sense.529  
 
Knowledge of the world is thus at once a problem of the application of theoretical 
knowledge, and of the anticipation of experience by means of an architectonic idea of a 
whole, called the world, in us.  
 
As a system, knowledge of the world is explicitly the combined effort of both physical 
geography and anthropology, and thus concerns both nature and human beings. “Both 
parts, however, must be considered cosmologically, namely not with regard for a single 
noteworthy object that they contain (physics and empirical psychology), but rather with 
regard to the relationship to the whole in which they are found, and within each takes its 
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place.”530 It is thus not only that anthropology and geography belong together as sister-
disciplines, but moreover that they must themselves be considered cosmologically, and 
thus in respect to the whole of which they are each a part.531 The world is a cosmological 
whole, “das je schon als spezifische, natürliche Erfahrung erworben ist und in dieser Form 
auch kultiviert werden kann.”532 Thus, when Kant, in his lectures on logic, adds the fourth 
question regarding the human to the hitherto three-fold program of critical philosophy, he 
cannot be said to reduce critical philosophy to the human. He rather grounds and relates 
critical philosophy with a larger notion of the world, of which both geography and 
anthropology are a part.533 Kant’s point, then, is that the three questions of critical 
philosophy need to be addressed not only regarding philosophy in the scholastic sense, but 
also, and most importantly, with regard to their “stage,” meaning the world. 
 
Philosophy in the world concept 
	
In 1781 the Critique of Pure Reason had already between two different kinds of 
knowledge when it comes to philosophy.534 On the one hand, and until now, Kant writes 
that “the concept of philosophy has been only a scholastic concept [Schulbegriff], namely 
that of a system of cognition that is sought only as a science without having as its end 
anything more than the systematic unity of this knowledge, thus the logical perfection of 
cognition.”535 Distinct from this scholastic concept, Kant speaks of “philosophy in sensu 
cosmico,”536 philosophy in the world concept, which Alfredo Ferrarin also calls cosmic 
philosophy.537 What ultimately differentiates the two kinds of philosophy from one another 
is their form of presentation and their end, meaning that their difference is once again of a 
methodological nature rather than a difference of domain. Kant’s critique of scholastic 
philosophy argues that it is neither grounded on nor concerned with the horizon of its 
application, meaning its end. It is a practice of philosophy “that is sought only as a science 
without having as its end anything more than the systematic unity of this knowledge, thus 
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the logical perfection of cognition.”538 Seeked “only as a science,” the practitioner of 
scholastic philosophy is thus in danger of becoming a philodox, who “strives only for 
speculative knowledge, without looking to see how much the knowledge contributes to the 
final end of human reason.”539 As a philodox, the scholastic philosopher thus cares only 
about science for the sake of science, and the logical perfection of this science, while 
remaining unconcerned with the purpose of this knowledge and its orientation within a 
world.  
 
Philosophy in the world concept, on the other hand, is described as the “science of the 
relation of all cognition to the essential ends of human reason (teleologia rationis 
humanae).”540 There are, then, explicitly multiple essential ends that philosophy in the 
world concept is concerned with.541 However, these essential ends are themselves specified 
as means to yet another end, of which there is only one. This final end, Kant writes, is “the 
entire vocation of human beings, and the philosophy of it is called moral philosophy.”542 
What this means, then, is that, already in the Critique of Pure Reason, what differentiates 
scholastic philosophy from philosophy according to the world concept is that the latter is 
concerned with more than the mere logical perfection of the system of cognition for its 
own sake. It instead aims to situate and generate that system in relation to its stage 
(Schauplatz) – meaning the world – and then, finally, to do the same for the relation of this 
world as a system of essential ends to the final end, understood as the vocation of all 
human beings. It is thus crucial that theoretical philosophy in the world concept, as a 
system of essential ends, is itself oriented towards the final end, and thus to moral 
philosophy as the “science of the highest maxim for the use of our reason.”543  
 
God, the world, and the human in the Opus Postumum, the system of transcendental 
philosophy 
 
These architectonic, methodological reflections on world and the different forms of 
knowledge of the world resurface with renewed urgency within the context of the Opus 
Postumum and more specifically, in relation to self-positing. Reason ‘makes’ its ideas for 
the sake of the second act of self-positing. To this end, the Opus Postumum enacted an 
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essential change to the three-fold special metaphysics as Kant replaced Rational 
Psychology, the science of the soul, with Anthropology, the science of the human. The 
preceding discussion has now shown how the human is however part of a complex cluster 
of systematic discussions, as anthropology forms one part of what Kant calls knowledge of 
the world (Weltkenntnis), which is the necessary supplement to theoretical philosophy if 
theoretical philosophy aims to achieve more than a mere logical perfection of its system.  
 
 In the Opus Postumum, the reformulation of Rational Psychology into Anthropology takes 
place within the discussion of self-positing, which concerns the problematic relation 
between my transcendental and empirical self-consciousness, and thus describes the 
process by which the subject “makes” itself.544 In a sense, however, the human was already 
considered from a perspective of self-making in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of 
View. While anthropology from the physiological point of view “concerns the investigation 
of what nature makes of the human being,” pragmatic anthropology is there described as 
“the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should 
make of himself.”545  
 
In the Opus Postumum, we find in the closing line to a paragraph on self-positing the 
aforementioned position being reformulated as a question. Only now, it is self-positing, 
rather than pragmatic anthropology which is to answer the question “Was macht der 
Mensch aus sich selbst?”546 What the human refers to here is here equally to God and the 
world a mere idea. “Wenn Gott ist so nur einer. Ist eine Welt in metaphysischer bedeutung 
so ist nur Eine und ist der Mensch so ist es das Ideal Urbild Prototypon Eines der Pflicht 
adäquaten Menschen.”547 From this perspective, then, the human “ist eine bloße Idee der 
reinen Vernunft der categorische Imperativ bewährt ihm seine Realität und er ist insofern 
Noumenon.”548 This means that the existence of the human, as much as that of the world 
and God, can neither be affirmed nor denied, as it cannot be determinately answered from 
within the critical restrictions set by Kant. Analogically to the world, the idea of the human 
is equally characterized as a task (aufgegeben), in the sense that it can never be given but is 
subject to being brought about.  
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This very task, however, turns out to be a two-fold undertaking. “Ich der Mensch bin ein 
Weltwesen und Erscheinung im Raum und der Zeit.”549 On the ond hand, then, the human 
is here always already determined by its relationship to the world.550 At the same time, 
however, the Opus Postumum also writes, that „Der Mensch ist einerseits ein Weltwesen: 
andererseits aber der dem Gesetz der Pflicht sich weisende Mensch ein noumenon.“551 Due 
to this double determination of the human, a trait familiar to readers of Kant’s critical 
philosophy, Kant differentiates the idea of the human from that of the other two ideas, and 
thus, in a sense, elevates and ennobles the idea of the human over and above the other two 
ideas. Being at once at once in the noumenal and phenomenal realm, the human can take 
on the function of the copula between the ideas of God and the world, thus mediating, 
combining, and synthesizing these two heterogeneous ideas. This, the human can however 
only do, according to the Opus Postumum, because the very distinction between God and 
the world is itself the result of the act of thinking. The human can thus only unify God and 
the world, because it is itself the originary power from which the distinction itself derives. 
“Der medius terminus (copula) im Urtheile ist hier das Urtheilende Subject (das denkende 
Weltwesen, der Mensch, in der Welt.) Subiect, Praedicat, Copula.”552 
 
When taken together, the three ideas form a “Gedankensystem,”553 and thus a system of 
thought rather than nature, a “Wissenschaft der Formen ähnlich unter welchen wenn sie 
gegeben werden sollten sie allein erscheinen müßten.”554 Ultimately, this science of forms 
is nothing other than the system of transcendental philosophy that Kant had announced as 
early as the Critique of Pure Reason, where he had distinguished its propaedeutic critical 
project from the actual system of transcendental philosophy. While the Critique of Pure 
Reason self-reflexively announced itself as the “science of the mere estimation of pure 
reason, of its sources and boundaries, as the propaedeutic to the system of pure reason,”555 
it also put forward the plan for the entire system of pure reason, understood as “the 
exhaustive analysis of all of human cognition.”556  
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However, while already announced in the Critique of Pure Reason, it is the Opus 
Postumum that now finally ventures to lay open and unfold the system of philosophy. 
Transcendental philosophy, Fascicle I tells us, is “eine Wissenschaft welche (objectiv) 
Grundsätze über Objekte sondern über das Subject der Erkenntnis  desselben Umfang und 
Grenzen seines Wissens vorträgt.”557 However, it is more than simply the capacity of 
analytic reflection and self-limitation, and thus the world of analytic consciousness, but, 
further “ein Vermögen sich selbst synthetisch in seiner durchgängigen Bestimmung als in 
einem System der Ideen a priori gegeben vorzustellen.”558 This means that transcendental 
philosophy is explicitly articulated as the a priori presentation and constitution of myself as 
an object in the system of pure reason. Self-positing thus, is the self-constitution of reason 
to a system according to its ideas. “Transc. Philos. ist die Autonomie der Ideen in so fern 
sie unabhängig von allem Empirischen ein unbedingtes Ganze ausmachen und die 
Vernunft sich selbst zu diesem als einem absonderlichen System constituiert.”559 And, 
again,  “… das Denken wodurch wir uns die Gegenstände selbst durch synthetische 
Erkenntnis a priori aus Begriffen selbst machen und der gedachten Gegenstände subjective 
Selbstschöpfer sind.”560 A few pages later Kant repeats that “Transc. Phil. ist das formale 
Princip sich selbst als Object der Erkenntnis systematisch zu constituieren.”561 This means 
that after the first pure logical act of self-positing, in which the subject posits itself as an 
object of thought, reason constitutes itself as a system of thought “noch vor seiner 
Selbstbestimmung im Raume u. der Zeit doch zum Behuf derselben.”562  
 
Thus, regarding the preceding question of reason’s contribution to self-positing, it has now 
become clear that in Fascicle I transcendental philosophy essentially, “becomes,” as it 
were, the theory of self-positing, as reason posits itself by way of positing its three original 
and self-made ideas. Furthermore, then, the system of transcendental philosophy, 
according to its three ideas, provides original images (Urbild) for all possible objects of my 
thought, as the place into which they must be set: “Die Transc: Philosophie geht vor der 
Behauptung der gedachten Dinge Voraus als ihr Urbild wohin sie gestellt werden 
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müssen.”563 Reason’s ideas thus are needed at this point and before any further act of 
positing, because, as Förster points out, “without reason’s ideal of a world, there would not 
even arise the notion of a sensible outer.”564 This means that without such ideas we could 
not even conceive of the very difference between the inside and the outside, or between the 
sensible and the intelligible. But how is one to understand this differentiating function that 
reason has acquired in the Opus Postumum, a function that in the Critique of Pure Reason 
was explicated as problem of the concepts of reflection? 
 
Reason, self-positing and transcendental reflection 
 
The B-Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason argued that the determination of my 
consciousness in time essentially presupposes that I exist and occupy a position in space, a 
position that other things can therefore be external to. In the Critique of Pure Reason, 
however, how exactly such a position of externality is to be thought remained unresolved, 
since space, according to the transcendental idealist point of view, is the mere form of 
outer intuition, rather than designating something “outside” myself. Within the Critique of 
Pure Reason the concepts of the inner and outer are, properly speaking, concepts of 
reflection, the discussion of which is ‘tagged on’ as an appendix as the third and last part 
of the Transcendental Analytic, in a section entitled On the amphiboly of concepts of 
reflection.565  
 
Reflection (Überlegung, reflexio) here is explicitly not concerned with objects themselves, 
as it rather concerns the “state of mind [Zustand des Gemüts] in which we first prepare 
ourselves to find out the subjective conditions under which we can arrive at concepts.”566 
Furthermore, a difference is posited between logical and transcendental reflection. For its 
part, logical reflection compares concepts, thus establishing their identity and difference 
from one another. Transcendental reflection, on the other hand, has an altogether different 
function. Its primary responsibility is to sort any given representation and to distinguish 
whether it belongs to the faculty of understanding (as an object of thought) or the faculty 
of sensibility (as an object given in intuition):  
 
																																																								
563 OP 21:7. “Transcendental philosophyTranscendental philosophy precedes the assertion of things that are 
thought, as their archetype, [the place] in which they must be set.” 
564 Förster, Kant’s Final Synthesis, p.163. 
565 The source, exact number and layout of the concepts of reflection is not disclosed in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. Kant merely refers to logicians “von ehedem” (formerly), meaning that they had been handed down 
by tradition. See CPR A266/B322. 
566 CPR A260/B316. 
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If it is not the logical forms but the content of concepts that is concerned, i.e., whether the 
things themselves are identical or different, in agreement or in opposition, etc., the things 
can have a twofold relation to our power of cognition, namely to sensibility and to 
understanding, yet it is this place [Stelle] in which they belong that concerns how they 
ought to belong to each other.567  
 
Transcendental reflection thus establishes the relation between given representations by 
establishing the place (Stelle), and thus the faculty, to which each representation belongs. 
The important point, then, is that any judgment whatsoever essentially requires another 
judgment, that is, an act of transcendental reflection, in order to establish the 
“transcendental place”568 and thus to distinguish the proper cognitive faculty to which each 
representation that is to be connected in judgment belongs.569  
 
The determination of such a transcendental place is accomplished by the employment of 
four conceptual couples of reflection: identity and difference, agreement and opposition, 
the inner and the outer, and matter and form.570 Complementing transcendental place as 
“the position that we assign to a concept either in sensibility or in pure understanding,”571 
Kant further introduces the notion of a transcendental topic: “In the same way, the 
estimation of this position that pertains to every concept in accordance with the difference 
in its use, and guidance for determining this place for all concepts in accordance with the 
rules, would be the transcendental topic.”572 The transcendental topic consists of these four 
conceptual couples of reflection, which “[precede] the concepts of things,”573 since they 
precede any judgment, be it synthetic or analytic. It is thus by way of transcendental 
reflection that the transcendental place of any representation must first be determined, from 
which, in a second step, judgment then becomes possible. 
 
Differently to the Critique of Pure Reason, where the discussion of transcendental 
reflection was added on as an appendix to the Transcendental Analytic, I argue that the 
Opus Postumum treats the problematic of transcendental place as a problem of the 
transition from the first act of self-positing to the second, and thus after positing myself as 
a thinking thing but before, or, rather, for the purpose of, positing myself as an empirical 
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569 On aporia of judgment, see Chapter 2 
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object in time and space.  In the transition from logical to synthetic self-positing, reason 
puts forth a system of ideas called Transcendental philosophy, which “geht vor der 
Behauptung der gedachten Dinge Voraus als ihr Urbild wohin sie gestellt werden 
müssen.”574 I will thus argue that the function of the original image (Urbild) put forth by 
the reason is to establish the (transcendental) position (die Stelle) for any particular object 
of my thought, including that of myself.  
 
While transcendental reflection is not explicitly referred to in the sections in question, I 
would like to argue that the originary bifurcation, that is, self-positing of reason as a 
system of ideas (God and the world), performs an analogical, primordial role of orienting 
reason according to the originary distinction between the sensible (phenomenal) and the 
intelligible (noumenal) world. For a noumenon, an object of pure understanding capable of 
being thought but never given, its transcendental place can only be in pure understanding, 
whereas a phenomenon as an object of sensibility can and must be given as an appearance 
in sensibility.575  It is only by way of establishing this initial distinction by way of two 
ideals, two proto-intuitive original images (Urbilder), that reason can orient itself and 
anticipate the place for each and every possible object of thought, including that of itself, 
in order to, then, determine itself as an object in time and space in the second act of self-
positing. Out of the first distinction of the totality of beings (Das All der Wesen) into God 
and the world,576 forming an initial two-fold transcendental topic, a cascade of further 
distinctions must then become possible, which in the Critique of Pure Reason were 
specified as the concepts of reflection, consisting of the inner and outer, matter and form, 
identity and difference, and agreement and opposition. As Förster proposed without 
however showing how this is to be done, I argue that reason must essentially precede the 
understanding in the Opus Postumum, in a similar way to how in the Critique of the Power 
of Judgment, reflecting judgment preceded determining judgment, because “without its 
[reason’s] projections thought could not orient itself in the world.”577 
 
Technical-practical and moral practical-reason 
 
The preceding discussion has thus shown that in the transition from the first to the second 
																																																								
574 OP 21:7. “Transcendental philosophyTranscendental philosophy precedes the assertion of things that are 
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575 Phenomena are “appearances, to the extent as objects they are thought in accordance with the unity of the 
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576 OP 21:43. Foucault points out that finally, in the Opus Postumum, Kant conceded to thinking the absolute 
from the starting point of man. Foucault, Introduction. P.78 
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act of self-positing, reason makes itself into a system of thought according to three ideas, 
the human, God, and the world. The resulting system of transcendental philosophy, I have 
argued, provides a transcendental topic, offering orientation to reason for the sake of a 
second, synthetic act of self-positing. Without the system of transcendental philosophy 
thought could never find itself in the world and could also, in a further step, not constitute 
itself to an empirical object in the world.  
 
The key to this discussion is, then, that the ideas of God and the world are “Ideen der 
moralisch//practischen und technisch//practischen auf Sinnenvorstellungen gegründeten 
Vernunft.”578 Slightly further on, Kant reformulates this point and articulates it in relation 
to transcendental philosophy as an act of self-positing: “Transc: Phil. ist der Act des 
Bewußtsyns dadurch das Subject seiner selbst Urheber wird und dadurch auch von dem 
ganzen gegenstande der technisch//practischen und moralisch//pracischen Vernunft in 
Einem System in Gott alle Dinge als in Einem System zu ordnen.”579 The same point was 
first announced in Fascicle VII, before surfacing again and being treated in more detail in 
the very last Fascicle I: 
 
Das Subject bestimmt sich selbst 1) durch technisch//practische 2) durch 
moralisch//practische Vernunft und ist sich selbst ein Gegenstand von beyden Die 
Welt und Gott. Das erste im Raum u. der Zeit als Erscheinung. Das zweyte nach 
Vernunftbegriffen d.i. einem Princip des categorischen Imperativs.580 
 
Gott und die Welt. Ein System der Transcendentalphilosophie von Technisch 
theoretischer und moralisch//practischer Vernunft.581  
 
Gott u die Welt. Jede ein der Qualität besonderes Ganze. Einzeln und in Verbindung. 
Technisch//practische und moralisch//practische Vernunft. Jedes ein Ganzes und 
beide zusammen in Verbindung (das All der Objecte u des Subjects).582   
 
																																																								
578 OP 21:21. “God and the world are ideas of moral-practical and technical-practical reason, founded on 
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At the very beginning of this chapter I showed that the dynamic forces of matter, also 
called ether, were characterized by Kant as technical. Now the archetype (Urbild) of 
world, as the successor of ether from Fascicle VII onwards, is explicitly defined as the 
product of technical-practical reason. Consequently, this means that technical-practical 
reason does not only allow us to cognize the means necessary for a number of contingent 
ends and to bring forth objects in accordance with the laws of nature: in the Opus 
Postumum Kant holds that technical-practical reason also has a larger systematizing and 
orienting function, which together with moral-practical reason forms the absolute 
systematic whole of transcendental philosophy. Similarly to the role of ether, technical-
practical reason is said to anticipate the whole of possible experience in the systematic 
whole called world. “Der Weltraum wird als eine allgemeine Basis der Körperwelt 
gedacht,”583 meaning that objects of possible experience, here also already explicitly 
referred to as bodies, can a priori be given their place and relation to one another in the 
archetype of the world as a system of ends not legislated by the categorical imperative, as 
they form, what is essentially, a cosmo-technical system.  
 
While moral-practical reason brings forth and systematizes with the idea of God as “ein 
Vernunftbegriff der Freyheit in so fern in ihm ein Princip der Verknüpfung des 
Mannigfaltigen liegt das nur einer Person zukommt,”584 technical-practical reason makes 
the idea of world as “das Ganze aller Gegenstände der Sinnenvorstellung.”585 What 
differentiates these two systematic wholes is that reason, in each of these uses, “makes” 
and systematizes according to a different set of ends (Zwecke). Moral-practical reason is 
oriented towards and legislates according to one final end, the categorical imperative, 
while technical-practical reason concerns itself with all ends not legislated by the 
categorical imperative: “Das eine geht auf Kunst u. Geschicklichkeit (nach beliebigen 
Zwecken) das andere auf Weisheit auf den Endzweck.”586  
 
As such, however, technical-practical reason cannot be equated with Kant’s critcicism of 
scholastic philosophy in the Critique of Pure Reason,587 since scholastic philosophy is 
explicitly critiqued for its lack of concern for the foundation of knowledge and the horizon 
of application of knowledge, as it aims at mere logical perfection of the system of 
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philosophy. It is precisely through technical-practical reason’s contribution that the place 
and relations within the whole called world can be established, a reading is further 
supported by Gerhard Lehmann claim in his Habilitationsschrift, according to which “die 
technisch-praktische Vernunft eben diesen Weltbezug des theoretischen Naturbezugs 
[bezeichnet].”588 As such, and most importantly, technical-practical reason ensures the 
world relation of theoretical reason and its cognitions, meaning that, without technical-
practical reason’s cosmo-technical contribution, theoretical cognition would be in danger 
of remaining unconcerned with the purpose and end of its cognitions, and thus their 
orientation, place and application within the world.  
 
As a consequence, however, it is my understanding that both understanding and intuition, 
meaning the categorical apparatus as well as the forms of intuition, and as such the entire 
sphere of theoretical philosophy, have been integrated into the technical-practical sphere. 
Differently, then, to the Critique of the Power of Judgment, where the ominous critique of 
technical power of judgment could have always been systematically added to the 
theoretical part of philosophy, the Opus Postumum now shows how any system of thought, 
including that of the theory of nature, is made possible by and sets off in the world.  
 
The preceding discussion of the role and contribution of technical-practical reason to self-
positing has indeed painted a remarkable picture. Firstly, self-positing was reformulated as 
reason’s self-constitution as a system of thought. This self-constitution begins by 
distinguishing itself, in an originary act of thought, into technical-practical and moral-
practical reason, that is, the world and God, which together make up the system of thought. 
Only this way can the transcendental place for any representation be a priori established, 
including that of myself, as at once an object of thought and an empirical object. It is 
specifically technical-practical reason that ‘makes’ the world as a cosmo-technical system, 
and thus the pure formal system of all possible objects that can ever be given to me, 
including that of myself. What remains to be shown, then, is how the second act of self-
positing, as at once technical-practical and moral-practical self-positing, takes off from the 




588 Lehmann, Kants Nachlasswerk und die Kritik der Urteilskraft, p.352. 
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CHAPTER 4.5 Technical-practical self-positing 
While it is true, as Lehmann points out, that Kant did not say nearly half as much about 
technical-practical reason as about moral-practical reason,589 the preceding section has 
shown that the entire discussion of the second act of self-positing in Fascicle VII must be 
understood as concerning the process by which the subject determines itself as a sensible 
object amongst other objects in the world, and thus as concerning technical-practical self-
positing.590 How, then, does technical-practical self-positing look like?  
 
In Fascicle I, Kant offers the following reformulation of the second act of self-positing: 
“Das denkende Subject schafft sich […] eine Welt als Gegenstand möglicher Erfahrung im 
Raum und der Zeit. […].”591 World, as the idea of technical-practical reason brought forth 
as the transition from the first to the second act of self-positing, must thus be subject to 
further determination, because the subject introduces, in a second step, time and space, and 
thus the forms of intuition, into the world prepared by technical-practical reason. What is 
remarkable in this next step is that Kant argues that the act of positing time and space is in 
fact the act whereby the subject posits itself: “Raum und Zeit in der Anschauung sind nicht 
Dinge sondern actus der Vorstellunfskraft sich selbst zu setzen, wodurch das Subject sich 
selbst zum Object macht.”592 A little further on he repeats that “das Object der reinen 
Anschauung vermittelst welcher das Subject sich selbst setzt ist unendlich nämlich Raum 
und Zeit.”593 Gerhard Lehman is thus right to point out that the determination of time and 
space as forms of self-positing is most certainly the most important development of the 
Transcendental Aesthetic within the Opus Postumum.594  
 
By characterizing time and space as forms of self-positing, the Opus Postumum can say 
more about the source of the forms of intuition than the Critique of Pure Reason had 
previously conceded. The Transcendental Aesthetics famously laid out sensibility and 
understanding as two heterogeneous stems of cognition with an unknown common root,595 
propelling many a post-Kantian philosopher to embark on the search for this common root. 
With the discussion of self-positing the Opus Postumum, Kant too now proposes that 
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understanding and sensibility are no longer different stems of cognition with an unknown 
root. Kant can now hold that the two faculties derive from one common and underlying 
activity, an activity of self-positing, of which they are forms. Both the forms of the 
understanding and the forms of intuition are here, then, presented as forms of self-
consciousness, and thus as complementary and necessary ways by which the subject posits 
itself.596  
 
What is ultimately at stake in positing myself by way of positing time and space is that, 
according to Kant’s transcendental restrictions to knowledge, the forms of intuition are our 
needed forms of object-receptivity, meaning that only by way of these forms can things be 
given to us in the form of appearances. The Critique of Pure Reason had defined 
appearances (Erscheinungen) as the “undetermined [objects] of an empirical intuition,”597 
which can be considered concerning both their form and matter. While the matter of 
appearance is said to “correspond to sensation,”598 meaning that it is subject to being 
empirically given, its form is said to be what “allows the manifold of appearance to be 
ordered in certain relations.”599 In order to be able to carry out this function of ordering, 
the form of appearance can then itself not be given in sensation. Instead, pure space and 
time, as the form of appearances, are said to “lie ready for the sensations a priori in the 
mind [Gemüt]”600 to be activated, so to speak, by sensation.  
 
With the Opus Postumum, the forms of intuition are still claimed to be the subject’s a 
priori forms of object-receptivity, and thus the only way in which the subject can be 
affected by objects. But differently to the Critique of Pure Reason, where the source of 
these a priori forms of intuition was left in enigmatic suspension, the Opus Postumum now 
decisively affirms that the a priori forms of intuition are subject to being made. They are, 
Kant writes, selbstgeschaffen (self-made).601 And the power that is said to “make” these 
forms is determined to be the power of imagination: “Raum und Zeit sind Producte (aber 
primitive Producte) unserer eigenen Einbildungskraft mithin selbstgeschaffene 
Anschauungen.”602 Kant will later repeat “die Vorstellung derselben [Raum und Zeit] ist 
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ein Act des Subjects selbst und ein Product der Einbildungskraft für den Sinn des 
Subjects,”603 which the later Fascicle VII also calls an “ursprüngliche Akt.”604 And it is in 
the making of these forms, that “[das Subject] sich selbst zum Object konstituiert und 
dieses sein eigener Gegenstand ist.”605 This means that technical-practical self-positing 
enlists the power of imagination, to “make” the pure forms of time and space as its forms 
of objectivity.  
 
What “making” these a priori forms means is that they are themselves subject to an a priori 
synthesis (Zusammensetzung). The Critique of Pure Reason had claimed that the synthesis 
of apprehension “must also be exercised a priori, i.e., in regard to representations that are 
not empirical.”606 And indeed, by saying that the a priori forms of time and space are 
posited and brought fourth (selbstgemacht) by the power of imagination, Kant says as 
much as that the pure forms of time and space are subject to synthesis. In calling this 
production an originary act, Kant decisively refers to the productive, rather than the 
reproductive, power of imagination, and thus pure synthesis. Pure synthesis apprehends 
and comprehends the pure manifold of space-time itself rather than any given empirical 
manifold, meaning that pure synthesis deals with our forms of affectability themselves.  
 
But in the Opus Postumum, rather than talking about apprehension and comprehension, 
Kant specifies the work of the productive power of imagination in the act of positing space 
and time in a wholly other manner. If one searches the Opus Postumum for the specific 
“mode of production” of the forms of intuition by the power of imagination, one finds a 
number of passages like the following:  
 
Der Verstand fängt nicht vom Object sondern von seinem eigenen Subject an die 
Sinnenvorstellung ihrer Form nach zu construieren d.i. synthetisch a priori das 
Mannigfaltige derselben in der Einheit desselben nach einem Prinzip darzustellen welches 
eine mathematische Operation desselben ist […] Die unbedingte Eineit des Mannigfaltigen 
in der Anschauung ist nicht dem Subject von einem anderen Gegenstande gegeben sondern 
durch dasselbe gedacht. Raum u. Zeit sind nicht als Verstandesbegriffe Anticipationen der 
Wahrnehmung sondern Formen der Gegenstände in der Erscheinung.607  
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As an a priori construction, time and space are thus explicitly said to not contain the 
anticipation of perception, which in the Critique of Pure Reason determined that the real of 
perception can be anticipated according to its degree of intensity alone.608 Kant’s assertion 
that the power of imagination synthetically constructs the pure forms of intuition is made 
not only in Fascicles X and XI, but also appears in the later Fascicle VII, where Kant 
writes that “das Formale dieser Anschauung ist Eines und Alles zusammengefaßt ist die 
Vorstellung von Raum und Zeit welche nicht analytisch aus Begriffen sondern synthetisch 
durch Construction der Begriffe eine Unendlichkeit (unbegrenzte Größe) vorstellt.”609 As 
forms of intuition, Kant writes, their representation “ist reine nicht empirische Anschauung 
welche nicht wie in der Logik vom allgemeinen zum besonderen analytisch sondern 
synthetisch vom All des Inbegriffs des Mannigfaltigen zum Einzelnen synthetisch sich 
selbst a priori constituirt und blos das Formale des Mannigfaltigen der Anschauung des 
Subjects in der Totalität d.i. das Unbedingte Ganze der Anschauung enthält.”610 This 
means that we construct the pure forms of intuition purposively into the unconditioned 
whole of intuition as an infinite magnitude.  
 
Furthermore, that which is properly said to carry out this act of construction by means of 
the power of imagination is technical-practical reason: “Es ist aber ausser der 
Sinnenvorstellung noch ein Erkenntnisvermögen welches nicht blos Receptivität sondern 
auch Spontaneität (als oberes Erkenntnisvermögen) enthält nämlich Verstand, Urtheilskraft 
und Vernunft und diese kann technisch// Anschauung construierende oder 
moralisch//practische Vernunft seyn beyde a priori.”611 This act of a priori construction is 
thus a spontaneous act of technical-practical reason, which enlists the power of 
imagination to construct itself into an object of intuition within the whole of all 
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appearances. Lehmann is thus right to argue that the entire formal realm of appearances is 
subsumed under the teleological, technical sphere, since it is, as I have shown, the product 
of technical-practical reason.612  
 
The problem of construction 
	
Kant’s determination of the pure forms of intuition as the technical-practical product of 
intuitive construction brings up a number of problems, some of which threaten to 
transgress the critical limits that Kant himself has set. As Chapter 2 showed the Critique of 
Pure Reason was organized around the founding methodological distinction between 
philosophy and mathematics. Mathematics was then said to be able to a priori construct its 
concepts in intuition, meaning that it could provide an a priori intuition to its concepts 
through mere a priori presentation (hypotyposis, Darstellung). Kant’s 1790 text On a 
discovery whereby any new critique of pure reason is to be made superfluous by an older 
one613 had defined construction as the “exhibition of a concept through the (spontaneous) 
production of a corresponding intuition.”614 This general sense of construction was then 
further distinguished into pure or schematic construction and empirical construction, which 
was also called technical. While pure construction was specified as occurring “through 
mere imagination in accordance with an a priori concept,” technical construction, which 
was further differentiated into geometrical and mechanical construction, was said to be 
“carried out on some kind of material.”615 In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant made 
allowances for mathematics to demonstrate its concepts through schematic construction, 
since mathematics only deals with concept of magnitude to begin with, which contains 
“just that which the definition would think through it.”616 As such, the concepts of 
mathematics can be constructed “in concreto and yet a priori.”617 This means that in 
mathematical construction the validity of a concept can be determinately cognized a priori 
through a priori intuition alone, and thus without taking recourse to empirical data. If the 
concept (of construction) were to have any relation to a possible content of intuition 
whatsoever, meaning if the concept “contain[ed] an existence and correspond[ed] to 
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sensation,”618 such a priori presentation would be illegitimate, since such content can be 
given only in empirical actuality and thus a posteriori.  
 
Consequently, in the Critique of Pure Reason the difference between mathematics and 
philosophy is that, distinct from mathematical concepts, philosophical concepts are subject 
to schematization rather than construction, both of which are types of hypotyposis 
(presentation). Importantly, through schematization the objective validity of concepts can 
also be given a priori, but only insofar as schematization offers “a general but sufficient 
characterization of the conditions under which objects in harmony with those concepts can 
be given.”619 Philosophical concepts gain their validity in relation to the conditions of 
possible experience, which extend beyond concepts of magnitude, and due to this Kant 
vehemently argued against the application of the geometrical-mathematical method in 
philosophy.620  
 
When it comes to the Opus Postumum, this important methodological distinction seems to 
have been definitively transgressed, as Kant designates the a priori construction of intuition 
as the technical-practical second act of self-positing. This also means that what was 
hitherto relegated to technical construction has been elevated into the transcendental, and 
thus the earlier distinction between schematic and technical construction has been 
invalidated. The second step of technical-practical self-positing begins with nothing less 
than the intuitive construction (a priori presentation) of the concept of the subject in 
intuition. Since these forms of intuition are however spontaneously constructed by the 
power of imagination, they can only present the infinite magnitude of intuition in concreto 
and a priori, without any relation to the reality of that which appears in space and time, 
meaning myself as an object of existence.  
 
At the same time, however, Kant must have deemed it possible to avoid his own critique of 
Fichte’s purely logical system of thought, which he denounced as incapable of ever 
relating to any real objects. This means that something more is needed. In Kant’s Final 
Synthesis, Eckhart Förster methodologically follows Kant’s self-description of self-
positing as a series,621 extending it to mean that self-positing in fact consists of what he 
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619 CPR A136/B175. 
620 See Chapter 1 for the discussion on the methodological difference between mathematics and philosophy 
621 OP 22:82. “The understanding begins with the consciousness of itself (apperception) and performs 
thereby a logical act. To this the manifold of outer and inner intuition attaches itself serially and the subject 
makes itself into an object in a limitless sequence.” 
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defines as five acts, rather than merely two.  Förster’s sequential interpretation, which 
demands much freedom of interpretation with regard to the Opus Postumum, proposes that 
a supposed third act of self-positing determines my own existence as a corporeal organic 
being in space and time by realizing space as an object of the senses.622 He thus argues that 
the third step proceeds by way of “the assumption of a universally distributed ether,” and 
thus the hypostatization of space.623 
 
Stephen Howard critiques Förster’s five-step interpretation by arguing, that self-positing is 
the mere subjective part of the transition project, which must be read in its essential 
relation to the objective pole formulated by what he identifies as the ether proofs. 624 
Critiquing Förster’s account, Howard argues that what is needed is a bridge between the 
objective and subjective poles, since without such a bridge neither of the pieces by 
themselves could make sense. Howard finds this bridge in Fascicles X and XI. I agree with 
Howard’s critique of Förster, in the sense that the intricate series of steps in Förster’s 
account treats self-positing in quasi-isolation and thus does not account for the dynamic 
nature of Kant’s thought and how it works through problems across the different Fascicles. 
However, differently to Howard, who reads Fascicle VII in relation to the earlier Fascicles 
X and XI and in particular Kant’s renewed engagement with physics, I have in the 
preceding discussion moved from Fascicle VII to the very last Fascicle I. While Howard 
identified the objective pole as ether, I have argued that Kant’s engagement with ether 
transitioned into world in Fascicle I with the end of the manuscript.625  
 
Similar to Howard, then, who argues for the necessity of a transition within the transition-
project that is the Opus Postumum as a whole, I have argued in the preceding pages that 
Kant himself subjected the two acts of self-positing to a transition. And it is this very 
transition which, I argue, ensures reason’s relation to the world and , furthermore, position 
in a world of objects. Differently to Förster, who’s five-step program sequentially makes 
its way from the most universal to the most concrete - the object of pure thought until 
finally the embodied subject in the sensible world - I have argued that one is to approach 
																																																								
622 Förster, Kant’s Final Synthesis, p.105. The consecutive fourth and fifth steps are considered by Förster to 
consist of inserting the concept of ether into the sensible, and, finally, performing bodily actions initiated by 
the subject within this sensible world of forces. See p.111-112. 
623 Förster, Kant’s Final Synthesis, p.105, 109.	
624 See Stephen Howard, 2019. “The transition within the transition: the Übergang from the 
Selbstsetzungslehre to the ether proofs in Kant’s Opus postumum.” Kant-Studien 110 (4), p.595-617 
625 I will also engage with Fascicle X and XI, but only to lay open the details of the following discussion on 
self-affection. The transition, according to my argument, is located in Kant’s discussion of the system of 
transcendental philosophy in Fascicle I. 
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self-positing from the middle, that is, reason and in specific technical-practical reason’s 
idea of world as part of the system of transcendental philosophy. How, then, is it possible 
for Kant to avoid his own critique of Fichte and move from mathematics to philosophy, 
and thus from the mere a priori construction of time and space as infinite magnitudes to the 
consciousness of myself as a being in the world by way of the middle, that is, the 
transition, and what role does technical-practical reason play here? 
 
Self-affection and appearances of appearances 
	
The Critique of Pure Reason had famously introduced the idea that, in the a priori 
synthesis of time and space, the subject comes to affect itself. This is due to the fact that 
the forms of intuition are themselves nothing but the subject’s forms of affectability (or 
object-receptivity). And while space is the way in which things can be given to me, time is 
thus the way in which I can be given to myself. As pure forms of intuition, time contains 
only the relations of succession, simultaneity and persistence in time, while space contains 
the relations of extension, motion and moving forces in space.626 “But for Kant, “through 
mere relations no thing in itself is cognized.”627 This means that the a priori form of space 
only concerns the place (Ort) of something, or its change of place, but cannot say anything 
concerning what is given and real (gegenwärtig) in that place. The same applies for the a 
priori form of time, which concerns only the temporal relations in which a representation 
can be set. Consequently, the pure form of time “dos not represent anything except insofar 
as something is posited in the mind [Gemüt].”628 However, it is through this very activity 
of positing the relations of time in the mind that “the mind [Gemüt] is affected by its own 
activity, […] it is affected through itself.”629 This means that the Critique of Pure Reason 
proposed that the subject comes to affect itself through the a priori synthesis of time and 
space, through which it can then, in a second step, know something more. And that 
something is myself, not how I am in itself, but only how I appear to myself.  
 
Similarly, in the Opus Postumum Kant writes that “our sensible intuition is, initially, not 
perception (empirical representation with consciousness), for a principle of positing 
oneself and of becoming conscious of this position precedes it; and the forms of this 
positing of the manifold, as thoroughly combined, are the pure intuitions, which are called 
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space and time.”630 In the act of construction of the pure forms of intuition the subject is 
thus said to become conscious of itself, in the position of time and space as forms of self-
positing: “das zusammensetzende Subject erscheint sich selbst in der Zusammensetzung 
nach Prinzipien a priori.”631 Thus, the subject is also here said to be at once the cause of 
affection and that which is affected, at once the active cause of construction of the forms of 
self-positing and at the same time that which appears to itself as the object of this 
construction. But, differently to Kant’s claim in the Critique of Pure Reason, where the 
subject was said to appear to itself just “like other phenomena,”632 the subject in the Opus 
Postumum no longer appears to itself just like any other phenomenon. In fact, the subject is 
now said to appear to itself unlike anything else. Introducing an inner distinction into 
appearances, the subject, Kant claims, now appears to itself as an appearance of an 
appearance.  
 
With the Opus Postumum, Kant’s thought on appearances (Erscheinungen) has thus 
undergone a fundamental change. Appearances have now become two-fold, in the sense of 
being internally differentiated, as there are appearances of a first and second order, which 
Kant also calls direct and indirect appearances, with the latter also called appearances of 
appearances (Erscheinungen von der Erscheinung). Appearances of the first order, or 
direct appearances, represent objects in relation to how the subject is affected by them, and 
thus as the way in which (undetermined) objects of empirical intuition are given to us. 
Appearances of the first order are claimed by Kant to be the objective, physiological mode 
of representation.633 The subject that appears to itself, however, is said to be an altogether 
different kind of appearance. It is the “Erscheinung des sich selbst affizierenden 
Subjects,”634 and thus the way that the subject appears to itself and becomes conscious of 
its own activity of self-positing.  
 
In many ways, the discussion of self-affection is the precursor to that of self-positing. Self-
affection and the grades of appearances are first discussed in Fascicles X and XI, written 
																																																								
630 OP 22:420. “Our sensible intuition is, initially, not perception (empirical representation with 
consciousness), for a principle of positing oneself and of becoming conscious of this position precedes it; and 
the form[s] of this positing of the manifold, as thoroughly combined, are the pure intuitions, which are called 
space and time (outer and inner intuition) [...].” 
631 OP 22:368. “[...] the composing subject appears to itself in the composition according to principles, and 
so, in a system of perceptions (as forces of matter affecting the senses), progresses a priori toward the 
possibility of physics.” For the relation between second order appearances and the possibility of physics see 
Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781-1801, p.203-204; Lehmann, Kants 
Nachlasswerk und die Kritik der Urteilskraft, p.366-367. 
632 CPR B155. 
633 OP 22:320. 
634 OP 22:367. “[...] that is, appearance of the self-affecting subject (hence indirect).” 
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between August 1799 and April 1800, and thus in the period immediately preceding Kant’s 
engagement with self-positing in Fascicle VII. As Frederick Beiser points out, the term 
Selbstsetzungslehre (doctrine of self-positing) is a scholarly anachronism, as Kant himself 
never used the term in the substantive grammatical form, while he did frequently refer to 
self-affection.635 Further, it is essentially out of his discussion on self-affection that the 
systematic discussion on self-positing (in Fascicle VII) and finally Transcendental 
philosophy (in Fascicle I) emerged. The discussion on self-affection has, similarly to self-
positing, been the focus of much scholarly debate.  
 
In the literature on self-affection, particular attention has been paid to the question of 
whether in his final work Kant confirmed at last there to be a double-affection at play, with 
the empirical object affecting the empirical subject, while the thing-in-itself acts on the 
transcendental subject. This point of view is famously held by Adickes, Kemp Smith and 
Vaihinger.636 Lehmann, on the other hand, reads self-affection in the Opus Postumum as a 
final testament to Kant’s abolition of the thing-in-itself, interpreting self-affection and 
affection as two sides of the same coin.637 My focus in the remainder of this section, 
however, is limited in scope, as I will not intervene in the systematic discussions on self-
affection in the Opus Postumum put forward by readers like Adickes, Lehmann, and 
Förster. Instead, I would like to focus the remainder of this chapter on the relation between 
appearances of appearances and technical-practical reason, that is how what first appeared 
under the name of second order appearances in Fascicles X and XI relate to technical-
practical reason and the original image (Urbild) of the world. I consider this to be possible, 
since my argument here is that, leaving the question of the source of the affection to the 
side, the resulting appearance of an appearance must in essence be understood as the 
appearance of a technical-practical subject in the world. 
 
The preceding discussion has shown how technical-practical reason engages in the act of 
constructing the forms of intuition by means of the power of imagination. In the a priori 
synthetic presentation of the concept of magnitude in intuition, the subject is said to affect 
itself, and through this affection be given to itself as an appearance of an appearance. 
Appearing to oneself as a second order appearance means that I appear to myself in the act 
of spontaneously constituting myself into an object by means of the construction of pure 
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intuition. While a first-order appearance is the “undetermined [object] of an empirical 
intuition,”638 and thus the representation of an object of sense ordered and placed in 
intuition but not yet thought according to the unity of the categories, the second-order 
appearance only concerns the formal relations of an objectsto the subject, rather than any 
given empirical intuition of an object, and thus includes the subject of appearances itself as 
part of that which appears. To appear as “part” of the world of appearance, however, 
already necessarily means that the subject is now located in and occupies a position within 
the world of appearances, albeit at this point only considered formally. And only because 
the subject is located in and occupies a position within the world of appearances can the 
subject then have appearances of the first order.639  
 
What thus steps appears, under the name of a second-order appearance, is the technical-
practical subject, which posits itself by positing the pure forms of time and space in order 
to be able to be given objects in a second step. This means, however, that the 
transcendental forms of intuition and understanding, and thus that which the subject 
contributes (posits, makes, brings forth) for the cognition of given empirical things, are 
now able to appear to the subject under the name of an appearance of an appearance.640 
Consequently, Kant writes that “Erscheinung von einer Erscheinung ist das wodurch das 
subjective objective gemacht wird.”641 
 
To have an appearance of an appearance is thus the reflective self-consciousness of the 
technical-practical subject in the process of positing itself, by means of positing space and 
time for the purpose of orienting itself within and cognizing the world. Thus while we 
cannot learn anything about any given thing by way of second order appearances, we do 
learn about our relation to any possibly given thing and our place in the world as a whole. 
Technical-practical self-positing thus determines the world as mundus,642 the world “im 
Raum und der Zeit […] zusamt dem Subject (der Mensch) welches selbst ein Theil der 
Welt ist.”643 And the human, that appears to itself as part of this spatio-temporally 
determined world is, importantly, the technical-practical subject.644  
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CHAPTER 4.5 Conclusion 
Thinking back to the beginning of this chapter, it becomes clear that technical-practical 
reason was subject to a radical transformation between its articulation in Kant’s moral 
philosophy and the Opus Postumum. Technical-practical reason initially referred to the 
technical-practical imperatives, and thus rules, of skill and counsels of prudence,645 
concerning purposive actions not explicitly legislated by the categorical imperative. While 
already insisting that, properly speaking, these modes of purposiveness are to be dealt with 
internally to theoretical philosophy, a position explicitly repeated in the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment,646 the relation between technical-practical reason and theoretical 
knowledge oscillated between one of mere application and one of the technical power of 
judgment in its relation to reason being a further condition of possibility for science. 
 
As I have argued, in the Opus Postumum this very relation was explicitly articulated and 
further developed by Kant. Technical-practical reason, as I have shown, is responsible for 
legislating one part of the cosmological universe of all things constituted by reason in its 
unity. Bifurcating into moral-practical reason on the one side and technical-practical 
reason on the other, reason, in this two-fold use, was shown to be productive of ideas that 
function as original images (Urbilder) and provide the transcendental place of the sensible 
and intelligible worlds. Technical-practical reason was then specifically shown to bring 
forth the idea of world, which provides the stage and ground of the whole of all objects of 
sensible representation that can be given to us, while moral-practical reason brings forth 
the idea of God, which concerns the concepts of freedom, duty and right.  
 
Consequently, and similarly to transcendental reflection, which searched for the belonging 
of any given representation to either pure reason or sensible intuition by means of the 
concepts of reflection, reason here introduces a fundamental distinction between God and 
the world. After the bifurcation of reason into the two wholes of God and the world, self-
positing is subject to a two-fold treatment by, on the one hand, moral practical reason, and, 
on the other, technical-practical reason, with technical-practical reason concerning the self-
constitution of the human within the world. Since there has hitherto been no literature on 
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technical-practical self-positing, I have in the following focused exclusively on technical-
practiacl self-positing.  
 
The remainder of the chapter showed how the positing of time and space, as at once forms 
of self-positing and forms of appearance, effected a self-affection and thus objectification 
of the transcendental conditions of experience, under the name of a second order 
appearance. Under the name of an appearance of appearance, the technical-practical 
subject was said to appear to itself as a technical-practical subject, and thus as situated in 
the world and engaged in the technical-practical construction of the formal relations that 
allow it to orient itself in the world and to cognize the world in its particular objects. 
Appearances of an appearance thus designate a specifically technical-practical self-
consciousness, as it concerns the way in which the technical-practical subject appears to 
itself in the construction of the forms of appearance for the purpose of “having” 
appearances. 
 
In a remarkable way, then, Kant has indeed granted technical-practical reason a 
fundamental place within the system of transcendental philosophy in his very last 
manuscript, the Opus Postumum. Self-making, self-positing, and self-determination are 
acts that take place in both the practical domain and the theoretical domain, at once the 
responsibility of both moral-practical and technical-practical reason. In effect, the very 
process of self-positing is what unifies reason in its two uses, together making up the 
system of ideas called transcendental philosophy. Thus, both technical-practical and moral-
practical reason are explicitly characterized as autonomous, with theoretical and technical-
practical reason being no longer restricted to mere self-legislation. “Transc. Philos. ist die 
Autonomie der Ideen,”648 “das Selbstgeschöpf (autonomie).”649 The concept of autonomy 
is thus effectively no longer restricted to giving the law to oneself. Rather, reason, in both 
its technical-practical and moral-practical uses, is said to engage in the autonomous 
bringing forth of ideas and the further acts of self-making within the ideas of world and 
God.  
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The beginning of this project was marked by Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler’s forceful 
claim that since its very beginnings in ancient Greece, philosophy, in its canonical form, 
had constituted itself by way of distorting, repressing, and ultimately forgetting technics, 
referring to both the domains of skills, tools, instruments and machines, and to technology, 
the scientific meta-discourse on technics. Built on the exclusion of technics, philosophy 
was thus diagnosed as being structurally incapable of seeing, understanding, or thinking it. 
At the same time, technics was not only characterized as philosophy’s ultimate obstacle. It 
was also said to pose philosophy’s ultimate possibility: for Heidegger, Simondon, and 
Stiegler, if philosophy is to play a role in what has without doubt become a technological 
world, then it must reconstitute itself anew, only this time in its essential relation to 
technics. Technics thus concerns nothing less than the future of philosophy as a whole.  
 
At the center of philosophy’s technical exclusion, oblivion, and repression, Heidegger, 
Simondon, and Stiegler, positioned Kant as modern philosophy’s most prominent techno-
problematic representative. Kant’s role, as I have argued, was paradoxical. On the one 
hand, for Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler the philosophical task of thinking technics 
essentially meant overcoming the transcendental limits to knowledge so forcefully 
articulated by Kant, since transcendental philosophy was diagnosed as philosophy’s limit 
of thinking technics. On the other hand, I have shown that Heidegger, Simondon, and 
Stiegler’s own technical thought relied each in its own way on a problematic reading of 
Kant, according to which Kant implicitly articulated fundamental aspects of the modern 
concepts of technics, without, however, self-reflexively understanding the nature of his 
own insight.   
 
Contra Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler, the explicit aim of my project has been to lay 
out how technics formed an explicit object of inquiry for Kant from as early as his critical 
philosophy until his very last, unfinished manuscript, the Opus Postumum. I have shown 
that already in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant’s notion of theoretical philosophy was 
quite literally of technics, in the sense that it was at once constituted in opposition to, as 
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well as made possible, pinned down, and propped up at decisive moments by technics in 
different forms and appearances. The Critique of Pure Reason was shown to be 
fundamentally constituted against instrumental reason, while at the same time secured by 
the hidden art of schematization and the disciplining of reason’s talent of exteriorization, 
namely, its technics. The Critique of the Power of Judgment developed this positive notion 
of technics first encountered in the Critique of Pure Reason further under the name of a 
technics of nature and a technical power of judgment, until the Opus Postumum finally 
articulated the full extent of the relation between technical-practical and theoretical reason.  
 
This means, firstly, that the designated systematic place of technical-practical reason is no 
longer within empirical philosophy, as technical-practical reason is now discussed 
alongside theoretical reason and moral-practical reason as a pure faculty, meaning that, 
according to the Opus Postumum, there is such a thing as a pure, transcendental use of 
technical-practical reason. Secondly, however, this pure technical-practical reason has 
further consequences for reason as a whole. The Critique of Pure Reason had famously 
restricted theoretical reason to merely negative use. The Opus Postumum retained this 
legislative role in the sense that reason employs ideas for the sake of self-legislation. These 
ideas are at the same time, however, shown to be reason’s very own products, as the idea 
of world is made by technical-practical reason, and the idea of God by moral-practical 
reason. And as if that was not enough, technical-practical reason’s productivity further 
provides an answer to the enigma of time and space, since these intuitive forms are 
constructed by nothing else than technical-practical reason. Technical-practical reason is 
thus not only claimed to make the original image (Urbild) of the world, but also time and 
space for the sake of being able to receive, in the sense of being given, empirical objects of 
the sensible world.  
 
I have argued, then, that according to the Opus Postumum the subject of cognition is 
essentially technical-practical, as it “creates the elements of knowledge of the world 
himself, a priori, from which he, as, at the same time, an inhabitant of the world, constructs 
a world-vision [Weltbeschauung] in the idea.”650 The technical-practical subject was thus 
shown to first make, posit, and synthesize an archetype of this world “in his own self.”651 







Kant calls the technical-practical subject cosmotheoros, a rare Greek neologism, that Kant 
most likely adopted from Christian Huygens’s 1698 book of the same title. The technical-
practical subject as cosmotheoros thus a priori makes the elements for the theoretical 
cognition of the world in his own self.  
 
Consequently, while the Critique of Pure Reason had famously held the position that 
philosophy “is the science of the relation of all cognition to the essential ends of human 
reason (teleologia rationis humane), and the philosopher is not an artist of reason but the 
legislator of human reason,”652 the cosmotheoros of the Opus Postumum is very much an 
“artist of reason”, meaning that the cosmotheoros could also carry the name of 
cosmotechnikos, an artist or technician of the world. Differently to the total injunction 
against theoretical reason’s talent of building imposed in the Critique of Pure Reason, I 
have shown how the Opus Postumum critically delineated the conditions of possibility 
under which technical-practical reason can both produce its own elements of knowledge 
and methodologically employ them. Having decisively elevated technical-practical reason 
from a problem of empirical philosophy without a need for a critique, to a transcendental 
place, the Opus Postumum thus indeed, as first proposed by Gerhard Lehmann, contains 
the outline to what would have been Kant’s third critique of reason, that is, a critique of 
technical-practical reason.653 As such, it is my contention that Kant’s critical restriction of 
instrumental reason at the outset of the Critique of Pure Reason, together with his slow, 
continued development of a critique of technical-practical reason in its own right, puts 
forth a decisive image of Kant as a thinker of technics.  
 
While, on the one hand, this image of Kant as a thinker of technics challenges Kantian and 
post-Kantian philosophy in its omission of the meaning and role of technics in Kant’s 
Transcendental Philosophy tout court, it also troubles the account of Kant put forward in 
the field of philosophy of technics, exemplified by the discussions of Heidegger, 
Simondon, and Stiegler. As the preceding discussion has shown, Heidegger, Simondon, 
and Stiegler essentially read the history of philosophy as the history of philosophy’s 
technical oblivion. And, in one way or another Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler have 
argued that, despite finding the seeds to their own technics-thinking in their engagement 
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with and reading of Kant, ultimately, transcendental philosophy is philosophy’s obstacle to 
thinking technics. 
 
 In opposition to Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler, I have shown that Kant explicitly 
read all philosophy prior to the Critique of Pure Reason as the history of instrumental 
reason, while he at the same time delineated the conditions of possibility for technical-
practical reason, putting forward a transcendental concept of technics. Against Heidegger, 
Simondon, and Stiegler who diagnosed technics as Kant’s systematic omission and thus as 
the one thing that Kant was structurally incapable of seeing, I have shown that the Opus 
Postumum explicitly carves out a space for technics in its transcendental form in the realm 
of appearance. Thus, what was critiqued by Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler as Kant’s 
symptomatic omission is here explicitly investigated and laid open under the name of 
appearances of appearance. How so?  
 
First introduced as providing the transition (Übergang) between metaphysics and physics 
in the Opus Postumum, the idea of world, Chapter 4 has argued, is heir to what Kant 
hitherto called ether. Similarly to ether, the idea of world is needed to provide the medium 
in which and through which a particular object of experience can be given and placed. 
Determining the original image of world further by means of positing time and space, the 
technical-practical subject then appears to itself in the act of self-positing in self-affection. 
Thus, what for Simondon is called technical operation, which takes place between the a 
priori and a posteriori, is here called technical-practical position. And while for Simondon, 
transcendental philosophy is incapable of accounting for technical operation, and while 
according to Heidegger Kant only symptomatically and thus implicitly laid open the 
technical nature of the transcendental, it is precisely this very center, that is the explicit 
catalyst of Kant’s reformulation of the doctrine of appearances into a first and second 
order. While impossible within the first order of appearances, the conditions under which 
things can be given to us as things - the product of technical-practical self-positing - can 
now appear to us precisely under the name of second order appearances.  
 
My reading of the Opus Postumum thus also challenged the narrow account of technics put 
forward by Heidegger, Simondon, and Stiegler, which essentially consists of a pre-
industrial and thus artisanal techne, and an industrial, modern instantiation. As I have 
shown, Kant engaged two parallel genealogies of technics, at once the medieval scholastic 
notion of Technologie and the Aristotelian notion of techne. That he further shortened the 
term Technologie into the modernized German term Technik further shows that Kant was 
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aware of Beckmann’s invention of the modern science of Technologie as Kant aimed to 
distance his (transcendental) discourse on technics from the applied science of technology. 
Kant’s account of technical-practical reason problematizes and challenges the narrow, 
historically simple and universal notions of technics put forth by Heidegger, Simondon, 
and Stiegler as it falls outside  the simple two-fold schema. Since essentially, what is at 
stake in the question on the relation between Kant and technics is also the much larger, 
encompassing question about the relation between philosophy and technics, I have shown 
that there do exist philosophical resources for thinking technics prior to Heidegger, 
Simondon, and Stiegler’s interventions, despite their paradoxical inability to recognize 
them. 
  
Finally, then, Kant’s reformulation and critique of technical-practical reason in the Opus 
Postumum shows most clearly that he discussed technics as essentially part and parcel of a 
larger cosmological problematic. In surprising fashion, Kant’s technics thinking must 
essentially be understood as the hitherto eclipsed quasi-predecessor of contemporary 
cosmo-technical debates that has since emerged out of Simondonian thought and is the 
subject of work from Isabell Stengers, through Bruno Latour, and onto Yuk Hui. Yuk Hui 
has argued in The Question Concerning Technology In China that at the root of the 
majority of twentieth century discourses on technics lies an anthropologically universal 
concept of technics, which means that technics is read as a universal principle that 
transcends geographical and historical specificities.654 His notion of cosmo-technics aims 
to critique the widespread hypothesis according to which technology is an anthropological 
universal. Instead, he aims to show how supposedly independent concepts like techne, 
physis, or metaphysica in fact receive their meaning and are translated in relation to their 
position within a larger cosmological system.655 Consequently, he argues that technology 
must not be understood as an anthropological universal, as it rather gains its definition and 
meaning in relation to a cosmo-technically specific past and present.  
 
Kant’s essential and fundamental contribution to cosmology in the Critique of Pure 
Reason was to reconfigure the world as given into the world as a task for reason and thus 
as aufgegeben. I have shown that in the Opus Postumum, the faculty at once charged with 
this task and  charging itself with the task is technical-practical reason. What is specific 






conceptualizes how any system with its inherent characteristics of universality and 
necessity only becomes possible within the world built by technical-practical reason. For 
Kant, then, science, technology, or any other system of necessity always already sets off in 
a world built by technical-practical reason. According to Kant the world of science is thus 
a technical-practical projection, in as much as the world of technics in the empirical sense 
is equally situated in a larger cosmo-technical projection, which is the first and most 
important responsibility of technical-practical reason.  
 
Furthermore, however, the world built by technical-practical reason is also the (only) 
world in which the human can appear to itself, as a technical-practical subject, and thus as 
at once free and restrained by its relation to the world. As such, for Kant, there can indeed 
be no access to the world outside or before technical-practical reason, since the world is 
not a problem of aesthetics nor of any other pre- or post-rational modes of knowledge and 
engagement. Instead, the problem of the world is the fundamental task given to itself by 
technical-practical reason, as cosmology in the Opus Postumum has essentially become a 
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